A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar ([1959] SCR 1367), the Supreme Court of India explored the nuanced distinction between personal insults to a judge and acts that scandalize the court, thereby constituting contempt. Revashankar filed a transfer application against a Magistrate containing serious allegations, including conspiracy and bribery. The High Court of Madhya Bharat dismissed contempt proceedings, holding that the act constituted an offence under Section 228 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which ousted its jurisdiction under Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The Supreme Court overturned this decision, ruling that such grave allegations went beyond personal insult, undermining public confidence in judicial integrity, and therefore amounted to contempt of court. The ruling laid down a clear test: where acts undermine the authority of the court itself rather than merely insult the judge personally, they do not fall under Section 228 IPC alone, preserving High Court jurisdiction for contempt.

Keywords: Contempt of Court, Scandalizing the Court, Intentional Insult, Section 228 IPC, Section 3(2) Contempt of Courts Act, Judicial Integrity, High Court Jurisdiction.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title:
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Revashankar

ii) Case Number:
Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date:
September 24, 1958

iv) Court:
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum:
Justice S. K. Das, Justice J. L. Kapur, Justice Jafer Imam

vi) Author:
Justice S. K. Das

vii) Citation:
[1959] SCR 1367

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

• Section 3(2), Contempt of Courts Act, 1952

• Section 228, Indian Penal Code, 1860

• Section 528, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (now repealed)

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case (if any):
None explicitly overruled, but it distinguished Narotam Das v. Emperor AIR 1943 All 97.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law, Contempt of Court Law.

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court in this case addressed the limits of judicial contempt jurisdiction under Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952. The controversy arose when Revashankar, embroiled in litigation in Indore courts, filed a transfer application accusing the Magistrate of conspiracy and bribery. These allegations, later repeated in an affidavit, led the Magistrate to report the matter for contempt action. The High Court, however, refused to proceed, holding that since the act was punishable under Section 228 IPC, its jurisdiction was ousted. The State of Madhya Pradesh challenged this interpretation.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

Revashankar faced litigation involving Ganga Ram, who sought his eviction. Multiple applications were filed in those proceedings, alleging forgery and conspiracy involving Revashankar. In retaliation, Revashankar filed a criminal complaint under Section 500 IPC against five individuals.

In his transfer application filed on December 17, 1953, Revashankar accused the presiding Magistrate, Mr. X.K. Acharya, of conspiring with others to implicate him falsely and accepting a bribe of ₹500 from the opposing counsel. He repeated these serious allegations in an affidavit dated December 21, 1953. These allegations were highly scandalous, casting aspersions on the Magistrate’s integrity and judicial conduct.

Upon receiving the transfer application, the Magistrate reported the matter to the Registrar of the High Court for contempt proceedings. The High Court issued notice but eventually held that the act fell squarely under Section 228 IPC and hence refused to entertain contempt proceedings, citing lack of jurisdiction under Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952.

The State appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the High Court’s jurisdiction under the Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 was ousted due to the applicability of Section 228 IPC.

ii) Whether allegations in a transfer application containing defamatory accusations against a Magistrate amount to contempt or merely intentional insult.

iii) Whether the presence of intention to insult is determinative for attracting Section 228 IPC.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The allegations in Revashankar’s application were not mere personal insults but scandalized the judiciary. The accusations questioned judicial impartiality, alleging corruption and criminal conspiracy, which impaired public confidence in judicial integrity. They cited the Supreme Court’s earlier rulings in Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras ([1952] SCR 425) and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh ([1953] SCR 1169), emphasizing that contempt proceedings aim to protect the judiciary’s authority, not the judge’s personal reputation[5].

The counsel argued that Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act only barred jurisdiction where the act was specifically punishable as contempt under the IPC, i.e., Sections 175, 178, 179, 180, and 228 IPC. The present allegations went far beyond Section 228, as they scandalized the court itself.

They further argued that intention to insult under Section 228 IPC must be inferred from facts. Here, Revashankar claimed in his affidavit that he intended no insult but only sought a transfer. Thus, the High Court’s reliance on Section 228 was misplaced.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

Every insult to a judge amounts to contempt under Section 228 IPC if made during judicial proceedings. Thus, as soon as there was intentional insult, the High Court’s jurisdiction stood ousted under Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act[5].

The respondent relied on Narotam Das v. Emperor AIR 1943 All 97, which held that scandalous allegations made in a transfer application do not amount to contempt but rather to intentional insult under Section 228 IPC. They argued that any contemptuous insult falls under this provision, precluding High Court jurisdiction.

The counsel asserted that since the transfer application was presented during the Magistrate’s sitting, it fulfilled the essential ingredients of Section 228 IPC: intentional insult during judicial proceedings.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 228, Indian Penal Code, 1860
Read here
“Intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial proceeding.”

ii) Section 3(2), Contempt of Courts Act, 1952
Read here
Bars High Court jurisdiction if contempt is punishable under IPC.

iii) Section 480, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
Provided for Magistrate’s power to summarily punish for contempt under certain IPC sections.

iv) Section 528, Criminal Procedure Code, 1898
Pertained to transfer of cases between subordinate courts.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that serious defamatory accusations against a Magistrate, impugning his integrity, went beyond mere personal insult. Such acts undermined public confidence in judicial administration and constituted contempt.

The Court clarified that Section 228 IPC addresses simple insults or interruptions during judicial sittings. However, when allegations attack the judiciary’s impartiality, they scandalize the court itself and fall outside Section 228 IPC.

ii) The Supreme Court emphasized that Section 3(2) of the Contempt of Courts Act ousts jurisdiction only where contempt is punishable under specific IPC provisions. Acts of “scandalizing the court” fall under contempt jurisdiction of the High Court[5].

iii) The Court cited Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras and Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh as authoritative precedents affirming that contempt aims to protect public confidence in the justice system, not judges personally.

iv) The Court criticized the High Court’s narrow view in interpreting intention and rejected its reliance on Narotam Das v. Emperor. It ruled that intention must be assessed case-by-case and in this instance, grave allegations transcended mere insult[5].

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that the act of filing defamatory transfer applications is not shielded by claiming intent to seek transfer. When such applications contain serious scandalous imputations, courts must treat them as contempt to preserve judicial authority.

ii) It reiterated Lord Atkin’s observation in Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago ([1936] AC 322): public criticism of courts is permitted unless it imputes improper motives or maliciously undermines judicial administration.

c. GUIDELINES

• Mere presence of insult does not automatically invoke Section 228 IPC.

• Intention must be assessed contextually.

• Scandalizing the court transcends Section 228 IPC and attracts contempt jurisdiction.

• High Courts retain contempt jurisdiction unless specific IPC provisions fully cover the offence.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s judgment reaffirmed the sanctity of judicial dignity while balancing free expression. The ruling clarifies that scandalizing the court compromises public trust in justice, a cornerstone of constitutional governance. This decision remains a leading precedent guiding Indian contempt law and judicial independence. The Court wisely refused to set rigid boundaries, leaving discretion to assess “intention” based on facts, preventing misuse of transfer applications as shields for baseless allegations.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Bathina Ramakrishna Reddy v. State of Madras, [1952] SCR 425 [5]
ii) Brahma Prakash Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, [1953] SCR 1169 [5]
iii) Narotam Das v. Emperor, AIR 1943 All 97 [5]
iv) Queen Empress v. Abdullah Khan, (1898) AWN 145 [5]
v) Emperor v. Murli Dhar, (1916) ILR 38 All 284 [5]
vi) Ambard v. Attorney-General for Trinidad and Tobago, [1936] AC 322 [5]

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Contempt of Courts Act, 1952 (Section 3(2))
ii) Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Section 228)
iii) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (Sections 480 & 528)