A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This landmark case Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi (AIR 1957 SC 425) presents an incisive judicial pronouncement on the principles of natural justice, bias, and waiver within quasi-judicial proceedings. The appellant, an advocate, faced professional misconduct charges involving the alleged fabrication of a court order to benefit his clients. A tribunal under the Bar Councils Act, 1926, found him guilty. The composition of the tribunal was challenged on the grounds that its Chairman, a senior advocate, had previously appeared for the complainant in the same matter. The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that justice must not only be done but must manifestly appear to be done, asserting that any reasonable apprehension of bias could vitiate the proceeding. However, it held that a party aware of such a disqualification who does not object in time waives the right to later contest the tribunal’s composition. Ultimately, the Court upheld the tribunal’s finding and the High Court’s order striking the appellant’s name from the roll of advocates, considering the gravity of the misconduct. The case provides a robust framework on judicial impartiality, waiver of rights, and standards of professional ethics under Indian legal jurisprudence.

Keywords: Bias in tribunal, Professional misconduct, Natural justice, Waiver of objection, Bar Councils Act.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Manak Lal v. Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 246 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date
February 6, 1957

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Justices S.K. Das, Venkatarama Ayyar, and P.B. Gajendragadkar

vi) Author
Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar

vii) Citation
AIR 1957 SC 425; 1957 SCR 575

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 10(2), Bar Councils Act, 1926

• Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act, 1879

• Section 145, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898

• Principles of natural justice

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects

• Constitutional Law

• Legal Ethics / Professional Misconduct

• Administrative Law

• Criminal Procedure

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
This case arose from a professional misconduct complaint against Manak Lal, an advocate practicing in the Rajasthan High Court. The complaint, filed by Dr. Prem Chand Singhvi, alleged that the advocate obtained a fraudulent stay order by colluding with court staff to benefit his clients in a dispute under Section 145 CrPC. The matter was referred to a tribunal established under Section 10(2) of the Bar Councils Act, 1926, which found the advocate guilty. A legal challenge followed regarding the tribunal’s composition, as its chairman had once represented the complainant in the same matter. The Supreme Court examined the larger issue of judicial bias and waiver and reiterated its commitment to upholding principles of natural justice.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The dispute arose from proceedings under Section 145 CrPC relating to agricultural land and a well known as the “Jhalra well”. The appellant represented Party No. 1 (Pukhraj and others), while Dr. Prem Chand led Party No. 2. After the Sub-Divisional Magistrate issued preliminary and attachment orders, the appellant filed a revision in the Sessions Court at Pali. During proceedings, it was discovered that a fraudulent stay order had been inserted into the judicial record, purportedly directing the Magistrate to halt execution of earlier orders. Investigations revealed that a court clerk had authored and dispatched this order, which the appellant personally delivered to the lower court. The Sessions Judge fined the clerk and closed the matter. However, a formal complaint was lodged under Section 13 of the Legal Practitioners Act, and a tribunal found the appellant guilty of grave misconduct. Crucially, the chairman of the tribunal had appeared for the complainant in earlier related proceedings, leading to an allegation of bias.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether the tribunal was vitiated by bias owing to the participation of a member who had earlier appeared for the complainant?
ii) Whether the failure to raise this objection earlier constituted a waiver?
iii) Whether the appellant’s conduct amounted to professional misconduct under law?
iv) Whether the High Court’s punishment of removing the appellant’s name from the roll of advocates was justified?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that the tribunal was not legally constituted because its Chairman, Shri Chhangani, had previously appeared for the complainant in a related proceeding. This gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias, thus vitiating the proceedings. They cited Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 K.B. 256 and Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices [1926] A.C. 586 to support their argument that not just actual bias, but the appearance of bias was sufficient to invalidate quasi-judicial proceedings[1]. The appellant further argued that no waiver could be implied since he was not aware that Shri Chhangani’s prior appearance disqualified him. It was also contended that the evidence against the appellant was primarily circumstantial and did not conclusively prove his involvement in the fabrication of the order[2].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that the appellant had full knowledge of Shri Chhangani’s appearance in earlier proceedings but chose not to object until the tribunal had delivered an adverse finding. Hence, his conduct constituted an unequivocal waiver[3]. The respondent also stressed that the evidence, including the appellant’s presence in court, the delivery of the fraudulent order, and the testimony of court clerks, clearly pointed to the appellant’s active involvement. They argued that such acts of misleading the court and tampering with judicial processes amounted to serious professional misconduct under the Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, warranting the penalty imposed[4].

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Section 10(2), Bar Councils Act, 1926 – Empowers the Chief Justice of the High Court to constitute a tribunal to inquire into allegations of professional misconduct against advocates.
ii) Section 13, Legal Practitioners Act, 1879 – Prescribes penalties for professional misconduct, including suspension or removal from the roll.
iii) Section 145, CrPC, 1898 – Relates to disputes concerning possession of immovable property likely to cause breach of peace.
iv) Doctrine of Bias (Nemo judex in causa sua) – A person cannot be a judge in his own cause.
v) Principles of Natural Justice – Includes fair hearing and absence of bias.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Supreme Court reaffirmed that a reasonable apprehension of bias in a quasi-judicial body is sufficient to vitiate proceedings. The test is whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend that bias might have influenced the decision. The Court applied this test to hold that Shri Chhangani, having previously represented the complainant, should not have served on the tribunal. However, since the appellant had knowledge of this fact and failed to object timely, he waived his right to challenge the tribunal’s composition. This waiver was inferred from the appellant’s silence and subsequent conduct. Additionally, the Court found the evidence against the appellant reliable and conclusive, upholding the finding of gross professional misconduct[5].

b. OBITER DICTA 
i) The Court observed that even in quasi-criminal proceedings like those under the Bar Councils Act, the prosecution is not required to call all witnesses unless they are essential to the unfolding of the case. A complainant is not obliged to present accomplices as witnesses if the remaining evidence is sufficient.

c. GUIDELINES 

• A member of a tribunal with prior involvement in the matter disqualifies the body due to perceived bias.

• Waiver of objections can be implied if a party fails to raise timely protest despite knowing material facts.

• Misconduct involving manipulation of judicial records is a grave violation deserving strong penal action.

• Courts must preserve the integrity of the legal profession by upholding high ethical standards.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The Manak Lal judgment remains a cornerstone of Indian jurisprudence on natural justice, judicial bias, waiver, and professional ethics. The Supreme Court’s balanced approach in enforcing procedural fairness, while not allowing technical objections to override substantive justice, reflects its commitment to the rule of law. The waiver doctrine serves as a deterrent against strategic silence, and the affirmation of a stringent penalty illustrates zero tolerance for fraudulent behavior in court processes. This case underlines the indispensable role of lawyers in maintaining the sanctity of judicial institutions.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred
i. Rex v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 K.B. 256.
ii. Frome United Breweries Co. v. Bath Justices, [1926] A.C. 586.
iii. Vyvyan v. Vyvyan, (1861) 30 Beav. 65; 54 E.R. 813.
iv. Rex v. Essex Justices, Ex parte Perkins, [1927] 2 K.B. 475.
v. Rex v. Williams, Ex parte Phillips, [1914] 1 K.B. 608.

b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Bar Councils Act, 1926, [Section 10(2)]
ii. Legal Practitioners Act, 1879, [Section 13]
iii. Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, [Section 145]
iv. Constitution of India, Article 136 – Special Leave to Appeal
v. Principles of Natural Justice – Common Law Doctrine