A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in The State of Bombay v. Salat Pragji Karamsi, 1957 SCR 745 resolved a key constitutional and statutory interpretation issue regarding the applicability and enforcement of pre-Constitution legislation in newly integrated Indian territories. The case involved the application of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 (hereinafter “Bombay Act”) to the erstwhile princely state of Kutch, following its accession to the Indian Union. The question was whether a notification issued by the Chief Commissioner of Kutch bringing the Bombay Act into force was valid and enforceable under the Constitution. The Court clarified that even post-Constitution, the powers vested in pre-existing authorities could continue under the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, especially due to Article 239. The decision reaffirmed the principle that statutory modifications through legal fiction or adaptation orders continue to apply unless expressly repealed. The Court rejected the argument that the President alone had authority under Article 239, upholding the continuity and validity of delegated powers to the Chief Commissioner for enforcing laws. The judgment reinstated the trial court’s conviction of the respondent under Section 12(a) of the Bombay Act and highlighted the critical function of legislative adaptation in the post-merger governance of Indian territories.

Keywords: Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, Adaptation of Laws, Article 239, Chief Commissioner, Kutch, Constitutional Law, Post-Merger Legal Application, Criminal Law

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
The State of Bombay v. Salat Pragji Karamsi

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 33 of 1955

iii) Judgement Date
March 7, 1957

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Bhagwati J., Jagannadhadas J., Jaffer Imam J., Govinda Menon J., J.L. Kapur J.

vi) Author
Justice J.L. Kapur

vii) Citation
AIR 1957 SC 354; 1957 SCR 745

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 12(a), Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887

• Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949

• Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950

• Article 239, Constitution of India

• States Merger (Chief Commissioner’s Provinces) Order, 1949

• Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949

• General Clauses Act, 1897

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case
None specifically overruled; Agaria Osman Marakhya v. Kutch State was cited with partial approval.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Administrative Law, Statutory Interpretation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case stems from the post-independence integration of princely states and their legal systems into the Indian Union. After Kutch acceded to India in 1948, the Government applied several central and provincial laws to it via the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949. One of these was the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887. The Chief Commissioner issued a notification under Section 1 of the Act, making it enforceable across Kutch. However, the Judicial Commissioner of Kutch acquitted the accused on grounds that the Act was not legally enforceable due to procedural and constitutional issues. The Supreme Court thus had to determine the legality of this application, and whether the Chief Commissioner could validly issue such a notification under constitutional and adapted statutory provisions.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent, Salat Pragji Karamsi, was convicted under Section 12(a) of the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, as applied to Kutch. On June 7, 1951, he was allegedly found guilty of gambling and was sentenced to a fine of ₹50 or 15 days simple imprisonment in default, and for forfeiture of money seized during the offence. He initially failed in his revision before the Sessions Judge but succeeded before the Judicial Commissioner of Kutch, who ruled that the Act was not in force in Kutch due to lack of valid extension and held that the Chief Commissioner lacked authority to issue the enforcement notification. The State appealed to the Supreme Court challenging this acquittal, not to secure a conviction per se, but to settle the important legal questions.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887, had been validly extended to the State of Kutch under the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949.

ii) Whether the notification dated November 28, 1950, issued by the Chief Commissioner of Kutch, was valid and empowered under the Constitution and statutory framework.

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Petitioner/Appellant submitted that

The Bombay Act was legally extended to the State of Kutch through the Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949, made under Section 4 of the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947. Clause 3 of the Order applied several Acts to Kutch, including the Bombay Act. They emphasized Clause 4, which stated that references to “Government” or “Province” in such laws shall be read as “Chief Commissioner of Kutch” or “Kutch” respectively. They further argued that Section 1 of the Bombay Act was modified to grant the Chief Commissioner power to extend its application to local areas through notification. Hence, the notification issued on 28th November 1950 validly brought the Act into force throughout Kutch. The petitioner contended that such power continued post-Constitution under Article 239 and Clauses 15 and 16 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, which preserved the powers vested in pre-Constitution authorities unless expressly repealed or amended.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Respondent submitted that

The respondent’s counsel argued that the Bombay Act could not be considered as having been brought into force in Kutch merely by the Application Order. They challenged the validity of the notification dated 28 November 1950, asserting that post-Constitution, only the President could issue such a notification under Article 239, and not the Chief Commissioner independently. They stressed that after January 26, 1950, when the Constitution came into force, any powers under pre-existing legislation must conform to the Constitution and could not override constitutional allocation of power, especially for Part C states like Kutch. They maintained that the adaptation clauses could not supersede constitutional intent or structure.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 1, Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887 – Allows extension of the Act’s provisions by appropriate authority via official notification.
ii) Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949 – Applied Bombay laws to Kutch and provided for interpretative substitutions.
iii) States Merger (Chief Commissioner’s Provinces) Order, 1949 – Declared Kutch as Chief Commissioner’s Province.
iv) Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949 – Made Central laws applicable to merged territories like Kutch.
v) Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 – Preserved continuity of laws and powers of authorities post-Constitution.
vi) Article 239, Constitution of India – Governs administration of Union Territories and Part C states via President.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that the Bombay Act was not automatically in force throughout Kutch by virtue of the Application Order alone. It required an explicit notification under its Section 1, and such a notification was indeed issued validly by the Chief Commissioner. The Court ruled that the interpretative substitutions under Clause 4 of the 1949 Order meant that the Chief Commissioner legally substituted the term “Provincial Government” and thus had authority under the Act. Furthermore, under Clause 15 of the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950, existing powers continued unless expressly repealed. Therefore, Article 239 did not invalidate the Chief Commissioner’s notification powers.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court remarked that statutory interpretation must give full effect to the adaptation mechanisms provided under transitional laws. It clarified that interpretative clauses like “shall be construed as” create a legal fiction which must be treated as actual substitution, not merely suggestive.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Legal fiction in adaptation orders must be treated as actual substitution.

• Post-Constitution, powers vested in pre-existing authorities survive unless explicitly removed.

• Notifications under state-applied laws must conform to procedural and adaptation guidelines.

• Article 239 does not nullify statutory powers granted under pre-existing laws.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment is a landmark precedent in delineating the application of pre-Constitution laws to merged states and Union territories. It affirms that legal adaptations and fictional substitutions under central orders are binding and enforceable unless explicitly repealed. The ruling upholds constitutional continuity and smooth transition of law enforcement mechanisms in newly integrated regions. It also clarifies that administrative structures under Article 239 do not override lawful statutory functions delegated to local authorities. The case strengthens the jurisprudence around adaptation orders and validates the decentralized implementation of laws during transitional phases of Indian federalism.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

[1] Agaria Osman Marakhya v. The Kutch State, AIR 1951 Kutch 9
[2] Regina v. Chester Corporation, (1855) 25 LJ QB 61
[3] Jagan Nath v. The State of Punjab, AIR 1952 SC 31 (referred on writ of mandamus principles)

b. Important Statutes Referred

[4] Bombay Prevention of Gambling Act, 1887
[5] Kutch (Application of Laws) Order, 1949
[6] Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950
[7] Merged States (Laws) Act, 1949
[8] General Clauses Act, 1897
[9] Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947
[10] States Merger (Chief Commissioner’s Provinces) Order, 1949
[11] Constitution of India, Article 239