A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in S. Veerabadhran Chettiar v. E. V. Ramaswami Naicker & Others examined the interpretation of Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The core issue revolved around whether breaking an idol of Lord Ganesa in a public place with an avowed intent to insult religious sentiments constituted an offence under Section 295. The lower courts had dismissed the complaint, narrowly interpreting “object held sacred” as only encompassing idols installed in temples or during processions. However, the Supreme Court overturned this narrow interpretation. It held that the statute covers any object considered sacred by any class of persons, irrespective of its consecration or place of worship. The Court emphasized a broader and purposive interpretation of Section 295 IPC to uphold the legislative intent of protecting religious sentiments across varying beliefs. Though the Court found the lower courts erred in law, it refrained from directing further inquiry, considering the staleness of the matter. This judgment clarified the wide ambit of protection accorded to religious sentiments under Indian criminal jurisprudence.

Keywords:
Section 295 IPC, Religious Insult, Sacred Object, Idol Breaking, Religious Sentiment, Indian Penal Code, Interpretation of Statute, Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Supreme Court of India.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
S. Veerabadhran Chettiar v. E. V. Ramaswami Naicker & Others

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. 49 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date:
August 25, 1958

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
R.P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, K.N. Wanchoo JJ.

vi) Author:
Justice R.P. Sinha

vii) Citation:
1958 AIR 1036, 1959 SCR 1211

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:
Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860; Section 295A of IPC, 1860; Sections 202, 203, 435, 436, 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any):
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Criminal Law, Constitutional Law, Interpretation of Statutes, Religious Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case stemmed from a complaint filed by S. Veerabadhran Chettiar against E. V. Ramaswami Naicker, leader of the Dravida Kazhagam, and others. The accused, as part of an anti-idolatry movement, broke an idol of Lord Ganesa in public to protest idol worship. The complainant, belonging to the Saivite sect of Hindus, contended that this act insulted the religious sentiments of Hindus and constituted an offence under Section 295 IPC. However, both the Magistrate and Sessions Court dismissed the complaint, interpreting “object held sacred” narrowly. The High Court upheld these decisions. The Supreme Court’s intervention brought clarity to the scope and ambit of Section 295 IPC.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The appellant, S. Veerabadhran Chettiar, filed a complaint alleging that E. V. Ramaswami Naicker, leader of Dravida Kazhagam, publicly declared his intention to break an idol of Lord Ganesa at a public meeting on May 27, 1953. Dravida Kazhagam was engaged in a reformist movement against idol worship. The announcement created fear among Saivite Hindus who venerated Lord Ganesa.

On the appointed day, E. V. Ramaswami Naicker along with co-accused, publicly broke a mud idol of Lord Ganesa at the Town Hall Maidan, Tiruchirappalli, after delivering a provocative speech. The complainant alleged that this act was deliberate to insult the religious sentiments of Hindus. The police report acknowledged the occurrence but left its legal interpretation open. The Magistrate dismissed the complaint under Section 203 CrPC holding that the mud idol was not a sacred object under Section 295 IPC.

Upon revision, the Sessions Judge and later the High Court concurred with the Magistrate. They opined that breaking a privately-owned mud idol not installed in a temple or used in a religious procession did not amount to insulting religion under Section 295 IPC. They also ruled that since the government’s sanction under Section 295A IPC was not obtained, no offence was made out.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether breaking a privately-owned idol not installed in a temple constitutes an offence under Section 295 IPC?

ii) Whether the words “object held sacred by any class of persons” cover idols not consecrated or used in public worship?

iii) Whether intention alone without fulfilment of statutory ingredients suffices for conviction under Section 295 IPC?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The lower courts erred by restricting the scope of Section 295 IPC to consecrated idols placed in temples or carried during festivals. They emphasized that the language of the statute used broad words—“any object held sacred by any class of persons”. Thus, even privately-owned idols, if held sacred by a community, fall within its ambit.

They argued that Lord Ganesa is universally venerated by Hindus, irrespective of whether the idol is installed in a temple or kept privately. The act of breaking such an idol in public was aimed at outraging religious feelings and thus constituted a clear offence under Section 295 IPC.

They highlighted that the accused publicly announced his intention to break the idol to provoke and insult Hindus. Therefore, both the actus reus (breaking the idol) and the mens rea (intention to insult religious feelings) were present.

They relied on the principle laid down in Queen Empress v. Imam Ali (1887 ILR 10 All 150) where it was acknowledged that even inanimate objects held sacred can fall within Section 295 IPC[5].

They further contended that the interpretation of the words by the lower courts violated the legislative intent of the provision, which was to protect the religious sentiments of all communities, regardless of the object’s consecration status.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The respondents argued that they broke a mud idol purchased for the purpose of their campaign against idol worship. The idol was neither consecrated nor used in any religious ceremony. It was simply a representation, not an object sacred under the law.

They emphasized that Section 295 IPC required the object to be one that is universally held sacred by a class of persons in the context of religious worship. Since the broken idol was neither installed nor worshipped, it did not meet this criterion.

They submitted that intention alone does not constitute the offence. The act must be accompanied by the destruction of a legally defined sacred object. They argued that their actions were protected under the freedom of expression and aimed at religious reform, not at insulting religion.

They relied on Ramesh Chunder Sannyal v. Hiru Mondal (1890 ILR 17 Cal 852), asserting that mere destruction of an object not worshipped does not fall within Section 295 IPC[5].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Link to Indian Kanoon: Section 295 IPC

ii) Section 295A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860
Link to Indian Kanoon: Section 295A IPC

iii) Sections 202, 203, 435, 436, 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898
Link to Indian Kanoon (modern CrPC provisions since the 1898 code has been replaced): CrPC 1973

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court held that:

The words “any object held sacred by any class of persons” in Section 295 IPC must receive a broad and inclusive interpretation. They encompass any object that is held sacred, irrespective of whether it is installed in a temple or used in processions.

The mud idol of Lord Ganesa, even though not consecrated or publicly worshipped, was held sacred by the Saivite sect. The accused’s admitted intention to break it publicly with an express purpose to insult the religious sentiments sufficed to constitute an offence under Section 295 IPC.

The lower courts erred by importing words of limitation not found in the statute and thus misdirected themselves. The Court reaffirmed that the penal provision protects religious feelings across all communities and creeds, regardless of judicial opinions on the rationality of such beliefs.

The Court referenced Queen Empress v. Imam Ali (1887 ILR 10 All 150) and distinguished the present facts from Ramesh Chunder Sannyal v. Hiru Mondal (1890 ILR 17 Cal 852)[5].

However, owing to the passage of over five years since the dismissal of the complaint, the Court declined to direct further inquiry.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed that:

Courts must be extremely circumspect in such matters involving religious sentiments. They should respect religious susceptibilities of all communities, regardless of whether those beliefs are shared or appear rational to the judiciary.

If similar acts recur in the future, law enforcement authorities should apply the law in the spirit of this judgment to maintain law and order.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Section 295 IPC must be interpreted broadly.

• Any object held sacred qualifies, even if privately owned or unconsecrated.

• Intention to insult religion combined with destruction of a sacred object suffices for prosecution.

• Courts must not inject subjective limitations into unambiguous statutory language.

• Religious sentiments of minorities or sects deserve full protection under criminal law.

• Judicial scrutiny must remain sensitive to religious diversity and social harmony.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Queen Empress v. Imam Ali, (1887) ILR 10 All 150.

ii) Ramesh Chunder Sannyal v. Hiru Mondal, (1890) ILR 17 Cal 852.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 295, 295A.

ii) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 – Sections 202, 203, 435, 436, 439.