A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
The Supreme Court in Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh (1957 SCR 657) tackled vital principles of criminal jurisprudence and the admissibility of evidence under the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The judgment delivered by Justice J.L. Kapur reversed the acquittal of the accused, Nisar Ali, previously declared not guilty by the Sessions Court in Bareilly. The Allahabad High Court, upon appeal, convicted him under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Sabir. The Supreme Court upheld this conviction, providing sharp scrutiny of evidentiary rules and emphasizing that falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is merely a cautionary guideline, not a binding rule. The Court held that the burden of proof in criminal trials rests squarely on the prosecution and underlined the irrelevance of First Information Reports made by co-accused persons. It also criticized the High Court’s improper assumption that an accused’s silence or failure to act affirmatively could be construed against them. This case remains a pivotal precedent for understanding the judicial treatment of conflicting testimonies and evidentiary weight in criminal appeals.
Keywords: First Information Report, Criminal Jurisprudence, Section 302 IPC, Presumption of Innocence, Falsus in Uno
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgement Cause Title: Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1956
iii) Judgement Date: 14 February 1957
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India
v) Quorum: B.P. Sinha, Bhagwati, and J.L. Kapur, JJ.
vi) Author: Justice J.L. Kapur
vii) Citation: 1957 SCR 657
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 302, Section 114 IPC, Sections 145 and 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None reported
x) Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Law of Evidence
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
This judgment arose in the aftermath of a conviction reversal by the Allahabad High Court, wherein the accused Nisar Ali was found guilty of murder after being acquitted by the Sessions Judge of Bareilly. The appellant, originally exonerated along with co-accused Qudrat Ullah, challenged the High Court’s decision that selectively set aside the acquittal of only one of the two accused. The core legal questions included the status of a First Information Report filed by a co-accused, the application of the legal maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, and the overarching presumption of innocence that governs criminal trials. These foundational principles and their application in the Indian legal system were decisively addressed by the Supreme Court through a detailed review of factual and evidentiary circumstances of the case.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
On 11 May 1951, Sabir was stabbed and killed at approximately 6:30 PM. Within 15 minutes, a First Information Report was lodged by Qudrat Ullah, a butcher and co-accused, at the police station. According to the prosecution, a verbal altercation arose near Qudrat Ullah’s shop between Sabir and Nisar Ali. The deceased had allegedly mocked Nisar Ali’s appearance, prompting a physical confrontation. Witnesses testified that Nisar Ali asked Qudrat Ullah for a knife, which was then used to stab Sabir. Post-assault, Nisar fled, while Qudrat Ullah took the injured Sabir to the hospital and subsequently filed the FIR.
Notably, the accused and the deceased were acquaintances from the same sect. Eyewitnesses — Yad Ali (PW1), Banne (PW2), and Mohammad Ahmed (PW3) — recounted seeing the physical scuffle and the stabbing. Other witnesses arrived later and found Sabir already unconscious. Qudrat Ullah claimed innocence and facilitated Sabir’s transport to the hospital. This action was heavily emphasized by the High Court while discrediting his alleged role in abetment.
The Sessions Court acquitted both accused, but the State appealed only against Nisar Ali, resulting in a reversal of his acquittal.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether a First Information Report by a co-accused can be treated as admissible evidence against the accused.
ii) Whether the principle falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus mandates the total rejection of testimony partially proven false.
iii) Whether the High Court’s reversal of acquittal was justifiable given the standards for evaluating evidence in criminal appeals.
F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for the appellant, Daulat Ram Prem and P.C. Agrawala, contended that the FIR made by Qudrat Ullah was inadmissible, as the maker himself was an accused and later exonerated. Under Section 157 and Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, a FIR can only corroborate or contradict the maker’s testimony — not be used substantively against others when the maker turns accused[1]. Since Qudrat was a co-accused, using the FIR against Nisar Ali violated this evidentiary principle.
They also argued that the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applied here. The eye-witnesses had falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah, and their entire testimonies should be discarded as unreliable. The contention was that once a part of a witness’s statement is disbelieved, the rest should not be selectively accepted.
Further, the appellant highlighted the contradictions and improbabilities in the prosecution’s narrative. There was no established motive for the crime, given the friendly relations between the accused and deceased. Also, the conduct of Qudrat Ullah in helping Sabir and reporting to police contradicted the theory of abetment, casting doubt on the overall prosecution version.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for the Respondent-State, Gyan Chand Mathur and C.P. Lal, emphasized that the case against Nisar Ali was fully supported by the testimonies of multiple eye-witnesses. They contended that even if Qudrat Ullah was falsely implicated, the role of Nisar Ali in the stabbing remained consistently established across all three primary witnesses. The doctrine of falsus in uno was, they argued, not a mandatory evidentiary principle in Indian law.
They further asserted that the First Information Report was never used as substantive evidence. Instead, the prosecution relied entirely on eye-witness testimony, post-mortem findings, and circumstantial consistency. The presence of motive — humiliation in a public place — and immediate conduct post-incident (fleeing the scene) further pointed to Nisar Ali’s guilt.
They urged the Court to uphold the High Court’s authority to reverse an acquittal if the Sessions Judge’s findings were “unreasonable or perverse,” causing miscarriage of justice.
H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Section 302 IPC – Punishment for Murder
ii) Section 114 IPC – Abetment
iii) Section 157 Evidence Act, 1872 – Corroboration of Witness Statement
iv) Section 145 Evidence Act, 1872 – Cross-Examination as to Previous Statements
I) JUDGEMENT
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Court held that a First Information Report filed by a co-accused cannot be treated as substantive evidence against the other accused if the maker himself becomes an accused later. It affirmed that FIRs are admissible only to the extent prescribed under Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act.
Further, the Court decisively rejected the rigid application of the doctrine falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. It reiterated that Indian jurisprudence does not recognize it as a rule of law. It is only a cautionary principle allowing courts to weigh evidence prudently, not mandatorily disregard it in entirety[2].
Lastly, the Court emphasized that presumption of innocence remains intact unless conclusively rebutted by the prosecution. The High Court’s suggestion that the accused’s silence implied guilt was labeled as a dangerous misdirection, bordering on violating fundamental legal safeguards. The conviction was upheld, but the Court cautioned against such judicial reasoning in future.
b. OBITER DICTA
i) Justice Kapur criticized the High Court for implying that an innocent man “must have come out of his house” to prove his innocence. He noted that such reasoning inverts the burden of proof and undermines the rule of presumed innocence, which is central to criminal law and upheld in landmark precedents like Woolmington v. DPP, [1935] AC 462.
c. GUIDELINES
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FIR by co-accused is inadmissible as substantive evidence against the accused.
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Falsus in uno is not a binding rule of law in India but a cautionary guideline.
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Conviction can be sustained even if a part of a witness’s statement is disbelieved, provided the rest is credible.
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Appellate courts may reverse acquittals if the trial court’s reasoning is perverse or grossly erroneous.
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Presumption of innocence cannot be overturned by accused’s silence or expected conduct.
J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The Supreme Court in Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh set enduring standards in evaluating testimonial evidence and preserving fundamental protections of accused persons. It clarified that evidence must be dissected prudently, without wholesale rejection merely due to partial inconsistencies. This judgment remains crucial in maintaining the delicate balance between convicting the guilty and safeguarding the innocent under India’s adversarial system. The Court’s refusal to allow circumstantial presumption to displace the burden of proof reflects its commitment to due process and reasoned adjudication.
K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
[1] Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] AC 462
[2] Chaubaria Singh v. Bhuneswari Prasad Pal, Privy Council (Unreported)
[3] Nisar Ali v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1957 SCR 657
b. Important Statutes Referred
[4] Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 302, Link
[5] Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 145 & 157, Link
[6] Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Section 114, Link
