A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Supreme Court in The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, 1952 SCR 28 clarified the scope of Article 226 of the Indian Constitution, particularly focusing on the limits of the High Court’s jurisdiction in granting interim relief. The respondents sought relief under Article 226, after the State of Orissa cancelled temporary mining permits and ordered removal of equipment. They contended the cancellation would result in irreparable loss, given the bar to instituting a suit immediately due to Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, which mandates a 60-day notice before suing the government.
The Orissa High Court granted interim protection through a limited order restraining the State from disturbing possession. However, it explicitly refrained from adjudicating any legal rights. The Supreme Court overruled this, stating that no writ or interim relief can be granted under Article 226 unless the existence of a legal right is judicially determined. The judgment emphasized that interim relief is permissible only as an ancillary to a principal relief, not as an end in itself. This decision established a constitutional principle limiting misuse of Article 226 for provisional remedies without substantive adjudication.
This case, thus, became a cornerstone in constitutional jurisprudence, limiting arbitrary interim reliefs under writ jurisdiction and reinforcing procedural propriety in administrative law.
Keywords: Article 226, Interim Relief, Writ Jurisdiction, Legal Right, Civil Procedure Code, Mandamus, Orissa, Mining Lease, Estoppel, State Action.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title: The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta
ii) Case Number: Civil Appeals Nos. 300 to 304 of 1951
iii) Judgement Date: 25th October 1951
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: Harilal Kania, C.J., Patanjali Sastri, Mukherjea, Das, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ.
vi) Author: Harilal Kania, Chief Justice of India
vii) Citation: [1952] SCR 28
viii) Legal Provisions Involved:
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Article 226 of the Constitution of India
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Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908
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Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947
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Notification No. 172/IB dated 23rd March 1948
ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None.
x) Case is Related to: Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Civil Procedure, Public Law, Mining Lease Disputes
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The background of the judgment is rooted in the post-independence integration of princely states, particularly Keonjhar, which merged with the Dominion of India via a merger agreement effective from 1st January 1948. Before this merger, the ruler of Keonjhar granted unregistered mining leases between 1941 and 1947. On 27th December 1947, a few days after signing the merger agreement, he executed registered leases in favor of individuals including Madan Gopal Rungta.
Subsequently, invoking powers under the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947, and a notification from the Government of India, the State of Orissa declared the leases void on 8th June 1949, asserting that these transactions were neither bona fide nor reasonable. In the interim, the State allowed temporary permits to continue operations. Later, on 3rd July 1951, it revoked these permits and asked lessees to vacate the mines.
Affected parties filed petitions under Article 226 in the Orissa High Court seeking a writ of mandamus and direction to restrain the government from enforcing cancellation notices. The High Court issued a protective order granting interim relief, but expressly refused to adjudicate legal rights. The State appealed to the Supreme Court questioning this interim-centric judicial intervention.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
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Between 1941 and 1947, respondents agreed to mining leases with the Ruler of Keonjhar and took possession.
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These leases, though acted upon, were not registered until 27th December 1947.
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The Merger Agreement was signed by the ruler on 14th December 1947; Keonjhar was integrated into India by 1st January 1948.
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Orissa Government, under authority from the Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, declared the registered leases void by a Notification on 8th June 1949.
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In November 1949, temporary mining permits were granted to the lessees.
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On 3rd July 1951, the State cancelled these temporary permits, ordered lessees to vacate, and remove machinery within 15 days.
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Respondents approached the Orissa High Court under Article 226, seeking writs to prevent the cancellation from taking effect, arguing it would lead to irreparable loss.
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High Court granted interim protection until expiry of Section 80 CPC notice period or three months, whichever earlier.
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Supreme Court was approached by the State challenging this interim-only relief.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether interim relief under Article 226 can be granted in absence of adjudication on legal rights?
ii) Whether High Court can use Article 226 merely to prevent hardship due to procedural delay under Section 80 CPC?
iii) Whether writ of mandamus can be granted when alternative remedies like civil suits are available but pending statutory limitation?
F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:
The Orissa Government, represented by Attorney General M. C. Setalvad, argued that no judicial determination of legal rights took place in the High Court. Therefore, there was no basis for granting interim relief under Article 226. The High Court, by refusing to adjudicate and merely aiming to protect the respondents from hardship due to Section 80 CPC, misused constitutional writ jurisdiction. They emphasized that Article 226 requires a determination of right before invoking any relief. Without recognizing a right, no interim orders could stand independently.
Further, it was urged that granting an interim relief without any finding on legal validity or rights circumvents Section 80 of CPC, which imposes a mandatory notice period. Thus, using Article 226 to delay consequences of statutory procedure created a dangerous precedent, undermining judicial discipline and legislative intent.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:
Advocates N. C. Chatterjee and Roshan Lal for respondents argued that the State’s sudden revocation of permits violated natural justice and disrupted settled possession. They asserted that the respondents had invested heavily, installed equipment, and undertaken mine development. The State’s arbitrary action caused irreparable loss, which could not be compensated by money. Since the law barred suit initiation for 60 days due to Section 80 CPC, they had no immediate remedy.
Therefore, the High Court rightly used Article 226 to protect possession temporarily. They maintained that the High Court did not grant final relief but ensured justice was not defeated due to procedural constraints. They also cited urgency, balance of convenience, and the principle of ubi jus ibi remedium (where there is a right, there is a remedy).
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Article 226 of the Constitution of India:
This provision empowers High Courts to issue directions, orders, or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto, and certiorari, not only for enforcement of fundamental rights but also “for any other purpose.” However, the Court in this case underscored that the existence of a legal right is a precondition for invoking jurisdiction under Article 226[1].
ii) Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908:
Section 80 mandates that no suit shall be instituted against the Government or a public officer until after a two-month prior notice, stating the cause of action and relief sought. This section acts as a barrier to immediate judicial recourse, which formed the basis of the respondent’s argument for interim relief.
iii) Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947:
The Act empowered the Central Government to exercise jurisdiction over former princely states through delegated authority. Using this power, the State of Orissa issued Notification No. 172/IB dated 23rd March 1948, which later formed the statutory backing for the cancellation of the leases as being not bona fide.
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Supreme Court held that Article 226 cannot be invoked solely for granting interim relief without a determination of a party’s legal rights. Relief under this Article can be granted only if it is ancillary to the main relief sought.
The Court clarified that the foundation for invoking jurisdiction under Article 226 is the existence of a right, and not merely the possibility of irreparable harm or procedural delay under Section 80 CPC[2]. Since the High Court explicitly declined to decide any of the rights in question, it had no authority to issue directions granting interim protection as a final relief.
The Court stated:
“An interim relief can be granted only in aid of and as ancillary to the main relief which may be available to the party on final determination of his rights…”[3]
It emphasized that the High Court’s directions were not temporary orders pending final determination, but rather final orders, as the writ petitions were disposed of entirely without reserving the main issue for future decision.
Hence, the Court held the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction, and the orders were ultra vires Article 226.
b. OBITER DICTA
i) The Supreme Court in its observations distinguished between interim orders passed during pending writ petitions and orders that dispose of writ petitions entirely on an interim basis. The former may be permissible to preserve the status quo but the latter, as in this case, amounts to granting final relief without determining the rights, which violates procedural and constitutional norms[4].
The Court also warned against using writ jurisdiction to bypass procedural safeguards like Section 80 CPC, cautioning that this could open the floodgates for similar misuse in future litigation.
c. GUIDELINES
The judgment laid down the following binding principles:
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No interim relief under Article 226 can be granted unless the Court adjudicates upon the legal rights of the parties.
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Relief under Article 226 must not be used to sidestep statutory procedural bars, such as those under Section 80 CPC.
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An interim relief can be issued only in aid of main relief, not as a standalone order.
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Where the High Court expressly declines to decide any rights, it cannot issue directions that affect legal positions or property interests.
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Interim orders must preserve status quo ante and not prejudice the rights of either party in potential civil litigation.
These guidelines remain a critical precedent in writ jurisprudence and are frequently cited in matters involving interim protection under Article 226.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
This case acts as a constitutional compass directing how High Courts must navigate the powers under Article 226. It affirms that judicial restraint and procedural propriety must go hand in hand, especially when fundamental constitutional principles are at stake. The Supreme Court sternly restricted the scope of interim relief in writ jurisdiction and placed substantive limits on High Courts’ discretionary powers, ensuring that no final orders could flow without a corresponding adjudication on rights.
By doing so, the Court upheld the sanctity of civil procedure, prevented misuse of the writ remedy, and protected the structural integrity of the judicial process. The judgment also serves as a critical doctrinal milestone in ensuring that constitutional remedies are not converted into equitable tools to override statutory mandates like Section 80 CPC.
Courts today continue to rely on The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta to decline writ petitions which seek to obtain provisional relief without laying any enforceable right, reaffirming the dictum that procedure is as vital as substance in rule-of-law regimes.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i) The State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Rungta, [1952] SCR 28
ii) T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa, AIR 1954 SC 440 – For scope of Article 226
iii) Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, AIR 1950 SC 163 – Early writ jurisprudence under Article 226
b. Important Statutes Referred
i) Article 226 of the Constitution of India
ii) Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908
iii) Extra Provincial Jurisdiction Act, 1947
iv) Notification No. 172/IB dated 23rd March 1948
