A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Supreme Court in Hanskumar Kishanchand v. The Union of India addressed the maintainability of appeals filed under Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, arising from an award under Section 19(1)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939. The case critically analyzed whether appellate decisions rendered by High Courts under statutory arbitration proceedings constitute judgments, decrees, or orders appealable to the Federal Court or subsequently the Supreme Court of India. The Court decisively held that arbitration awards, even when modified by appellate courts, retain their fundamental character as arbitral awards rather than judgments or decrees of civil courts. This verdict distinguished between decisions rendered by courts acting as persona designata versus courts exercising regular judicial functions. Numerous precedents, both Indian and foreign, were referred to establish the jurisprudential principle that arbitration proceedings—whether statutory or consensual—remain outside the appellate jurisdiction reserved for judgments, decrees, or orders of civil courts unless explicitly provided otherwise by statute. The judgment clarifies the limited nature of appellate jurisdiction over statutory arbitration awards and preserves the distinction between judicial adjudications and arbitral determinations under special statutes.
Keywords: Defence of India Act 1939, statutory arbitration, persona designata, appeal maintainability, Hanskumar Kishanchand, Supreme Court of India, Nagpur High Court, arbitration award, judgment vs. award distinction.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title
Hanskumar Kishanchand v. The Union of India
ii) Case Number
Civil Appeals Nos. 224 and 225 of 1954
iii) Judgement Date
August 22, 1958
iv) Court
Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum
Venkatarama Aiyar J., Gajendragadkar J., A.K. Sarkar J.
vi) Author
Venkatarama Aiyar J.
vii) Citation
AIR 1959 SC 1177; (1959) SCR 1177
viii) Legal Provisions Involved
-
Defence of India Act, 1939: Section 19(1)(b), (f), (g)
-
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Sections 109, 110
-
Arbitration Act, 1940: Sections 17, 46
-
Letters Patent of Nagpur High Court: Clause 29
-
Government of India Act, 1935: Section 299(2)
ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case
None
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Arbitration Law, Civil Procedure Law
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The appeals in this matter originated from a requisitioning of property under wartime legislation. The Central Government requisitioned certain properties owned by Hanskumar Kishanchand under Section 75(A) of the Defence of India Rules, 1939, framed under the Defence of India Act, 1939. As there was no mutual agreement regarding compensation, the matter was referred for arbitration to Mr. Jafry, Additional District Judge, Khandwa, under Section 19(1)(b) of the said Act.
The arbitrator determined the annual compensation payable, which led both parties—the property owner and the Government—to file appeals before the Nagpur High Court under Section 19(1)(f). The High Court partially modified the award and enhanced the compensation. Dissatisfied, both parties sought to further appeal before the Federal Court under Sections 109 and 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The present judgment arises from a preliminary objection raised by the Government, contesting the maintainability of these appeals. The issue primarily revolved around whether decisions arising from statutory arbitration proceedings could be considered as judgments, decrees, or orders under the CPC so as to attract appellate jurisdiction.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The Government requisitioned Kishanchand’s property on February 19, 1941 under Section 75(A) of the Defence of India Rules, 1939. No consensus on compensation was reached. The Central Government appointed Mr. Jafry as arbitrator under Section 19(1)(b).
The arbitrator, on March 31, 1943, awarded compensation of Rs. 13,000 per annum for the occupied premises. Dissatisfied, both parties appealed to the Nagpur High Court under Section 19(1)(f).
The Nagpur High Court enhanced the compensation by Rs. 3,250 annually and granted additional sums for disruption caused to the High School functioning on the requisitioned premises.
Both parties sought leave to appeal to the Federal Court under Sections 109 and 110 CPC. The High Court granted certificates permitting the appeals.
The Union of India subsequently raised a preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the appeals, asserting that decisions arising from arbitration under Section 19(1)(f) were not appealable judgments or decrees.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether decisions passed by the High Court under Section 19(1)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939 constitute judgments, decrees, or orders under Sections 109 and 110 CPC, enabling further appeal.
ii. Whether arbitration proceedings under Section 19(1)(b) and 19(1)(f) remain arbitral in nature even at the appellate stage.
iii. Whether the High Court, while hearing appeals under Section 19(1)(f), acts as a civil court or as persona designata.
iv. Whether the certificate granted under Sections 109 and 110 CPC was valid.
F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:
Achhru Ram contended that once the matter reached the High Court under Section 19(1)(f), the High Court acted within its ordinary civil jurisdiction.
The appellant argued that the High Court’s decision became a judgment under Section 109 and 110 CPC, thus attracting appellate jurisdiction of the Federal Court (now the Supreme Court).
The counsel relied on the doctrine laid down in National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster General [(1913) AC 546] where referring to an existing court imports its regular jurisdiction along with appellate rights.
It was argued that although the initial proceeding was arbitral, upon appeal, it assumed the character of a judicial adjudication.
The appellant further contended that even if no appeal lay under CPC or Letters Patent, the Federal Court (now Supreme Court) retained inherent jurisdiction to grant leave to appeal under residual powers.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that:
The Solicitor General of India argued that both the reference under Section 19(1)(b) and the appeal under Section 19(1)(f) were parts of an arbitration mechanism.
He argued that the High Court while deciding appeals under Section 19(1)(f) acts not as a civil court but as persona designata, continuing the arbitration framework.
The respondent relied heavily on Rangoon Botatoung Company v. Collector, Rangoon [(1912) 39 IA 197] where the Privy Council held that references under Land Acquisition Act and appeals therefrom were arbitration proceedings.
The respondent distinguished National Telephone Co. as inapplicable since there, the reference was to a statutorily recognized court functioning as a court of record, unlike here.
They contended that unless the statute explicitly provided otherwise, arbitration proceedings do not convert into civil suits at any appellate stage.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i. Defence of India Act, 1939
-
Section 19(1)(b): Appointment of arbitrator.
-
Section 19(1)(f): Appeal to High Court against arbitrator’s award.
-
Section 19(1)(g): Arbitration remains outside civil court jurisdiction.
ii. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
-
Section 109 and 110: Conditions for appeals to the Federal Court/Supreme Court.
iii. Arbitration Act, 1940
-
Section 17: Nature of decree following an arbitration award.
-
Section 46: Applicability of Arbitration Act to statutory arbitrations.
iv. Letters Patent of Nagpur High Court
-
Clause 29: Appellate jurisdiction clause.
v. Government of India Act, 1935
-
Section 299(2): Compensation for requisitioned property.
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i. The Supreme Court held that appeals under Section 19(1)(f) of the Defence of India Act, 1939, continue to form part of arbitration proceedings.
ii. The High Court, even while entertaining such appeals, functions as an arbitral authority and not as a civil court exercising ordinary jurisdiction.
iii. The decision referred extensively to the principle in Rangoon Botatoung Co. v. Collector, Rangoon [(1912) 39 IA 197] which stated that references to arbitration remain arbitral even upon appellate review.
iv. The Court clarified that an appeal is merely a continuation of original arbitration, not an initiation of civil litigation.
v. Thus, decisions under Section 19(1)(f) are arbitral awards and not judgments, decrees, or orders within the meaning of Sections 109 and 110 CPC.
vi. Consequently, the certificates granted by the High Court under Sections 109 and 110 CPC were invalid.
b. OBITER DICTA
i. The Court discussed National Telephone Co. and distinguished it from the present matter since in that case the Railway and Canal Commission was a court of record, unlike arbitral tribunals under Defence of India Act.
ii. The Court emphasized that unless statutes clearly state otherwise, arbitration retains its inherent character at every stage including appeals.
iii. The use of words such as “award” in statutory language reaffirms the legislative intent to treat these proceedings as arbitral throughout.
c. GUIDELINES
-
Statutory arbitration remains arbitration even on appeal unless the statute expressly provides otherwise.
-
The expression “Court” or High Court in such statutes does not automatically confer jurisdiction under the CPC unless so specified.
-
Distinction between judicial adjudication and statutory arbitration must be preserved.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The Supreme Court’s ruling reinforces the distinctiveness of statutory arbitration from civil litigation. It clarifies that statutory arbitration, even when it provides for appeals to superior courts, retains its arbitral nature unless explicitly absorbed into ordinary judicial processes. The judgment strictly applies statutory interpretation principles, preserving legislative intention and preventing unwarranted judicial expansion of appellate jurisdiction. It upholds longstanding precedents while carefully distinguishing contrary authorities. This judgment remains a leading authority on the doctrine of persona designata, arbitration jurisprudence, and appellate jurisdiction under Indian law.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
-
Rangoon Botatoung Co. v. Collector, Rangoon, (1912) 39 IA 197
-
Special Officer, Salsette Building Sites v. Dossabhai Bezonji, (1912) ILR 37 Bom 506
-
Manavikraman Tirumalpad v. Collector of Nilgiris, (1918) ILR 41 Mad 943
-
Secretary of State for India v. Hindusthan Co-operative Insurance Society Ltd., (1931) LR 58 IA 259
-
National Telephone Co. Ltd. v. Postmaster-General, [1913] AC 546
-
Chelikani Rama Rao v. Secretary of State for India, (1916) 43 IA 192
b. Important Statutes Referred
-
Defence of India Act, 1939
-
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
-
Arbitration Act, 1940
-
Government of India Act, 1935
-
Letters Patent of Nagpur High Court
