A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This Supreme Court judgment in Feroz Din and Others v. The State of West Bengal (1959) primarily deals with the interpretation of a strike and a lock-out under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The crux of the dispute was whether the actions of the Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., in issuing notices to its workers, constituted a lock-out, thereby making the subsequent workers’ strike a reactionary and legal one. The appellants, having been convicted under Section 27 for instigating an illegal strike, challenged the validity of their conviction by arguing that the company had effected an illegal lock-out through two specific notices dated April 8 and April 25, 1953. However, the Court found that these notices did not amount to a lock-out but were instead clear acts of employee discharge. The Court clarified the distinction between a “discharge” and a “lock-out” under Section 2(1) and Section 2(oo) of the Act and held that the conviction was valid as the strike was not in response to an illegal lock-out. It also upheld the validity of government sanction under Section 34(1) of the Act, even though it lacked detailed reasoning on its face, since supporting evidence showed proper factual consideration. Ultimately, while affirming the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence imposed on the appellants.

Keywords: Illegal strike, Lock-out definition, Discharge vs. Lock-out, Industrial Disputes Act, Section 27 conviction, Sanction under Section 34.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Feroz Din and Others v. The State of West Bengal

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 48 of 1958

iii) Judgement Date
November 25, 1959

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Hon’ble Justices S.K. Das, A.K. Sarkar, and M. Hidayatullah

vi) Author
Justice A.K. Sarkar

vii) Citation
AIR 1960 SC 363, (1960) 2 SCR 319

viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Section 2(1), 2(oo), 22, 24, 27, 33, and 34 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Labour Law, Criminal Law, Industrial Disputes

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The present case arose against the backdrop of industrial unrest at the Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd., a public utility concern in Burnpur, West Bengal. The company faced a slowdown strike in its Hot Mill section. The appellants, including four employees and an outsider, allegedly incited the strike. The company responded with disciplinary actions, including dismissals. The employees challenged these actions as constituting a “lock-out.” The central legal tension revolved around whether these dismissals, communicated through two notices, amounted to a “lock-out,” thereby legitimizing the workers’ retaliatory strike under Section 24(3) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The interpretation of “lock-out” and its distinction from a “discharge” was key. The matter reached the Supreme Court via a special leave petition following convictions under Section 27 of the Act, which penalizes instigation of illegal strikes. This judgment serves as a foundational precedent in defining the contours of employer-employee relations under Indian industrial jurisprudence.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. experienced a slow-down strike in the Hot Mill section of its Sheet Mill in 1953. The company alleged that four of its employees, who are also the appellants in this case, instigated the strike. Following this, it served charge sheets on the involved workers and eventually dismissed them. On April 8, 1953, the company issued a notice to all Hot Mill workers, stating that if they failed to record willingness to work the plant to its full capacity by April 10, they would be deemed no longer employed. Only 40 of about 340 workers complied. On April 11, a larger section of the Sheet Mill, around 1300 workers, initiated a sit-down strike.

Subsequently, on April 25, 1953, a second notice reiterated that workers who had not responded were considered no longer employed, but their formal discharge had been kept pending to avoid unfair assumptions. It asked for compliance by April 28. Failure would result in full discharge. In the meantime, the Labour Minister proposed a compromise and suggested reinstatement of workers if they reported for duty. However, a strike occurred on April 27 involving nearly all workers except essential services. The company, after obtaining government sanction under Section 34(1), filed a complaint under Section 27, leading to the appellants’ conviction for instigating an illegal strike. They challenged the conviction as unjust and argued the notices amounted to a lock-out.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the two notices issued by the employer amounted to a lock-out under Section 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947?

ii) Whether the resultant strike was legal, having occurred in response to an alleged illegal lock-out under Section 24(3)?

iii) Whether the employer’s action in terminating employment via the two notices constituted a discharge or a lock-out?

iv) Whether the sanction under Section 34(1) was invalid due to lack of reasoning on the face of the sanction?

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The notices of April 8 and April 25, 1953, were not mere discharges but de facto lock-outs, as they imposed collective employment termination upon workers unwilling to submit to arbitrary demands. The appellants argued that these notices resembled “refusal by an employer to continue to employ” under Section 2(1) of the Act and therefore met the statutory definition of lock-out. They further contended that even if the notices were termed “discharges,” they operated as functional lock-outs by denying workers access to employment without due process or valid reason. Consequently, the strike triggered thereafter was legal under Section 24(3). They also challenged the Section 34(1) sanction, arguing that the absence of express reference to case facts on its face rendered it bad in law, as held in Gokalchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King (1948) LR 75 IA 30.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The employer’s notices merely conveyed termination of employment contracts and were consistent with due industrial process. The wording of the notices made it clear that discharge had already occurred by April 10 and the April 25 notice was merely a formal confirmation. Hence, these notices did not fulfill the criteria under Section 2(1) of a “lock-out.” The company argued that employment relationships were severed, not suspended, which rules out any suggestion of a lock-out. They emphasized that even the Labour Minister’s compromise assumed termination had taken place. They justified the Section 34(1) sanction by relying on Presidency Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Presidency Jute Mills Employees Union [1952] LAC 62, where it was held that absence of explicit facts in the sanction is not fatal if evidence proves their consideration.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 2(1) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 – Defines “lock-out”
ii) Section 24(1) & (3) – Strike illegality and exceptions
iii) Section 27 – Penalty for instigating illegal strike
iv) Section 34(1) – Sanction requirement for complaint
v) Section 33 – Prohibition of actions during conciliation
vi) Section 2(oo) – Definition of retrenchment (introduced later but discussed for comparative reasoning)

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court held that the April 8 and 25 notices constituted a discharge of employees and not a lock-out. The term “no longer employed” indicated severance of the employment relationship. A discharge ends employment, while a lock-out suspends it. The removal of names from rolls was held to be a mere formality. The judgment clarified that Section 2(1) does not include discharge within the meaning of “lock-out.”

ii) It further ruled that Section 24(3) does not protect strikes which are responses to discharges, even if large-scale. The Court upheld the appellants’ conviction under Section 27, as the strike was illegal under Section 22 and did not qualify for exemption.

b. OBITER DICTA

i) The Court noted that permitting discharges to be equated with lock-outs would hamper employer discipline, conflict with Section 33, and undermine legislative intent. It warned against overextending worker protections beyond their statutory scope.

c. GUIDELINES

• A “lock-out” requires continuing employment status but denial of work.

• A discharge, even if collective, does not amount to a lock-out.

• Government sanction under Section 34(1) is valid if factual review is evident, even if not recorded in writing.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court in this landmark case clarified the contours of strike legality, lock-out definitions, and discharge procedures under Indian labour jurisprudence. It upheld the employer’s right to terminate employment in cases of worker misconduct or non-compliance, provided it is not done arbitrarily or under the guise of a lock-out. The decision draws a fine but critical distinction between discharge and lock-out, which has far-reaching implications on industrial relations. The Court’s reasoning prevents misuse of industrial protection provisions by employees and preserves employer prerogatives to maintain discipline. This case remains a cornerstone precedent for interpreting Sections 2(1), 24, and 27 of the Industrial Disputes Act and has been consistently cited in later industrial jurisprudence.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Presidency Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Presidency Jute Mills Co. Employees Union, [1952] LAC 62
ii) Gokalchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. The King, (1948) LR 75 IA 30

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, Sections 2(1), 2(oo), 22, 24, 27, 33, 34(1)
ii) Constitution of India – Article 226 and 227 (on High Court jurisdiction)