A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The dispute concerns the respondent’s claim for appointment to the post of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) under the ex-casual labourers quota framed by the Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board (APSEB) through its policy dated 18.05.1997. The respondent’s candidature was rejected multiple times on grounds ranging from the alleged non-genuineness of his service certificate to the absence of vacancies in his category.

The High Court intervened and directed consideration of his claim in parity with other similarly placed candidates who, despite possessing less man-days and being lower in the seniority list, had already been appointed pursuant to judicial directions. The Supreme Court examined whether the High Court was justified in treating the respondent at par with those candidates and whether the list relied on by the High Court constituted a seniority list.

Holding that the list titled “Seniority list of qualified candidates for the post of LDCs” was indeed a seniority list and that persons placed below the respondent with fewer man-days had secured appointment, the Court upheld the High Court’s reasoning. The Court directed reconsideration of the respondent’s appointment to the post of LDC or any equivalent post in which a vacancy exists, while permitting the authority to evaluate other factual objections raised by it.

The ruling reaffirms parity principles in service jurisprudence, especially where similarly situated candidates secure benefits through judicial intervention.

Keywords: LDC appointment; ex-casual labourers; seniority list; man-days; APSEB recruitment policy; service certificate; review committee; suitable post; supernumerary post.

B) CASE DETAILS 

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGMENT

The litigation emanates from the framework created by APSEB through its policy dated 18.05.1997, which allowed filling 50% vacancies in initial recruitment cadres, including LDC, from the category of ex-casual labourers.

The policy laid down parameters of age, educational qualification, seniority determined by man-days, reservations, and the functioning of the Selection Committee. Subsequently, an advertisement dated 11.03.2001 was issued to recruit LDCs from this category.

The respondent applied but was rejected on the ground that his service certificate was allegedly not genuine. The High Court directed verification of the certificate, but the certificate was again disbelieved when the contractor stated that the respondent had never worked under him.

A further disqualification was recorded on the premise that he lacked the required typewriting skill; however, by the High Court’s order dated 01.11.2004, it was held that typewriting proficiency was not mandatory.

Against this background, the Review Committee re-evaluated his case but rejected it again on 28.03.2006, citing the absence of a vacancy in the BC-B category under the quota and asserting that no candidate with less man-days in that category had been appointed.

The policy itself was withdrawn with effect from 15.09.2006. The respondent approached the High Court belatedly in 2008, and while the writ was initially dismissed, a review was allowed upon discovery that the respondent was placed at Sl. No. 22 in the list of eligible candidates, while persons at Sl. Nos. 23 and 28 with fewer man-days had been appointed pursuant to other judicial directions. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench accepted that the respondent must be treated at par with these candidates and issued directions accordingly.

The Supreme Court was called upon to decide whether the High Court was correct in identifying the list as a seniority list and in equating the respondent with other candidates who had benefited from judicial orders despite being lower in seniority. The Court also evaluated the appellant’s objections relating to the genuineness of the service certificate, vacancy position, and recruitment methodology, all of which had shaped the earlier denials of appointment.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The APSEB introduced a recruitment policy on 18.05.1997 to fill 50% vacancies in initial cadres such as LDC from the ex-casual labourer category. The respondent applied pursuant to the notification 11.03.2001. His application was rejected on 21.01.2002 because the Inspector of Police reported that the service certificate was not genuine, and the contractor who allegedly issued it denied employing him.

The High Court intervened on 24.12.2002, directing verification. Yet again, on 13.03.2003, the authority rejected the claim citing the contractor’s denial. A further rejection dated 14.04.2003 rested on the assertion that he lacked typewriting skills, though this was later negated by the High Court’s order dated 01.11.2004, which clarified that typewriting skills were not mandatory for LDC appointment.

Following this, the Review Committee re-assessed the claim and rejected it on 28.03.2006 on a new premise that no vacancy existed in BC-B category under the quota and no BC-B candidate with fewer man-days had been appointed.

Meanwhile, six candidates with fewer man-days had been appointed under the 1997 notification, and three candidates with fewer man-days M. Laxminarsu (BC-B), M. Bhaskar (BC-A), A. Karunakar Reddy (OC) were appointed under the 2001 notification pursuant to High Court directions in other petitions. This fact was acknowledged in the appellant’s affidavit filed before the Supreme Court.

The policy itself was withdrawn through notification dated 15.11.2006, with its cessation effective 15.09.2006. The respondent filed his writ petition only in 2008, leading to its initial dismissal for delay and because of the policy withdrawal.

However, upon review, the High Court found that candidates placed below him at Sl. Nos. 23 and 28 in the list titled “Seniority list of qualified candidates for the post of LDCs” had been appointed, and therefore the respondent deserved parity. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench directed reconsideration of appointment to LDC or any suitable or supernumerary post.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the respondent was entitled to be considered for appointment to the post of LDC on par with candidates who had fewer man-days and were lower in the seniority list?
ii. Whether the list titled “Seniority list of qualified candidates for the post of LDCs” constituted a genuine seniority list for the purpose of applying parity?
iii. Whether the alleged non-genuineness of the service certificate could defeat the respondent’s entitlement to parity where similarly situated candidates had been given appointment?
iv. Whether the withdrawal of the 1997 policy barred consideration of the respondent’s claim?
v. Whether the High Court’s directions to consider the respondent for LDC or any suitable or supernumerary post were legally sustainable?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellants asserted that the list relied on by the High Court was not a seniority list but a mere list of eligible candidates possessing minimum qualifications for appearance in the interview. They stated that there was no workable gradation or seniority list for contractual labourers because they were not employees.

They further argued that the respondent’s service certificate was not genuine, as confirmed by the contractor and the Inspector of Police’s report dated 21.01.2002. They maintained that vacancies earmarked for BC-B candidates under the ex-casual labourer quota had been exhausted by the time the respondent’s case was reviewed, and that the respondent could not claim equal treatment with candidates appointed earlier under judicial directions.

The appellants also contended that after withdrawal of the 1997 policy, no further appointments could be made under its terms, and that all current vacancies were filled only through direct recruitment.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondent maintained that his placement at Sl. No. 22 in the seniority list entitled him to consideration at least equal to candidates placed at Sl. Nos. 23 and 28, who had lesser man-days and yet secured appointment following High Court directions. He argued that the list titled “Seniority list of qualified candidates for the post of LDCs” was indeed a seniority list because candidates were arranged in order of their first engagement, which reflected the measure of man-days.

The respondent asserted that the non-genuineness attributed to his service certificate had already been addressed by earlier High Court directions and could not defeat the parity principle after similarly situated candidates had been regularised.

He further contended that withdrawal of the policy could not retrospectively extinguish claims already crystallised through prior applications and rights arising from parity with those appointed pursuant to judicial orders.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. APSEB Notification dated 18.05.1997 prescribing criteria of age, educational qualification, seniority by man-days, reservation, and selection process.
ii. Notification dated 11.03.2001 inviting applications for LDC under the ex-casual labourer quota.
iii. Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India (implicit), ensuring equality and fair treatment in public employment.
iv. Principles relating to regularisation of casual labour as interpreted through service jurisprudence.

I) JUDGMENT

The Supreme Court first rejected the appellants’ contention that the list relied upon by the High Court was not a seniority list. The Court observed that the respondent produced a list titled “Seniority list of qualified candidates for the post of L.D.C.s”, and that the structure of the list reflected ranking based on date of first engagement, with earlier-engaged workers placed higher.

This confirmed its status as a seniority list. The Court then examined the appellant’s affidavit dated 04.07.2024, which admitted that multiple candidates with fewer man-days than the respondent namely M. Laxminarsu (BC-B), M. Bhaskar (BC-A), and A. Karunakar Reddy (OC) had been appointed pursuant to High Court directions. From this, it became evident that the respondent, placed at Sl. No. 22, was senior to persons placed at Sl. Nos. 23 and 28, who had secured appointment.

Once this factual matrix was established, the Court upheld the reasoning adopted by the Single Judge and Division Bench that the respondent could not be treated differently. The Court emphasised that he must be considered “on par” with similarly placed persons.

At the same time, the Court clarified that questions relating to the genuineness of the service certificate and availability of vacancies were factual matters that the authorities were competent to decide while reconsidering the case. The Court refrained from adjudicating those factual disputes, noting that they fall outside the appellate jurisdiction in this context.

The Court finally directed that the respondent’s case be reconsidered for appointment either to the post of LDC or any equivalent post in which a vacancy exists. Considering the prolonged trajectory of litigation since 2008, the Court ordered that the exercise be concluded within six weeks.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The core ratio rests on the doctrine of parity in service law. Where similarly situated candidates having less man-days and placed lower in the seniority list secured appointment pursuant to judicial orders, the State cannot deny equal treatment to a candidate who stands on a superior footing in the same list.

The Court interpreted the list titled “Seniority list of qualified candidates for the post of LDCs” as a legitimate seniority list because its internal structure revealed a consistent ranking based on date of first engagement, the key determinant of man-days.

Once it became undisputed through the appellant’s own affidavit that candidates with fewer man-days were appointed, the Court held that the respondent must be considered “at par” with them. The ratio implicitly applies Articles 14 and 16, mandating non-arbitrariness in public employment. The Court further held that withdrawal of the 1997 policy did not extinguish the respondent’s right to consideration where similarly situated candidates had already derived advantage under that very policy.

The ratio is confined to consideration and does not guarantee appointment. The Court preserved the authority’s right to examine other factual objections, such as the genuineness of the service certificate and vacancy availability, but restrained them from relying on the seniority-list argument to defeat the claim.

b. OBITER DICTA

While distinguishing between issues that could be judicially resolved and issues reserved for administrative decision-making, the Court suggested that factual disputes such as vacancy position and authenticity of service certificates lie more appropriately within the domain of the employer.

This reflects a broader judicial philosophy that courts should not engage in fact-finding exercises better suited for administrative authorities. The Court implicitly recognised that while parity may justify reconsideration, it does not automatically override factual disqualifications that may emerge upon administrative scrutiny.

Another important obiter aspect emerges from the Court’s observation that the present litigation had been pending since 2008. Though not forming part of the ratio, the Court’s insistence that the matter be concluded within six weeks signals judicial intolerance toward excessive delays in service matters. It underscores the principle that unresolved service claims affect livelihoods and must be addressed promptly.

Further, the Court’s acknowledgment that all present vacancies are being filled through direct recruitment serves as a contextual observation, indicating that the respondent’s claim must be fitted within contemporary administrative practices without expanding the scope of the 1997 policy.

c. GUIDELINES

Although the Court did not frame formal guidelines, its directions contain binding procedural guidance for similar cases:

i. Authorities must treat candidates placed higher in seniority at par with candidates lower in the list who obtained appointment through judicial orders, unless a legally sustainable distinguishing factor exists.

ii. Lists labelled and structured as seniority lists—particularly where arranged according to date of first engagement or man-days—must be treated as seniority lists for the purpose of service parity arguments.

iii. Upon remand from judicial authorities, employers must reconsider cases comprehensively, taking into account both parity considerations and other factual objections, but cannot reject claims solely by disputing the nature of the seniority list.

iv. Even after withdrawal of a recruitment policy, authorities may still be bound to consider candidates whose claims remain intertwined with comparative rights already adjudicated or recognised by courts.

v. Reconsideration pursuant to judicial directions must be completed expeditiously, particularly where litigation has been prolonged, reflecting the principle of timely justice in service law disputes.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment reinforces a consistent judicial approach that parity must be maintained in public employment, particularly where appointments have been made pursuant to judicial directions. The Supreme Court validated the High Court’s reasoning that the respondent, standing higher in the seniority list than candidates who obtained appointment, cannot be denied similar treatment without violating the equality mandate. At the same time, the Court carefully balanced this by preserving the employer’s authority to evaluate factual matters such as certificate authenticity and vacancy availability.

The Court’s nuanced stance respects both administrative discretion and constitutional equality. It prevents arbitrary exclusion while ensuring that judicial directions do not inadvertently compel appointments unsupported by factual verification. The decision harmonises the principles of fairness in recruitment with respect for factual assessments that lie within administrative competence.

The insistence on expeditious reconsideration also reflects the judiciary’s awareness that service disputes involve livelihood concerns and that inordinate delay undermines the purpose of recruitment policies. The ruling guides administrative authorities on how to address claims emerging from long-standing policies and judicial interventions, especially when such policies have been withdrawn.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

The judgment does not reference external case law; only internal High Court orders and writ petitions such as W.P. No. 2651 of 2004 and W.P. No. 858 of 2009 are cited.

b. Important Statutes / Instruments Referred

i. APSEB Notification dated 18.05.1997.
ii. APSEB Notification dated 11.03.2001.
iii. Articles 14 and 16, Constitution of India (implicit).