A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court’s decision in Shrimant Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade v. Shrimant Malojirao Daulatrao Ghorpade and Others (1952 SCR 402) focused on the jurisdictional competence of civil courts in matters concerning saranjam lands under the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876. The central question revolved around whether a suit filed to declare a government resolution ultra vires and to assert exclusive rights over a saranjam estate was maintainable before a civil court. The estate, known as the Gajendragad Saranjam, had a complex history of recognition, partition, and governmental re-grants dating back to British India. The appellant challenged the 1936 Government Resolution, which allowed the de facto division of the estate into three hereditarily continuable portions held by different family branches. The plaintiff contended that he alone was entitled to be recognised as the sole saranjamdar under a prior resolution of 1932 and that subsequent governmental interference was ultra vires.

The Court held that such suits were barred under Section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as they amounted to claims against the Crown relating to lands held as saranjam. The Court also emphasized that the plaintiff’s claims against the co-defendants could not be separated from those against the government. It established a significant precedent on the interpretation of jurisdictional ousters under revenue statutes and the limitations of civil court authority when adjudicating disputes involving special tenures like saranjam. The ruling also clarified the application of earlier precedents and fortified governmental authority in revenue-related adjudications.

Keywords: Saranjam, Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, Crown Suits, Ultra Vires, Civil Court Jurisdiction, Inam, Partition, Hereditary Grants, Res Judicata, British India Revenue Law.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Shrimant Sardar Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade v. Shrimant Malojirao Daulatrao Ghorpade and Others

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1950

iii) Judgement Date: 30th January, 1952

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Patanjali Sastri C.J., S.R. Das J., and Vivian Bose J.

vi) Author: Vivian Bose J.

vii) Citation: (1952) SCR 402

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 4(a), Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876

• Schedule B, Rule 10 of the Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852

• Section 2(3), Bombay Summary Settlement Act, 1863

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any): Dattatreya Viswanath v. Secretary of State for India (ILR 1948 Bom. 809) disapproved

x) Case is Related to: Constitutional Law, Revenue Law, Property Law, Colonial Land Tenures, Civil Procedure

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This case arose out of a long-standing inheritance dispute involving the Gajendragad Saranjam, a landed estate originally recognized during British rule. The estate, governed under pre-independence land tenure systems, was subjected to repeated governmental interventions and revenue resolutions determining the rights of successors. These interventions culminated in a 1936 resolution that allowed hereditary continuation of estate portions to members of different branches of the same family. The plaintiff, who represented the senior-most line, challenged this as unlawful, seeking a declaration and injunction that only he held rights as the sole saranjamdar. He also sought to restrain the co-defendants from exercising any estate rights. The legal question concerned the maintainability of such a suit before a civil court, given the statutory bar under the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act. The case’s trajectory reflects both the peculiar legal fabric of hereditary land grants under colonial India and the changing nature of land governance post-independence.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The original grantee of the Gajendragad Saranjam was Bhujangrao Appasaheb, recognized by the British government. His successor Daulatrao I died in 1864, leaving three sons. A dispute ensued in 1866 between the sons regarding the partibility of the estate, resolved by the Bombay High Court in 1868 (5 Bom H.C.R. 161), declaring the estate partible and assigning one-third shares to each brother. Following this, multiple governmental interventions occurred, notably a Government Resolution of 1891 declaring the estate an inalienable and impartible saranjam, hereditarily continuable to legitimate male descendants of the original grantee.

In 1932, the government formally resumed the estate and regranted it solely to the plaintiff, Bhujangrao Daulatrao Ghorpade, excluding the other branches. This prompted resentment, and the Government, through a Resolution in 1936, modified its earlier order, recognizing the estate as divisible into three de facto hereditarily continuable shares. The plaintiff challenged this in a civil court, seeking to invalidate the 1936 Resolution, restore the 1932 position, and restrain the defendants from exercising any rights as saranjamdars. The government was impleaded as a party to ensure enforcement against the state.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether a suit seeking to challenge the validity of a government resolution affecting saranjam lands is maintainable before a civil court?

ii. Whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over claims relating to lands held as saranjam under Section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876?

iii. Whether the plaintiff can claim exclusive rights as saranjamdar, to the exclusion of other co-claimants recognized by the government?

iv. Whether the government’s modification of its own prior resolutions can be challenged in civil court?

v. Whether rights against private parties in a dispute over a saranjam estate can be adjudicated independently of the claims against the government?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the petitioner/appellant submitted that the 1936 Resolution was ultra vires as it sought to reverse the 1932 Resolution, which had already recognised the plaintiff as the sole saranjamdar.

They argued that once the estate was regranted in 1932 in the plaintiff’s sole name, the government had no legal authority to alter or divide it among the other claimants. The estate had thus become the exclusive hereditary property of the plaintiff under the terms of the regrant.

They also contended that the 1936 Resolution infringed upon the vested rights of the plaintiff by attempting to confer de facto and hereditary continuity to other branches, despite prior governmental records treating those branches merely as potgi holders.

They invoked the principles of legitimate expectation, asserting that based on governmental representations in 1932, the plaintiff had a protected right over the estate. The alteration by the 1936 Resolution was thus arbitrary and contrary to established legal norms governing regrants under Rule V and Rule IX of the 1852 Act.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the respondents submitted that the government retained the sovereign authority to resume and regrant lands held as saranjam and that such acts were governed by executive discretion, not subject to judicial review under Section 4 of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act.

They argued that the 1936 Resolution was merely a formal recognition of the existing de facto possession and enjoyment of the estate by different family branches. The modification did not alter the nature of the estate as inalienable and impartible but merely regularised hereditary continuity of distinct shares.

They further contended that the estate had historically been subject to judicial declarations of partibility, as held in the 1868 and 1908 judgments, and the plaintiff’s claim was barred by res judicata. The present suit, therefore, sought a reversal of those long-standing judicial decisions indirectly.

They emphasized that the reliefs sought by the plaintiff inherently challenged Crown acts related to revenue and land, which are clearly excluded from the civil court’s jurisdiction under Section 4 of the 1876 Act.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 4(a), Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876: Bars suits in civil courts against the Crown relating to lands held as saranjam.

ii. Rule V, Schedule B, Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852: Permits the government to resume and regrant saranjam estates on the death of a holder.

iii. Rule IX, Schedule B, 1852 Act: Grants the government power to resume lands for non-compliance with maintenance obligations and redistribute revenues.

iv. Section 2(3), Bombay Summary Settlement Act, 1863: Grants regulatory power over land settlements to the provincial government.

H) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court held that the suit was barred under Section 4(a) of the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, as it directly related to land held as saranjam and was against the Crown.

The Court emphasized that rights of saranjamdars are inextricably linked to land, and any declaration of rights or privileges inevitably pertains to the land itself. Even declaratory reliefs that did not seek possession or revenue directly fell within the statutory prohibition.

The Court rejected the plaintiff’s contention that claims against co-defendants could be adjudicated separately from those against the government. The interdependence of claims rendered them inseparable, and any adjudication would affect the government’s rights and recognition orders.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court clarified that Section 4 applies even where the only relief sought is declaratory in nature and not for possession or monetary claims, disapproving earlier decisions like Dattatreya Viswanath v. Secretary of State for India (ILR 1948 Bom. 809) that had taken a narrower view of the jurisdictional bar.

c. GUIDELINES

Civil courts lack jurisdiction over claims involving land held as saranjam, even when the claim seeks only declaratory relief.

• Declaratory suits that indirectly question government action over saranjam lands fall under the statutory bar.

• If government is impleaded as a party, then the suit becomes one against the Crown, regardless of whether relief is sought from the government.

• Claims arising from succession or government recognition of hereditary estates should be resolved through executive or revenue authorities, not civil courts.

• Co-defendants’ rights arising from government action cannot be adjudicated separately in civil court.

I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Court’s ruling reinforced the supremacy of the executive in managing hereditary land tenures and affirmed the legislative intent to limit judicial interference in revenue and administrative decisions. It also clarified interpretive ambiguities in the Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, marking a clear line between civil disputes and governmental land administration. The case is a seminal precedent in revenue jurisprudence and remains authoritative on civil court jurisdictional limits in land-related cases involving princely or colonial grants.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. Basalingappagowda v. Secretary of State, (1926) 28 Bom LR 651 [1]

2. Basangauda v. Secretary of State, (1930) 32 Bom LR 1370 [2]

3. Province of Bombay v. Hormusji Manekji, (1947) 74 IA 103 [3]

4. Dattatreya Viswanath v. Secretary of State for India, ILR 1948 Bom 809 (Disapproved) [4]

5. Daulatrao v. Government of Bombay, (1945) 47 Bom LR 214 (Approved) [5]

6. Bhujangrao v. Malojirao, 5 Bom. H.C.R. 161 [6]

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Bombay Revenue Jurisdiction Act, 1876, Section 4(a) [7]

2. Bombay Rent-Free Estates Act, 1852, Schedule B, Rule V, IX [8]

3. Bombay Summary Settlement Act, 1863, Section 2(3) [9]