A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court in The State v. Hiralal G. Kothari and Others (1960) 2 SCR 355 dealt with the interpretation and application of Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, in the context of pardons granted to approvers. The Court was called to decide whether a person who had been granted a pardon under Section 337 CrPC for certain serious offences (like bribery and corruption) could also be examined as an approver in separate proceedings concerning an offence under the Official Secrets Act, 1923 read with Section 120B IPC, which was not covered by Section 337. The Court strictly interpreted the provision, holding that a pardon could only be granted for offences explicitly mentioned under Section 337(1) CrPC, and since Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act was not one of them, the individual could not be examined as an approver in that proceeding. The ruling underscored the legal boundaries of prosecutorial discretion in granting pardons and emphasized the procedural safeguards for criminal trials. The judgment rejected the broader interpretation argued by the prosecution, which would have extended the pardon’s applicability to subsidiary offences not included in the statute.

Keywords: Pardon, Approver, Section 337 CrPC, Official Secrets Act, Criminal Conspiracy, Subsidiary Offences, Trial Procedure, Jurisdiction.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: The State v. Hiralal G. Kothari and Others

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeals Nos. 25 to 27 of 1958

iii) Judgement Date: November 30, 1959

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Justice Jafer Imam, Justice J.L. Kapur, and Justice K.N. Wanchoo

vi) Author: Justice K.N. Wanchoo

vii) Citation: (1960) 2 SCR 355

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 337, Section 339, Section 120B, Section 165A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

• Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947

• Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923

• Article 134(1)(c) of the Constitution of India

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Procedural Law, Anti-Corruption Law, Public Administration Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case arose from a major leak of India’s Union Budget proposals in the mid-1950s. The accused persons were involved in a conspiracy to leak these proposals before their official presentation in Parliament. These leaks occurred in both 1955 and 1956. The information was sold to businessmen who used it for insider trading and other corrupt commercial gains. The key accused, Jacobs, a senior official in the Rashtrapati Bhavan Printing Press, divulged this classified information for monetary consideration. Investigations led to the arrest of several individuals, including A.L. Mehra, who was granted a pardon under Section 337 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. However, subsequent proceedings were initiated only under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B IPC, which are not covered under Section 337 CrPC. This raised the pivotal question—could Mehra be treated as an approver in a case not falling within the offenses listed in Section 337?

The Supreme Court addressed the critical interplay between procedural law and substantive offences, focusing on how far prosecutorial discretion can stretch under the framework of CrPC and the Constitution.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Rashtrapati Bhavan Printing Press printed the Union Budget annually under strict secrecy. Jacobs, its General Foreman, was responsible for overseeing the printing. In 1955 and 1956, he conspired with A.L. Mehra, D.P. Ohadda, Nandlal More, and Hiralal G. Kothari to leak budget information for financial gain. Investigations revealed that the leaked information was sold to Bombay businessmen for trading purposes.

On March 10, 1956, authorities registered a case under Section 165A IPC, Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, and Section 120B IPC. On March 23, 1956, A.L. Mehra was granted pardon by the Additional District Magistrate under Section 337 CrPC for all four offences. However, due to procedural difficulties, a separate complaint was later filed only under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B IPC.

During this trial, the prosecution intended to examine Mehra as an approver. The defence objected, stating that Mehra could not be treated as such because the ongoing proceedings involved offences not covered under Section 337 CrPC. The magistrate disagreed, but the Sessions Court reversed this, and the Punjab High Court upheld the Sessions Court’s decision. The State appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether a pardon granted under Section 337 CrPC for multiple offences, including those covered under that section, could be extended to allow the approver to testify in a separate proceeding involving only offences not mentioned in Section 337 CrPC?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The prosecution argued that the scope of Section 337 CrPC should be interpreted liberally. They claimed that once a person is pardoned under this section, the disclosure of the “whole truth” includes all subsidiary offences, even those not specifically enumerated under the provision. They emphasized that Section 337(1) obliges the approver to give full disclosure of “every other person concerned” in the offence. They further referred to Section 339 CrPC, which allows prosecution of an approver for any offence in connection with the matter, as proof that the legislature contemplated interconnected subsidiary offences. Therefore, the prosecution asserted that Mehra’s testimony remained valid as an approver, regardless of the specific charges under trial.

They relied on judicial precedents such as Queen Empress v. Ganga Charan, ILR 11 All 79, and Shiam Sundar v. Emperor, AIR 1921 All 234, arguing that pardons should not be narrowly interpreted if they promote full cooperation from approvers and aid the ends of justice.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The respondents contended that the offences under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act and Section 120B IPC are not included in Section 337(1) CrPC, and hence the pardon tendered was invalid for such offences. They insisted that examining Mehra as an approver in proceedings concerning offences not specified in Section 337(1) was contrary to law. Mehra could, at most, be examined as an ordinary witness. They also emphasized the strict construction of penal statutes and argued that extending the benefit of pardon to unrelated offences undermines procedural fairness and statutory limitations.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 337 CrPC, 1898 – Pertains to the power of the Magistrate to tender pardon to an accomplice for specific offences.

ii) Section 339 CrPC, 1898 – Deals with the trial of persons who do not comply with the conditions of the pardon.

iii) Section 165A IPC – Criminalizes abetment by offering gratification to public servants.

iv) Section 5(2) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Prescribes penalties for public servants involved in corrupt acts.

v) Section 5 Official Secrets Act, 1923 – Penalizes unauthorized communication of classified government information.

vi) Section 120B IPC – Criminalizes criminal conspiracy.

vii) Article 134(1)(c) Constitution of India – Grants appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in criminal matters on certificate by High Court.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that a pardon under Section 337 CrPC can be granted only for offences explicitly enumerated under the provision. Offences under Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act read with Section 120B IPC are not included. Therefore, even if the person to whom the pardon was granted is expected to disclose all connected offences, the pardon cannot legally apply to offences not covered under Section 337(1). The Court ruled that Mehra could not be treated as an approver in the ongoing trial which involved only those non-enumerated offences.

The Court emphasized the importance of adhering to statutory language. It declined to expand the scope of Section 337 CrPC based on prosecutorial convenience or implied logic.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court remarked that the interpretation of penal and procedural laws must remain strict. Judicial innovation must not override clear statutory limitations. If the legislature intended to include offences like those under the Official Secrets Act within the scope of Section 337, it would have done so expressly.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Pardon under Section 337 CrPC is restricted to offences explicitly mentioned.

2. Prosecution must ensure that the offence in which an approver is being examined falls within the list of offences under Section 337.

3. Courts must resist reading into the law any broader interpretation not clearly stated by the legislature.

4. Procedural safeguards in criminal law must be strictly followed to preserve the fairness of trials.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The ruling clarified the procedural sanctity of criminal trials. It emphasized that pardons cannot be extended to offences outside the scope of Section 337 CrPC. This judgment reinforces the necessity for legislative clarity and prosecutorial diligence. While the argument for functional overlap of offences was persuasive, the Court rightly prioritized statutory limits. The decision ensures that procedural shortcuts do not erode the foundational safeguards in criminal justice.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Queen-Empress v. Ganga Charan, ILR 11 All 79

ii) Harumal Parmanand v. Emperor, AIR 1915 Sind 43

iii) Shiam Sunder v. Emperor, AIR 1921 All 234

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 – Section 337, Section 339

ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 120B, Section 165A

iii) Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 – Section 5(2)

iv) Official Secrets Act, 1923 – Section 5

v) Constitution of India – Article 134(1)(c)