A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in Anant Gopal Sheorey v. The State of Bombay addressed a pivotal legal question concerning the retrospective applicability of procedural amendments under criminal law. The core issue revolved around whether the newly inserted Section 342A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), via the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955, could be applied to ongoing proceedings that had commenced before the amendment came into force. The Court ruled affirmatively, establishing that changes in procedural law generally operate retrospectively unless expressly excluded. The ruling emphasized a clear distinction between substantive and procedural law and underscored the legislative intent embedded within Section 116 of the Amendment Act. The Supreme Court carefully analyzed both the statutory provisions and prevailing jurisprudence to conclude that the appellant had the right to appear as a witness on his behalf, even though the trial began before the enactment of the amendment. This judgment serves as a critical reference for the principles governing retrospective application of procedural laws and the interpretation of saving clauses in statutory amendments.

Keywords: Retrospective Operation, Procedural Law, Section 342A CrPC, Section 116 Amendment Act, Saving Clause Interpretation, Criminal Procedure Amendment, Right to Testify.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Anant Gopal Sheorey v. The State of Bombay

ii) Case Number
Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 1957

iii) Judgement Date
May 22, 1958

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
B. P. Sinha, Jafer Imam, J. L. Kapur, JJ.

vi) Author
Kapur, J.

vii) Citation
(1959) SCR 919

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Section 342A of Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955

• Section 116 of Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955

• Article 20(3) of Constitution of India

• Section 282 of Indian Companies Act

• Sections 465, 477A of Indian Penal Code

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Criminal Law, Procedural Law, Constitutional Law, Statutory Interpretation

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arose from a criminal proceeding instituted against Anant Gopal Sheorey and others. The core legal contention focused on the retrospective application of a newly inserted provision, Section 342A of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1898, which permitted accused persons to testify as witnesses in their defense. Before this amendment, the unamended Code prohibited accused individuals from testifying. The legislative change via Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 posed a legal dilemma concerning its application to ongoing trials that commenced prior to the amendment’s effective date of January 2, 1956. The Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 116 of the Amendment Act, which functioned as a saving clause, became crucial to resolving whether procedural law changes had retrospective effect on pending trials.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On January 13, 1953, the Advocate General of Madhya Pradesh filed a complaint against the appellant and others under Section 282 of the Indian Companies Act, along with Sections 465 and 477A of the Indian Penal Code. The case was initially heard before a magistrate in 1954 but was transferred on May 18, 1955, to a Special Magistrate who began recording evidence on July 4, 1955. Subsequently, the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 received presidential assent on August 12, 1955, and came into effect on January 2, 1956.

Upon the amendment’s enforcement, the appellant invoked Section 342A, seeking to testify as a defense witness. The Special Magistrate rejected his application, ruling that the amendment was inapplicable to ongoing proceedings. The Nagpur High Court upheld this decision, concluding that pending cases would continue under the unamended procedural framework. The appellant then approached the Supreme Court via special leave.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether Section 342A of the amended CrPC applied to pending proceedings commenced before the amendment’s effective date.

ii) Whether procedural amendments generally operate retrospectively unless explicitly excluded.

iii) Interpretation of Section 116 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955 as a saving clause.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The appellant’s counsel, R. Patnaik, argued that procedural law, unlike substantive law, operates retrospectively. He emphasized that Section 342A conferred a procedural right allowing the accused to testify on oath. Citing legal maxims like lex proceduralis retro agit (procedural law acts retrospectively), the counsel underscored that no vested right exists in any particular mode of procedure. Relying on Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, he referenced The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) AC 369, where the Privy Council affirmed that procedural changes operate on pending cases unless otherwise excluded[5].

The counsel asserted that Section 116 of the Amendment Act did not explicitly exclude the applicability of Section 342A to pending proceedings. Only specific procedural amendments enumerated under clauses (a), (b), (c), and (d) of Section 116 were excluded. Since Section 342A was not listed among these exclusions, it should apply to the ongoing trial.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The respondent’s counsel, S. N. Bindra and R. H. Dhebar, argued that Section 116(c) clearly stated that any inquiry or trial, where recording of evidence commenced before the amendment, would continue as if the amendment had not been passed. They stressed the phrase: “as if this Act had not been passed”, interpreting it to mean that all amendments, including Section 342A, stood excluded from pending proceedings.

The respondent further argued that the right to testify in one’s defense, though procedural, touched upon the accused’s substantive protections under Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Therefore, the provision required explicit legislative intent for retrospective operation, which was absent here.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Section 342A CrPC: Allows an accused to appear as a witness on oath, upon written request. This provision was introduced to enhance fairness by giving the accused the right to defend actively while preserving protection against self-incrimination[5].

ii) Section 116 of Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955: Saving clause delineating procedural changes applicable to pending cases and specifying exclusions.

iii) Article 20(3) of Constitution of India: Provides protection against self-incrimination, ensuring no compulsion upon the accused to testify.

iv) Section 282 of Indian Companies Act and Sections 465, 477A of IPC: Formed the basis of charges against the appellant.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Court, speaking through Justice Kapur, decisively held that procedural laws operate retrospectively unless expressly excluded. Since Section 342A was not among the exclusions listed in Section 116, the amendment applied to pending trials.

The Court observed that saving clauses under Section 116 only exempted particular provisions related to inquiry and trial stages that had already commenced. It reasoned that applying the respondent’s interpretation would conflict with the general saving clause that declared the amendment applicable to all pending proceedings not specifically exempted[5].

The Court rejected the High Court’s reliance on the phrase “as if this Act had not been passed” to exclude all amendments, explaining that such reading would nullify the general applicability clause.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court emphasized that no person possesses a vested right in procedural modes. It clarified that “he has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being”[5]. The Court thereby affirmed long-standing jurisprudence favoring retrospective operation of procedural statutes.

c. GUIDELINES 

i) Procedural amendments apply retrospectively unless expressly excluded.

ii) Saving clauses should be interpreted harmoniously, avoiding conflicts between general applicability and specific exclusions.

iii) The phrase “as if this Act had not been passed” refers only to provisions expressly excluded under Section 116(a) to (d).

iv) Courts must avoid interpretations that render certain statutory provisions redundant or inoperative.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving, (1905) AC 369.

ii) Mill Owners Association, Bombay v. The Rashtriya Mill Mazdoor Sangh, (1950) LLJ 1247 (referred later in judgment but part of appended cases).

iii) Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes, p. 225 (treatise relied on for principles of statutory interpretation).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 (pre-amendment version).

ii) Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1955.

iii) Indian Companies Act, Section 282.

iv) Indian Penal Code, Sections 465, 477A.

v) Constitution of India, Article 20(3).