A) Abstract / Headnote

This case examines whether the High Court was justified in allowing an amendment application under Order VI Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), altering the nature of a suit from one seeking partition to one seeking a declaration that a previous compromise decree was null and void. The Supreme Court held that amendments altering the fundamental nature of a suit or causing prejudice to the opposing party are impermissible. The application was rejected as it was time-barred under Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and contravened procedural diligence.

Keywords: Amendment application, Compromise decree, Partition suit, Order VI Rule 17 CPC, Limitation.

B) Case Details

• Judgment Cause Title: Basavaraj v. Indira and Others
• Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 2886 of 2012
• Judgment Date: 29 February 2024
• Court: Supreme Court of India
• Quorum: Justice C.T. Ravikumar and Justice Rajesh Bindal
• Author: Justice Rajesh Bindal
• Citation: [2024] 2 S.C.R. 935
• Legal Provisions Involved:
  • Order VI Rule 17, CPC (Amendment of pleadings)
  • Order XXIII Rule 3, CPC (Compromise decree)
  • Article 59, Limitation Act, 1963
• Judgments Overruled by the Case: None.
• Law Subjects: Civil Procedure, Property Law, Limitation Law

C) Introduction and Background of the Judgment

The dispute arose from a partition suit where respondents sought an amendment to the plaint to include a prayer for declaring a compromise decree (passed earlier in a Lok Adalat) as null and void. The trial court dismissed the amendment application; however, the High Court allowed it, reasoning that the relief was necessary for complete adjudication. The appellant challenged the High Court’s decision, contending procedural impropriety and prejudice.

D) Facts of the Case

1. Original Suit: Respondents filed a suit in 2005 for partition of ancestral property. They alleged that no actual partition had taken place.
2. Previous Compromise Decree: The dispute had been previously resolved in a Lok Adalat, leading to a compromise decree in 2004.
3. Amendment Application: After several years of trial, the respondents sought to amend the plaint to declare the compromise decree null and void, citing oversight.
4. Trial Court Decision: The trial court rejected the amendment as it altered the nature of the suit and was time-barred.
5. High Court Order: The High Court reversed the trial court’s decision, permitting the amendment.

E) Legal Issues Raised

1. Can an amendment application under Order VI Rule 17 CPC alter the fundamental nature of the suit?
2. Does the failure to exercise due diligence prevent amendment after the trial has commenced?
3. Is the amendment barred by limitation under Article 59 of the Limitation Act?
4. Can a compromise decree be challenged without bringing all necessary parties before the court?

F) Petitioners/Appellants’ Arguments

1. Nature of Suit Altered: The amendment changed the original suit for partition to one for declaration, which is impermissible under procedural law.
2. Bar of Limitation: The compromise decree, passed in 2004, could only be challenged within three years under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. The application filed in 2010 was time-barred.
3. No Due Diligence: The respondents failed to justify why they did not seek the relief earlier despite being aware of the compromise decree. Oversight cannot replace due diligence under Order VI Rule 17 CPC.
4. Prejudice to Opponent: Allowing the amendment would unfairly prejudice the appellants, who had acquired rights based on the compromise decree.
5. Binding Nature of Compromise Decree: As per Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC, a compromise decree is binding and can only be set aside by the court that recorded it.

G) Respondents’ Arguments

1. Oversight and Mistake: The omission to challenge the compromise decree was due to inadvertence. The amendment would prevent multiplicity of litigation and ensure justice.
2. Fair Partition: The prayer for declaration would only ensure that the partition was fair and not based on a flawed decree.
3. Costs as Compensation: Any inconvenience to the appellants could be compensated by costs.
4. No Prejudice: The amendment would not require additional evidence, as the case was already at the arguments stage.

H) Related Legal Provisions

1. Order VI Rule 17 CPC: Governs amendment of pleadings and prohibits amendments after trial commencement unless due diligence is shown.
2. Order XXIII Rule 3 CPC: Regulates the binding nature and challenge procedure for compromise decrees.
3. Article 59, Limitation Act, 1963: Prescribes a three-year limitation for challenging decrees or instruments.

I) Judgment

a. Ratio Decidendi

1. Fundamental Change in Suit: The proposed amendment altered the nature of the suit from partition to declaration, violating Order VI Rule 17 CPC.
2. Bar of Limitation: The amendment sought relief that was time-barred under Article 59 of the Limitation Act.
3. Lack of Due Diligence: The respondents failed to demonstrate diligence in seeking the amendment.
4. Prejudice to Appellants: Allowing the amendment would harm the appellants’ accrued rights based on the compromise decree.

b. Obiter Dicta

1. Binding Nature of Compromise Decrees: A compromise decree can only be challenged in the court that recorded it.
2. Multiplicity of Litigation: While avoiding multiplicity of litigation is desirable, procedural safeguards cannot be compromised.

c. Guidelines

1. Amendments altering the fundamental nature of a suit should not be allowed.
2. Time-barred amendments contravene procedural law.
3. Prejudice to the opposing party must be a key consideration in deciding amendment applications.

J) Conclusion and Comments

The Supreme Court’s decision reiterates the sanctity of procedural laws, emphasizing that amendments cannot be used to circumvent limitations or established rights. The case underscores the principle that substantive justice must align with procedural propriety.

References

1. Revajeetu Builders and Developers v. Narayanaswamy and sons and others, [2009] 15 SCR 103
2. Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh, [2006] Suppl. 3 SCR 370
3. M. Revanna v. Anjanamma, (2019) 4 SCC 332
4. Estralla Rubber v. Dass Estate (P) Ltd., (2001) 8 SCC 97
5. Limitation Act, 1963
6. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908