A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India adjudicated upon Ratan Gond v. The State of Bihar, [1959] SCR 1336. This case examined the evidentiary admissibility of extra-judicial confessions, statements of deceased persons, and circumstantial evidence in a murder trial under Sections 302 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, and relevant provisions of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The appellant, Ratan Gond, was accused of murdering a minor girl, Baisakhi, allegedly for financial gain. The prosecution’s case was based on his extra-judicial confession made before village panchayat authorities and circumstantial evidence including the recovery of a blood-stained weapon and hair strands. The defense contended the inadmissibility of certain evidence, including hearsay statements of the deceased’s younger sister, Aghani, under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, and challenged the voluntariness and credibility of the confession. The Supreme Court upheld the admissibility and truthfulness of the extra-judicial confession, finding sufficient corroborative circumstantial evidence, and confirmed the conviction and death sentence. The Court emphasized the principles governing the admissibility of confessions under Section 24 of the Evidence Act, voluntary nature of confessions, and sufficiency of circumstantial corroboration.

Keywords: Extra-judicial confession, circumstantial evidence, Indian Evidence Act, Section 302 IPC, admissibility, voluntariness, corroboration, hearsay evidence, Panchayat Raj Act.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
Ratan Gond v. The State of Bihar

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. 76 of 1958

iii) Judgement Date:
September 19, 1958

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
S.K. Das, J.L. Kapur & Jaffer Imam, JJ.

vi) Author:
Justice S.K. Das

vii) Citation:
[1959] SCR 1336

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860

• Sections 24, 32(1), and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872

• Section 374 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (then applicable)

• Section 342 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for examination of accused)

• Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1948

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any):
None.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Criminal Law, Law of Evidence, Criminal Procedure, Constitutional Law (Article 136 – Special Leave Appeal).

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arose from a gruesome murder of a minor tribal girl, Baisakhi, aged about 9 years, in a village in Bihar. Her headless body was discovered following a report by her younger sister, Aghani. The prosecution alleged that the appellant, Ratan Gond, murdered her to obtain monetary rewards as part of a superstitious human sacrifice allegedly demanded by a contractor building a bridge. The trial court convicted Ratan Gond under Section 302 IPC, sentencing him to death. The Patna High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence. Upon special leave granted under Article 136 of the Constitution, the matter reached the Supreme Court.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The deceased, Baisakhi, and her younger sister Aghani lived with their widowed mother, Mst. Jatri, in the village Urte, Tola Banmunda, under Kolebera police station, Chotanagpur district. On May 7, 1957, both children went to the nearby jungle to pluck berries. The mother returned by noon and found only Aghani at home. The elder child was missing. A search ensued, and the next day villagers discovered Baisakhi’s headless body near Amtis Chua hill. The identification was confirmed through clothing and ornaments found on the body.

The appellant, Ratan Gond, who lived in the same village, was absent during this period. The Gram Panchayat authorities interrogated him after his capture from another village, Karmapani. Therein, he allegedly confessed to murdering Baisakhi for a promised reward of Rs. 80 offered by a contractor for a human head. Pursuant to this, police recovered a blood-stained “balua” (a sharp-edged weapon) from his house and strands of blood-stained hair from a place he indicated near the crime scene.

The defense challenged the admissibility of Aghani’s statements, the voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession, and sufficiency of circumstantial evidence.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the extra-judicial confession was voluntary, truthful, and admissible under Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
ii) Whether the statements made by Aghani (the deceased’s sister) were admissible under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.
iii) Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
iv) Whether the non-compliance with procedural safeguards under Section 342 CrPC prejudiced the accused.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The confession was not voluntary as it was obtained while the appellant was in custody of village authorities who were legally persons in authority under the Bihar Panchayat Raj Act. The delay of 2-3 hours before making the confession suggests pressure or inducement violating Section 24 of the Evidence Act.

The statements of the deceased’s sister, Aghani, were inadmissible hearsay. She did not make these statements before any judicial authority or legally authorized person, disqualifying their inclusion under Sections 32 and 33 of the Indian Evidence Act.

The circumstantial evidence did not complete the chain necessary to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The discovery of blood-stained articles lacked decisive forensic confirmation tying the blood to the deceased.

The procedural irregularity under Section 342 CrPC, where certain key incriminatory circumstances were not put to the appellant, prejudiced his defense, thereby vitiating the trial process.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The confession was voluntarily made without coercion or inducement. The Panchayat members interrogated the appellant lawfully, and no threats were evidenced. The two-three hour period involved breaks, including offering food, and no continuous questioning occurred.

The statements of Aghani were irrelevant, and even if excluded, the remaining circumstantial evidence and confession sufficiently established guilt.

The recovery of the blood-stained balua, recovery of hair strands stained with human blood, and the appellant’s absconding behavior firmly established the guilt when read in conjunction with the confession.

The procedural lapses, even if present, did not prejudice the appellant since the critical evidence was adequately established and not seriously challenged in cross-examination.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i)

• Section 24 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Inadmissibility of confession induced by threat, inducement, or promise.

• Section 32(1) of Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Admissibility of statements by deceased relating to the cause of their death.

• Section 33 of Indian Evidence Act, 1872: Admissibility of evidence recorded in previous judicial proceedings.

• Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, 1860: Punishment for murder.

• Section 342 CrPC, 1898: Examination of accused.

• Section 374 CrPC, 1898: Confirmation of death sentence.

• Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1948: Legal status of village panchayat officials.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court ruled that statements of Aghani were inadmissible as they neither related to her own death nor were recorded by a judicial authority under Sections 32 or 33 of the Evidence Act.

ii) The Court held that the extra-judicial confession was voluntary. While the panchayat authorities were persons in authority under Section 24, no inducement or coercion was evident.

iii) The circumstantial evidence sufficiently corroborated the confession. Recovery of the blood-stained balua, human blood-stained female hair, and abscondence demonstrated a chain of guilt that excluded reasonable doubt.

iv) Procedural omissions under Section 342 CrPC were regrettable but not fatal since no prejudice resulted.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court emphasized caution while relying on extra-judicial confessions but noted that when properly corroborated by credible circumstances, such confessions can sustain a conviction.

ii) The Court also underlined the need for strict compliance under Section 342 CrPC in future trials to avoid omissions.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Extra-judicial confessions, when corroborated by independent and incriminating circumstances, can validly form the basis for conviction.

• Statements under Section 32(1) are restricted to the deceased’s own cause of death.

• Panchayat members are persons in authority under Section 24 Evidence Act.

• Procedural lapses must be assessed on whether real prejudice occurred.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Ratan Gond case remains a seminal authority on the admissibility of extra-judicial confessions in Indian criminal jurisprudence. The Supreme Court meticulously balanced procedural fairness with substantive justice. It reaffirmed that confessions made to persons in authority require scrupulous examination for voluntariness under Section 24 of the Evidence Act. At the same time, it highlighted that corroborated extra-judicial confessions, supported by credible circumstantial evidence, can validly lead to conviction even in absence of direct evidence.

This judgment also clarified the narrow interpretation of Section 32 of the Evidence Act, excluding statements of third parties about someone else’s death. The Court’s approach demonstrates both the rigor and flexibility of Indian evidentiary law, ensuring that justice is not derailed by technicalities but secured through careful evaluation of all admissible material.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. The Queen v. Thompson, (1893) 2 Q.B. 12.

2. In re Kataru Chinna Papiah, AIR 1940 Mad 136.

3. Hashmat Khan v. The Crown, ILR (1934) 15 Lah 856.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Indian Evidence Act, 1872, Sections 24, 32(1), 33.

2. Indian Penal Code, 1860, Sections 302, 34.

3. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, Sections 342, 374.

4. Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 1948.