A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India examined whether drivers can be held liable under Section 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 for violating permit conditions under Section 42(1). The Allahabad High Court earlier held that only owners could be liable under these provisions. The Supreme Court rejected this, emphasizing that both owners and drivers bear responsibility. The Court interpreted Section 42(1) broadly, holding that it prohibits both owners from permitting unauthorized use and any person from driving a vehicle contrary to permit terms. The Court emphasized public safety and the legislative intent behind the Act, asserting that the Act aims to control both ownership and operation of vehicles to ensure compliance with permits. In allowing the State’s appeals, the Court restored the drivers’ convictions. The ruling clarified that drivers play a crucial role in complying with permit conditions, and their violation invites penal consequences.

Keywords: Motor Vehicles Act, Section 42(1), Section 123, Driver Liability, Permit Violation, Criminal Appeal, Public Safety, Legislative Intent, Owner Responsibility, Supreme Court of India

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
The State of Uttar Pradesh v. Bansraj (and connected appeal)

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeals Nos. 115/56 & 83/57

iii) Judgement Date
9th October 1958

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Justice Imam and Justice J.L. Kapur

vi) Author
Justice J.L. Kapur

vii) Citation
[1959] Supp. SCR 153

viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Section 42(1) and Section 123 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1939;
Section 438 of the Code of Criminal Procedure

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
The interpretation of Allahabad High Court in Uma Shankar v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 234 was overturned.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Criminal Law, Transport Law, Motor Vehicles Law, Statutory Interpretation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 governs the regulation of motor vehicles in India. Section 42(1) mandates that no owner shall use or allow the use of a transport vehicle without a valid permit. Section 123 penalizes violations of these conditions. The central legal issue arose over whether drivers, who are not owners, are liable for such contraventions. The Allahabad High Court had earlier absolved drivers from liability under Section 123. However, divergent rulings by various High Courts had created ambiguity. The Supreme Court was called upon to resolve this inconsistency and definitively interpret the statutory provisions.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

In Criminal Appeal No. 115/56, the respondent, Bansraj, was driving a public carrier authorized to carry six passengers under Permit No. 42-926/123. He was found carrying twenty-three passengers. Charged under Section 42(1) read with Section 123 of the Motor Vehicles Act, he denied the offense, claiming he carried only six passengers. The Magistrate convicted him and imposed a fine.

Bansraj appealed to the Sessions Court, which ruled that as a driver—not an owner—he could not be convicted under Section 123. The Sessions Court referred the case to the Allahabad High Court under Section 438 CrPC, which agreed with this view and acquitted him.

In Criminal Appeal No. 83/57, respondent Vishwanath drove a private station wagon carrying thirteen passengers without a valid permit. Eight passengers paid fares. The Magistrate acquitted the owner but convicted the driver under Section 123, enhancing his sentence due to prior convictions. On appeal, the Sessions Judge reversed the conviction, citing similar reasoning that the driver could not be liable under Section 123.

The State of Uttar Pradesh challenged these acquittals before the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Section 42(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act imposes liability solely on the owner or extends to anyone operating the vehicle.

ii. Whether drivers, who are not owners, can be prosecuted under Section 123 for driving in violation of permit conditions.

iii. How to interpret the legislative intent and language of Sections 42(1) and 123 concerning responsibility for permit violations.

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The State argued that the Motor Vehicles Act regulates both ownership and operation of motor vehicles. Section 42(1) employs broad prohibitive language: “No owner shall use or permit the use… save in accordance with the conditions of a permit.” The legislative intent was not merely to regulate ownership but also the act of using or driving a vehicle in breach of permit conditions.

The State emphasized that Section 123 uses the word “whoever drives”, indicating legislative intent to penalize not only owners but anyone driving in contravention of Section 42(1). By adopting such inclusive language, Parliament sought to ensure that drivers—who play a central role in enforcing permit conditions—remain accountable.

Reliance was placed on multiple High Court rulings which supported this interpretation, including Public Prosecutor v. Jevan, AIR 1941 Mad 845, Provincial Government C.P. & Berar v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1944 Nag 5, Chandra Deo Singh v. The State, 1954 C.W.N. 787, Teja Singh v. The State, AIR 1952 Punj 45, Kalyan Lal v. The State, AIR 1954 Raj 230, The State v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1955 Raj 185, and The State v. Motilal, AIR 1957 Raj 63.

They contended that if drivers could escape liability, the object of the statute to ensure safe and regulated use of transport vehicles would be defeated.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The respondents maintained that Section 42(1) exclusively imposes obligations upon owners. The section’s language prohibits an owner from using or permitting use of the vehicle without complying with permit conditions.

They argued that Section 123 should be read in conjunction with Section 42(1), and since the latter targets owners, drivers fall outside its ambit. The marginal note of Section 42—“necessity for permits”—supports this restricted interpretation.

Respondents relied on the Allahabad High Court’s ruling in Uma Shankar v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 234, where Aggarwala J. held that drivers were not liable for violating permit conditions. They asserted that criminal liability must be construed strictly, and ambiguity should benefit the accused.

The respondents warned against burdening drivers with responsibilities meant for owners, especially when drivers often lack knowledge of permit details.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 42(1), Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Click here for provision

ii. Section 123, Motor Vehicles Act, 1939
Click here for provision

iii. Section 438, Code of Criminal Procedure
Click here for provision

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court rejected the narrow interpretation adopted by the Allahabad High Court. It held that Section 42(1) does not merely target owners but prohibits the unauthorized use of vehicles per se. The provision stipulates that vehicles can only be used as authorized by the permit.

The Court emphasized that Section 123 employs the phrase “whoever drives”, which clearly encompasses drivers regardless of ownership. The Legislature’s deliberate use of “whoever” demonstrates intent to include all individuals who operate vehicles contrary to permit conditions.

Driving a vehicle contrary to permit conditions, regardless of ownership, constitutes an offense under Section 123. Hence, both Bansraj and Vishwanath, as drivers, were rightly convicted.

The Court drew support from multiple High Court rulings which consistently interpreted Section 123 to include drivers. Only the Allahabad High Court had diverged from this view.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court observed that safety on roads necessitates strict compliance with permit conditions. It stressed that both owners and drivers play pivotal roles in maintaining regulatory standards. Exempting drivers would weaken the regulatory regime.

The judgment emphasized that criminal statutes regulating public safety must be interpreted to advance legislative objectives rather than frustrate them.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Both owners and drivers are liable under Section 123 for driving contrary to permit terms.

• Section 42(1) prohibits unauthorized vehicle use broadly, not just by owners.

• “Whoever drives” in Section 123 includes drivers irrespective of ownership.

• Legislative intent aims at comprehensive control over both vehicle ownership and operation.

• Courts must adopt interpretations that promote public safety and regulatory compliance.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Public Prosecutor v. Jevan, AIR 1941 Mad 845[5].

ii. Provincial Government, C.P. & Berar v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1944 Nag 5[5].

iii. Chandra Deo Singh v. The State, 1954 C.W.N. 787[5].

iv. Teja Singh v. The State, AIR 1952 Punj 45[5].

v. Kalyan Lal v. The State, AIR 1954 Raj 230[5].

vi. The State v. Ram Chandra, AIR 1955 Raj 185[5].

vii. The State v. Motilal, AIR 1957 Raj 63[5].

viii. Uma Shankar v. Rex, AIR 1950 All 234[5].

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 – Sections 42(1), 123

ii. Code of Criminal Procedure – Section 438