A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This landmark case Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay examined the constitutional validity of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, as amended in 1950. The petitioner, Lilavati Bai, challenged the legality of a government requisition order passed under Section 6(4)(a) of the Act. She contended that the Act violated her fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Indian Constitution and also asserted that the order was invalid as it was passed after the death of her husband, who was the original tenant. The Supreme Court held that the Act was constitutionally valid, being saved under Article 31(5)(a) as an existing law, and that the amendments did not require presidential assent under Article 31(3). The court further ruled that the State Government’s declaration of vacancy under Sections 5 and 6 was conclusive evidence, not open to judicial review under Articles 32 and 226. The judgment clarified the scope of judicial review and reinforced the sanctity of legislative intent in emergency housing laws. The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions with costs, upholding the legal framework governing land requisitions for public purposes.
Keywords: Constitutional Validity, Bombay Land Requisition Act, Requisition Order, Article 31, Article 19(1)(f), Article 226, Conclusive Evidence, Judicial Review, Public Purpose, Vacancy
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title:
Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay
ii) Case Number:
Petition No. 119 of 1955; Petition for Special Leave to Appeal No. 140 of 1955
iii) Judgement Date:
5 March 1957
iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum:
S.R. Das C.J., B.P. Sinha J., Venkatarama Ayyar J., S.K. Das J., Gajendragadkar J.
vi) Author:
Justice B.P. Sinha
vii) Citation:
[1957] SCR 721
viii) Legal Provisions Involved:
Sections 5, 6 and 13 of the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 (as amended);
Articles 19(1)(f), 31, 32, and 226 of the Constitution of India
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any):
None explicitly overruled.
However, it clarified the scope of judicial review in light of earlier conflicting Bombay High Court decisions.
x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Constitutional Law, Administrative Law, Property Law, Urban Land Regulation
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The case emerged amidst post-Independence housing shortages in urban India, especially Bombay. The State invoked its legislative power to requisition premises for public purposes, including housing for government servants. The Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 was originally enacted before the Constitution but was later amended post-1950. The petitioner, Lilavati Bai, was the widow of Dharamdas Chellaram, the original tenant. Following her husband’s death, the government declared the premises vacant and issued a requisition order. The petitioner contended that the order was void due to the lack of proper service, and the Act’s inconsistency with fundamental rights. The Bombay High Court rejected her plea, following which she moved the Supreme Court under Article 32, coupled with a Special Leave Petition under Article 136.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
Lilavati Bai was the widow of Dharamdas Chellaram, the tenant of Flat No. 3, Hem Prabha Building, Marine Drive, Bombay. After Dharamdas’ death in November 1953, the State of Bombay declared the premises vacant as of October 1952, alleging the tenant had vacated and handed over possession to a lodger, Narottamdas Dharamsey Patel. On 27 January 1954, the Government requisitioned the premises under Section 6(4)(a) of the Act for housing a State Government servant. The petitioner found the requisition order pasted on the door and approached the Bombay High Court for a writ of mandamus, which was dismissed. She then approached the Supreme Court, challenging the validity of the Act and the order.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether the Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 as amended, violated Articles 19(1)(f) and 31 of the Constitution.
ii) Whether the amendments made in 1950 without Presidential assent were invalid under Article 31(3).
iii) Whether the State Government’s declaration of vacancy could be reopened by judicial review.
iv) Whether the requisition order issued after the death of the tenant was legally enforceable.
v) Whether the rule of ejusdem generis applied to the phrase “or otherwise” under Explanation (a) to Section 6.
F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:
The Act violated Article 31(2) as it did not initially mention “public purpose”, making the original and amended versions unconstitutional after 26 January 1950[1]. They argued that since the amending Acts of 1950 lacked Presidential assent, they became void under Article 31(3)[2]. They further contended that Sections 5 and 6, by rendering government findings conclusive, curtailed the judicial power of the High Court and Supreme Court, violating the basic structure of judicial review[3]. They also argued that the order was invalid since Dharamdas had died before it was issued, making it non-est in law[4]. They invoked the doctrine of ejusdem generis, arguing that “or otherwise” in Explanation (a) to Section 6 must be construed restrictively and cannot extend to death[5].
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:
The Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948 was an existing law under Article 31(5)(a) and did not require compliance with Article 31(2). As held in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, [1955] 1 SCR 777, it remained constitutionally valid even without expressly stating “public purpose”[6]. The amendments of 1950 merely clarified the Act and did not alter its substantive character; hence, Presidential assent was not mandatory under Article 31(3)[7]. They also contended that Sections 5 and 6 provided conclusive presumptions, which were valid legislative instruments to ensure effective implementation of housing policy[8]. The order, though made after Dharamdas’ death, was valid since the vacancy arose during his lifetime, and the law allowed requisition based on objective findings[9]. They rejected the ejusdem generis plea, citing Skinner & Co. v. Shaw & Co., (1893) 1 Ch D 413, to show that “or otherwise” must be given a broad interpretation[10].
H) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Court upheld the constitutional validity of the Act under Article 31(5)(a), following its earlier decision in State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji[11]. It held that amendments made after the Constitution’s commencement did not alter the substantive nature of the Act and thus did not require Presidential assent under Article 31(3)[12].
ii) The findings of the Government under Sections 5 and 6 declaring vacancy were deemed conclusive evidence, not open to challenge under Article 226 or Article 32[13]. The Court applied Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S.K. Shaw & Brothers, [1951] SCR 145, which upheld similar finality clauses as constitutionally valid[14].
iii) The Court rejected the argument that the phrase “or otherwise” in Explanation (a) to Section 6 must be interpreted narrowly. It held that the words were expansive, covering all modes of vacancy, including death of the tenant[15].
iv) The Court clarified that the requisition order, though mentioning the name of a deceased person, was administrative and not judicial. Therefore, it did not become invalid on that ground[16].
b. OBITER DICTA
i) The Court remarked that legislative finality clauses, if clearly worded, are not unconstitutional per se, especially in land control statutes aimed at public welfare[17].
ii) The Court noted that judicial review under Article 226 is not extinguished but remains limited in matters where the legislature intends administrative finality[18].
c. GUIDELINES
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Legislative declarations like “conclusive evidence” are binding unless fraud or ultra vires is proven.
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Statutes aimed at public welfare and housing shortages are to be construed liberally.
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Amendments that merely clarify existing intent need not undergo presidential scrutiny under Article 31(3).
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The phrase “or otherwise” in legislation should be interpreted broadly, not restricted by ejusdem generis unless contextually necessary.
I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The Supreme Court’s decision in Lilavati Bai v. The State of Bombay established a firm precedent on the scope of judicial review in cases involving statutory finality clauses and land requisition laws. The Court reaffirmed the principle that legislative judgments on vacancy and requisition, when backed by express statutory authority, are not subject to collateral judicial scrutiny. It also clarified the non-applicability of Article 31(3) to certain types of amendments to existing laws, strengthening the doctrine of constitutional continuity. The decision balanced individual rights with public purpose, acknowledging the pressing housing needs of post-independence India.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
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State of Bombay v. Bhanji Munji, [1955] 1 SCR 777
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Rai Brij Raj Krishna v. S.K. Shaw & Brothers, [1951] SCR 145
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Moosa Goolam Ariff v. Ebrahim Goolam Ariff, [1912] 39 IA 237
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Skinner & Co. v. Shaw & Co., (1893) 1 Ch D 413
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Hubli Electricity Co. v. Province of Bombay, [1948] 76 IA 57
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Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd., [1917] AC 406
b. Important Statutes Referred
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Bombay Land Requisition Act, 1948, Sections 5, 6, 13
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Constitution of India, Articles 19(1)(f), 31, 31(3), 31(5)(a), 32, 226
