A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This Supreme Court judgment in State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others v. Thakur Ganga Singh and Another [1960 (2) SCR 346] addresses the scope of Article 132(2) of the Constitution of India, which provides for special leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on cases involving a substantial question of law relating to constitutional interpretation. The core legal issue was whether a rule under the Jammu & Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules—Rule 4-47—that denied service licenses to cooperative societies like the petitioner violated Article 14 (Right to Equality). The High Court had struck down the rule as ultra vires for violating Article 14. The State sought leave to appeal under Article 132(2), but the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, ruling that since no new or unsettled interpretation of the Constitution was in question—only its application—the matter did not qualify as a “substantial question of law” under Article 132(2). The Court upheld the principle that mere disagreement on classification under Article 14 does not amount to constitutional interpretation if the doctrine is already well-settled. This case reasserted that constitutional interpretation, as a threshold for appeal, must involve genuine legal ambiguity, not mere factual application.

Keywords: Article 132(2), Article 14, Rule 4-47, classification, special leave, equality before law, constitutional interpretation

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: State of Jammu & Kashmir and Others v. Thakur Ganga Singh and Another

ii) Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 217 of 1959

iii) Judgement Date: November 26, 1959

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: B.P. Sinha, C.J.; P.B. Gajendragadkar, K. Subba Rao, K.C. Das Gupta and J.C. Shah, JJ.

vi) Author: Justice K. Subba Rao

vii) Citation: 1960 (2) SCR 346

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Article 132(2) of the Constitution of India

• Article 14 of the Constitution of India

• Rule 4-47 of the Jammu & Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules

• Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir

• Jammu & Kashmir Co-operative Societies Act No. 6 of 1993 (Vikrimi)

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None

x) Law Subjects Involved:

• Constitutional Law

• Administrative Law

• Motor Vehicle Regulation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
This case examines the interplay between Article 132(2) and Article 14 of the Constitution in the context of a challenge to a state motor vehicle rule. The respondents challenged Rule 4-47 of the J&K Motor Vehicles Rules, which restricted service licenses only to individuals and partnerships, thus excluding cooperative societies. The Jammu & Kashmir High Court struck down the rule for violating Article 14, prompting the State to seek appeal under Article 132(1). When refused, they sought special leave under Article 132(2). This constitutional mechanism allows the Supreme Court to grant appeals only when a substantial question of law involving constitutional interpretation arises. The Supreme Court’s final ruling reiterated that no such substantial question was present since the issue merely involved application of well-settled principles on reasonable classification under Article 14, and not any new interpretation.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE
The first respondent was a shareholder in the Jammu Kashmir Mechanics and Transport Workers Co-operative Society Ltd., a body registered under the J&K Co-operative Societies Act. The society had applied for stage carriage and public carrier permits, which the Transport Department rejected. The rejection was based on Rule 4-47, which allowed permits only for natural persons or partnerships, thereby excluding co-operative societies. The respondents filed a writ petition under Section 103 of the J&K Constitution, challenging Rule 4-47 as violative of Article 14. The High Court accepted their argument and declared the rule ultra vires, issuing a writ of mandamus against its enforcement. The State then sought a certificate under Article 132(1) for an appeal to the Supreme Court, which the High Court denied, holding that no substantial question of constitutional interpretation was involved. Consequently, the State moved the Supreme Court under Article 132(2) for special leave.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i) Whether Rule 4-47 of the J&K Motor Vehicles Rules is discriminatory and ultra vires under Article 14 of the Constitution.
ii) Whether a classification that excludes co-operative societies while permitting individuals and partnerships is reasonable.
iii) Whether the appeal qualified under Article 132(2), i.e., does it involve a substantial question of law as to the interpretation of the Constitution.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for the Petitioner / Appellant submitted that any challenge to classification under Article 14 inherently raises an interpretational question of that Article. They argued that different legal personalities such as corporate bodies and partnerships have distinct characteristics. They contended that reasonable classification is permitted under Article 14, and Rule 4-47 is based on such valid differentiation. The State’s legal team, including the Additional Solicitor General, asserted that the purpose of the rule was to safeguard public interest and ensure effective regulatory compliance, justifying the exclusion of co-operative societies from transport licenses. They emphasized that the rule serves administrative convenience and public safety.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that Rule 4-47 was arbitrary and violated the right to equality. They emphasized that co-operative societies, like partnerships and individuals, are legal persons, and there’s no rational basis to exclude them. They argued that the rule lacked intelligible differentia and had no nexus with the object of the legislation. Since Article 14 jurisprudence was well-settled, there was no room for constitutional interpretation. Therefore, the special leave under Article 132(2) should not be granted as no substantial constitutional question was raised.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS
i) Article 132(2) – Special leave can be granted by the Supreme Court only if the case involves a substantial question of law regarding constitutional interpretation.
ii) Article 14 – Guarantees equality before the law and prohibits arbitrary classification.
iii) [Rule 4-47 of J&K Motor Vehicles Rules] – Allowed permits only to natural persons or partnerships, excluding corporate entities.
iv) [Section 103 of J&K Constitution] – Gave jurisdiction to the High Court to issue writs.
v) Article 141 of the Constitution – Declares that Supreme Court decisions are binding on all courts.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI
i) The Supreme Court held that no substantial question of law as to constitutional interpretation arose in the case. The dispute involved only the application of the well-settled classification test under Article 14, as established in previous rulings like Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar [1959 SCR 279] and Mohd. Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar [1959 SCR 629]. The meaning of Article 14 had already been interpreted authoritatively; hence, further appeal was not warranted under Article 132(2).

b. OBITER DICTA 
i) The Court observed that constitutional interpretation arises only where competing meanings are contended. If both parties accept a settled doctrine and only dispute its application, no question of interpretation emerges. Also, when the Supreme Court has already conclusively interpreted a provision, further legal doubt does not constitute a substantial question of law.

c. GUIDELINES

• A case must involve uncertainty in law, not just factual application, to invoke Article 132(2).

• Constitutional interpretation requires ambiguity or competing constructions.

• When Supreme Court jurisprudence is settled, its application to facts does not justify special leave.

• Equal protection challenges under Article 14 must demonstrate unresolved constitutional principles to attract Article 132(2).

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
This judgment delineates the boundary between constitutional interpretation and mere application of settled principles. It offers critical clarity on when special leave under Article 132(2) can be granted. The Court rightly ruled that settled jurisprudence, especially under Article 14, cannot be reopened unless new doctrinal issues are involved. The ruling further emphasizes judicial discipline in avoiding redundant constitutional litigation. It strengthens precedent consistency and respects the finality of Supreme Court interpretations under Article 141. By refusing to entertain appeals that merely re-argue facts under settled law, the Court upheld both judicial economy and constitutional structure.

K) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred

1. T.M. Krishnaswami Pillai v. Governor General in Council, (1947) 52 C.W.N. (F.R.) 1 [1]

2. Budhan Choudhry v. State of Bihar, [1955] 1 SCR 1045 [2]

3. Chiranjit Lal Chowdhuri v. Union of India, [1950] SCR 869 [3]

4. Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Justice Tendolkar, [1959] SCR 279 [4]

5. Mohammad Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar, [1959] SCR 629 [5]

6. Secretary of State for India v. I.M. Lal, [1945] FCR 103 [6]

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Constitution of India, Articles 14, 132(2), and 141

2. Jammu and Kashmir Motor Vehicles Rules, Rule 4-47

3. Jammu & Kashmir Constitution, Section 103

4. Jammu and Kashmir Co-operative Societies Act, No. 6 of 1993 Vikrimi