A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This Supreme Court decision in D. Stephens v. Nosibolla ([1951] SCR 284) examines the scope of Sections 25 and 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, particularly focusing on what constitutes “engaging or supplying” seamen and the implications of remuneration for employment facilitation. The appellant, D. Stephens, had been acquitted by the Chief Presidency Magistrate on the grounds that the Calcutta Maritime Board, of which he was Joint Secretary, did not engage or supply seamen, and the fee collected was not a remuneration for employment but an administrative contribution. The High Court, however, disagreed, holding that the issue of muster cards amounted to supply and the collection of Re. 1 as remuneration. The Supreme Court restored the acquittal, highlighting that interference with acquittals under Section 439 CrPC should occur only in exceptional cases, reiterating fundamental criminal jurisprudence regarding revisionary jurisdiction. It clarified the administrative nature of the Maritime Board and established that mere facilitation does not amount to engagement or supply under the Act.

Keywords: Indian Merchant Shipping Act, engaging seamen, supplying seamen, Section 25, Section 26, muster card, criminal revision, Calcutta Maritime Board, seamen recruitment, revisional jurisdiction.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: D. Stephens v. Nosibolla

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 19 of 1950

iii) Judgement Date: 2nd March 1951

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Saiyid Fazl Ali, Mehr Chand Mahajan, Mukherjea, and Chandrasekhara Ayyar JJ.

vi) Author: Justice Chandrasekhara Ayyar

vii) Citation: D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, [1951] SCR 284

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 25 and Section 26 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923

• Section 417 and Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case: None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Administrative Law, Labour Law, Maritime Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose from a complex factual scenario involving allegations of unauthorized engagement of seamen and illegal remuneration under the Indian Merchant Shipping Act. D. Stephens was accused of collecting a fee from a seaman as a precondition for issuing a muster card, which allegedly violated Sections 25 and 26 of the Act. The trial court acquitted him twice. However, the Calcutta High Court, through revision, directed multiple retrials. The Supreme Court examined whether such an order fell within the scope of revisional powers under Section 439 CrPC and whether Stephens’ actions constituted supplying or engaging seamen under the statute.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Calcutta Liners’ Conference, an association of shipowners, and the Joint Supply Office, representing seamen, created a Calcutta Maritime Board under a collective agreement. This Board issued muster cards to seamen, enabling them to appear before ship captains for employment. Each seaman, post-engagement, paid Re. 1 towards the administrative expenses of the Board. The accused, D. Stephens, was the Secretary of the Liners’ Conference and honorary Joint Secretary of the Maritime Board.

Nosibolla, a seaman, alleged that Stephens collected Re. 1 from him before issuing a muster card and claimed this constituted remuneration for employment facilitation, thereby contravening Section 26(2) of the Act. The Chief Presidency Magistrate acquitted Stephens, but the High Court directed retrials, interpreting the fee as unauthorized and the issuance of muster cards as an act of supply or engagement under Section 25.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the act of issuing muster cards by the Calcutta Maritime Board constituted “engaging or supplying” seamen under Section 25 of the Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923.

ii) Whether collecting Re. 1 from seamen amounted to “remuneration” for providing employment under Section 26 of the same Act.

iii) Whether the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 439 CrPC in revising an acquittal order and directing retrials.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

• Stephens never engaged or supplied any seaman. The Maritime Board did not recruit but merely facilitated appearances at the muster before the captains who made independent selections.

• The Re. 1 collected post-employment, as a wage deduction, funded the office functioning and was not paid to Stephens or the Board members.

• Stephens held an honorary post in the Board and drew a fixed salary from the Liners’ Conference, unrelated to the number of seamen processed.

• The complaint lacked substantiation. No evidence proved Stephens collected Re. 1 before employment, and the collection post-engagement could not fall under Section 26.

• The High Court acted beyond its jurisdiction in interfering with a well-reasoned acquittal under Section 439 of CrPC. It is well settled in Chinnaswami v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788, that revisional jurisdiction must be sparingly used in acquittals.

• No manifest illegality or miscarriage of justice occurred in the trial court’s acquittal; thus, the High Court’s intervention was unwarranted.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

• The issuance of muster cards created a direct nexus between the seamen and employment, equating to engagement or supply under Section 25.

• Re. 1 collected, whether before or after employment, was an indirect remuneration for facilitating employment.

• Even if Stephens personally did not benefit, the deduction from seamen’s wages showed a systemic practice that breached the statutory bar in Section 26(1).

• The High Court correctly exercised its revisional jurisdiction to prevent a technical acquittal from overriding legislative safeguards meant to protect vulnerable seamen.

• The principle laid down in Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas, AIR 1951 SC 316, justified revision in cases where the trial court ignores relevant evidence or law.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 25 of Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923: Prohibits anyone from supplying or engaging seamen without a license.

ii) Section 26 of Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923: Prohibits demanding or receiving remuneration from seamen for providing employment.

iii) Section 439 CrPC (1898): Empowers High Courts to revise cases but limits such power in cases involving acquittal by a competent magistrate.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that the Calcutta Maritime Board did not engage or supply seamen. It only issued muster cards to enable them to appear before captains who independently selected recruits. Thus, Stephens did not contravene Section 25.

ii) The Court found that the Re. 1 collected from wages post-employment was a contribution toward administrative costs, not remuneration under Section 26. There was no evidence that Stephens personally demanded money.

iii) The Court held that the High Court’s revisional interference violated the principles governing Section 439 CrPC. Interference in an acquittal is permissible only in exceptional circumstances involving gross miscarriage of justice, which was not the case here.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that the role of honorary secretaries and administrative boards must be viewed through a functional lens. In regulatory frameworks, facilitating platforms for employment should not attract penal consequences unless direct control or monetary gain is proved.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Revisional jurisdiction in acquittals must be invoked only when:

  • There is manifest illegality in the trial.

  • There is gross miscarriage of justice.

  • The trial court’s findings are perverse or irrational.

• Administrative contributions by workers do not amount to remuneration unless:

  • They are made before employment.

  • They are directly linked to employment facilitation.

  • The payment is made to the person responsible for employment.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

This case becomes a landmark precedent in defining the limits of criminal revision under CrPC, especially in cases where acquittals are concerned. It draws clear lines between facilitation and engagement and administrative contribution and remuneration. The Supreme Court reaffirmed that justice is not served by repeated trials when evidence is lacking, and acquittals are supported by fact and law. The judgment effectively protected the balance between worker rights and legitimate administrative structures, preventing over-criminalization in contexts where employment ecosystems are complex and collaborative.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Logendranath Jha v. Polai Lal Biswas, AIR 1951 SC 316.

ii) Chinnaswami v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1962 SC 1788.

iii) D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, [1951] SCR 284.

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Indian Merchant Shipping Act, 1923, Sections 25, 26
ii) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Sections 417, 439