THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH vs. MOHAMMAD NOOH

Case Analysis

THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH vs. MOHAMMAD NOOH

May 10, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This landmark case of The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh (1958 SCR 595) stands as a pivotal pronouncement in Indian administrative jurisprudence and the doctrine of natural justice. The case revolved around the improper conduct of a departmental enquiry where the presiding officer, a District Superintendent of Police (DSP), acted as both judge and witness. The case profoundly explored whether such an enquiry violates natural justice, and whether judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution could be invoked despite the existence of alternative remedies such as appeal and revision. The Supreme Court, in a majority opinion authored by Chief Justice S.R. Das, held that the departmental proceeding was void due to violation of fundamental fairness and that the presiding officer disqualified himself by testifying in the same matter. However, it limited the retrospective application of Article 226, ruling that the High Court lacked power to quash a dismissal order passed before the Constitution came into force. This decision laid down important principles on the non-exclusivity of alternative remedies in the context of writ of certiorari, and the supremacy of natural justice even within internal administrative mechanisms. The dissenting opinion by Justice Vivian Bose defended a broader interpretation of constitutional remedies, emphasizing justice and fairness over procedural rigidity.

Keywords: Natural Justice, Article 226, Certiorari, Departmental Enquiry, Bias, Administrative Law, Judicial Review, Retrospective Effect, Writ Jurisdiction, Constitutional Remedies

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Mohammad Nooh

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 130 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date: 30 September 1957

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das (C.J.), Venkatarama Ayyar, Jafer Imam, A.K. Sarkar, and Vivian Bose, JJ.

vi) Author: Majority opinion by S.R. Das, C.J.; Dissent by Vivian Bose, J.

vii) Citation: AIR 1958 SC 86; 1958 SCR 595

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

Article 226, Constitution of India
Section 7, Police Act, 1861
Regulations 508 & 512, Uttar Pradesh Police Regulations
Section 243, Government of India Act, 1935

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any): None explicitly overruled

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Criminal Law (Departmental Enquiry)

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The genesis of this litigation lies in an internal police departmental trial, during British India, against Mohammad Nooh, a head constable in Uttar Pradesh. Following a suspected act of forgery involving a selection letter for training at the Police Training College, Moradabad, the respondent was placed under suspension and subjected to disciplinary proceedings. The District Superintendent of Police (DSP), who was the enquiry officer, later provided his own testimony as a prosecution witness. Despite this role change, he continued as the presiding officer and eventually passed an order of dismissal against the respondent on 20 April 1948. This order was upheld in departmental appeal and revision prior to 26 January 1950—the date the Indian Constitution came into force. Nooh approached the Allahabad High Court in 1951 under Article 226, seeking a writ to quash his dismissal. The High Court ruled in his favour, asserting a breach of natural justice. The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged this decision before the Supreme Court.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The respondent, Mohammad Nooh, while serving as a head constable in the police force, was considered for training at the Police Training College in Moradabad. Despite failing the Hindi language test and not being selected, a forged letter dated 8 December 1947 appeared at the Police Headquarters, falsely declaring his selection. The letter allegedly originated from Lucknow and was suspected to be orchestrated by Nooh. An internal enquiry initiated under Section 7 of the Police Act, 1861, led to a departmental “trial” by DSP B.N. Bhalla.

During this trial, a crucial prosecution witness, Mohammad Khalil, retracted his earlier statements implicating Nooh. To counter this, DSP Bhalla deposed against Khalil, recording his statements on two occasions—before and after framing charges—while still acting as presiding officer. Relying partly on his own deposition, he dismissed Nooh. The appeal and revision within the departmental hierarchy failed. Thereafter, Nooh filed a writ petition under Article 226 before the Allahabad High Court post-Constitution, which set aside the dismissal. The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether a departmental enquiry where the presiding officer also acts as a witness is violative of natural justice?

ii) Whether the writ of certiorari is barred when alternative remedies such as appeal or revision exist?

iii) Whether the High Court could exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 in respect of orders passed before the commencement of the Constitution?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the petitioner State contended that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226, since the dismissal and appeal orders were passed prior to 26 January 1950. They argued that the Constitution did not operate retrospectively, and therefore, Article 226 could not be invoked to quash pre-Constitution orders[1].

They also argued that the respondent failed to raise the ground of bias during the departmental appeal or revision proceedings. Hence, he was precluded from raising it in a writ petition. Citing Janardan Reddy v. State of Hyderabad (1951 SCR 344), they contended that once appellate authorities have addressed the issues, writ jurisdiction must be declined[2].

Lastly, it was asserted that certiorari should not lie when alternative statutory remedies exist. They relied on the finality of departmental revision and that the writ petition amounted to reopening settled decisions.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the respondent argued that the enquiry stood vitiated as DSP Bhalla, who acted as the judge, later gave evidence as a prosecution witness in the same proceedings. This constituted a gross violation of audi alteram partem, an inviolable principle of natural justice[3].

They emphasized that this breach made the proceedings a nullity, citing Rex v. Wandsworth Justices, Ex parte Read [(1942) 1 KB 281], where certiorari was granted in a case involving denial of hearing. They also submitted that the departmental hierarchy lacked legal acumen and independence, unlike civil courts, justifying judicial review even where appellate remedies were available.

On the constitutional point, they argued that the dismissal only attained finality on 22 April 1950 when the revision was rejected, a date falling after the Constitution’s commencement. Hence, Article 226 jurisdiction was rightly invoked[4].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 226, Constitution of India: Empowers High Courts to issue writs including certiorari, mandamus, and habeas corpus.

ii) Section 7, Police Act, 1861: Grants authority to dismiss subordinate police officers.

iii) Regulation 508 and 512, U.P. Police Regulations: Provide for departmental appeal and revision respectively.

iv) Section 243, Government of India Act, 1935: Exempted police forces from the procedural protection under Section 240(3) (now Article 311).

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that DSP Bhalla disqualified himself by testifying during the trial he was presiding over. His dual role as judge and witness violated the doctrine of nemo judex in causa sua. The decision was rendered void due to breach of natural justice[5].

It further held that the existence of appellate remedies does not bar writ jurisdiction where there has been a fundamental procedural illegality. Certiorari is maintainable despite the availability of appeal or revision, especially where justice is denied[6].

However, on the constitutional question, the majority held that Article 226 has no retrospective effect, and therefore, it cannot be invoked to challenge orders passed before the Constitution came into force. The departmental orders dated 1948 and 1949 were beyond the High Court’s writ jurisdiction.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) Justice Vivian Bose dissented, emphasizing that the final decision was passed in 1950 after the Constitution came into effect. Therefore, Article 226 applied. He asserted that the Constitution was intended to ensure justice and fairness, and courts should adopt a liberal construction in favour of fundamental rights[7].

c. GUIDELINES

A person cannot act as both judge and witness in the same case.
Breach of natural justice renders proceedings void.
Existence of an alternative remedy is not an absolute bar to writ of certiorari.
Departmental appellate or revisional decisions cannot cure foundational procedural defects.
Article 226 does not apply retrospectively to pre-Constitution orders.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment sets an important precedent in defining the contours of judicial review in administrative matters. While the Supreme Court upheld the importance of natural justice, it cautiously restrained the retroactive application of constitutional remedies. The case illustrates how procedural defects at the departmental level can nullify even substantively correct decisions. The dissenting view by Justice Bose remains a beacon for a purposive interpretation of the Constitution focused on justice and equity. The decision remains a cornerstone in administrative law, particularly in relation to bias, natural justice, and writ jurisdiction under Article 226.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred