A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

This case elaborates the nuanced jurisprudence on the law of pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, interpreted by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India. The Court analyzed whether a second pre-emptor of equal degree could claim rights after the first pre-emptor obtained a decree, deposited the purchase money, and took possession. The Court held that pre-emption is a weak right and must be exercised before another person with an equal or superior right substitutes the vendee. The doctrines of lis pendens and substitution of rights were explored in depth, clarifying that lis pendens does not apply when a pre-existing, enforceable right is exercised. The judgment reinforced that conditional decrees take effect only upon fulfillment of their terms and detailed the procedural and substantive framework of pre-emption rights in Punjab.

Keywords: Pre-emption, Punjab Pre-emption Act, Substitution, Lis Pendens, Supreme Court of India, Pre-existing Right, Conditional Decree, Vendee Substitution, Priority of Pre-emption, Equal Right Pre-emptors.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Bishan Singh & Others v. Khazan Singh & Another

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 255 of 1954

iii) Judgement Date
20th May 1958

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
S. R. Das C.J., Bhagwati J., S. K. Das J., Subba Rao J.

vi) Author
Justice Subba Rao

vii) Citation
1959 SCR 878

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 – Sections 4, 13, 17, 19, 20, 28

• Doctrine of Lis Pendens under general principles of law.

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)

• Disapproved: Kundan Lal v. Amar Singh, AIR 1927 All 664

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Civil Law, Property Law, Law of Pre-emption, Procedural Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment addresses a pivotal dispute involving competing pre-emptive rights under the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913. It tests whether an earlier decree and subsequent possession by one pre-emptor nullify equal or competing rights of another pre-emptor arising later. The litigation traversed multiple judicial levels: Subordinate Judge, Additional District Judge, Pepsu High Court, and finally, the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The dispute concerns agricultural land measuring 179 kanals and 2 marlas situated in village Wanderjatana. On 26th August 1949, defendants 3 to 7 sold this land to defendants 1 and 2 for ₹37,611. Subsequently, defendants 8 to 11 (appellants) filed Suit No. 231 of 1950 seeking pre-emption under the Punjab Pre-emption Act. The parties entered a compromise on 6th January 1951 whereby the vendees acknowledged receipt of ₹1,700, and defendants 8 to 11 agreed to pay the balance ₹35,911 by 27th April 1951. The compromise was filed in District Court due to pecuniary jurisdictional limits, resulting in a decree on 23rd January 1951.

Before the appellants deposited the balance on 23rd April 1951, respondents (plaintiffs in Suit No. 13 of 1951) filed their pre-emption suit on 15th February 1951 claiming an equal right. The appellants eventually took possession on 17th May 1951 after fulfilling the decree’s terms.

The trial court ruled in favor of the appellants, recognizing their substitution as vendees. The appellate court allowed partial relief to respondents by apportioning ownership, but the High Court ordered remand on certain factual aspects. The matter reached the Supreme Court via special leave.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether an equal pre-emptor can claim rights after the first pre-emptor has obtained a decree and taken possession.

ii. Whether the doctrine of lis pendens applies to such substitution during pending litigation.

iii. Whether Section 28 of Punjab Pre-emption Act restricts separate adjudication of suits.

iv. Whether a conditional decree substitutes the pre-emptor before or after fulfillment of conditions.

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that:

The appellants argued that pre-emption is governed by inherent priority and not equality once substitution occurs. They emphasized that their rights became perfected when they obtained the compromise decree and deposited the purchase money. Referring to the judgment in Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah (1885) ILR 7 All 775, they contended that substitution transforms pre-emption from a right in expectation to an actual proprietary right [5].

They argued that Section 28 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act envisages joinder of suits only when simultaneous suits are pending. Since their decree preceded the respondents’ suit, no joint adjudication was warranted.

Relying on Dhani Nath v. Budhu, 136 P.R. 1894 at p.511, the appellants highlighted that pre-emption involves a two-tiered right: a primary offer right and secondary remedial substitution right, which once executed, extinguishes rival claims [5].

They strongly opposed the application of lis pendens, asserting that their substitution stemmed from an enforceable pre-existing right and not from pendente lite transactions as envisaged under Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566 [5].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondent submitted that:

The respondents asserted that under Section 17 of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, pre-emptors of equal degree are entitled to share the property equally. They contended that the appellants had not perfected substitution before the respondents’ suit was filed. Thus, they retained co-equal rights.

They argued that lis pendens barred the appellants from gaining superior rights during pendency. They relied on Kundan Lal v. Amar Singh, AIR 1927 All 664 to support their position that any transaction during litigation remains subject to final judicial determination [5].

They stressed that Section 28’s procedural mandate necessitates consolidation and proportional apportionment amongst equal claimants regardless of timing, as long as suits arise from the same sale transaction.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913

• Section 4 – Definition of right of pre-emption.

• Section 13 – Joint exercise of right by group members.

• Section 17 – Sharing amongst equally entitled pre-emptors.

• Section 19 & 20 – Notice and procedural compliance.

• Section 28 – Joinder of multiple suits from the same sale.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. Justice Subba Rao, delivering the judgment, ruled that pre-emption is a right of substitution, not ownership ab initio. It allows the pre-emptor to stand in the shoes of the vendee upon fulfillment of decree conditions (Deonandan Prashad Singh v. Ramdhari Chowdhri (1916) LR 44 IA 80) [5].

ii. The Court rejected the respondents’ lis pendens argument, affirming that substitution through a valid decree precludes rival equal pre-emptors, unless they possessed superior rights (Mool Chand v. Ganga Jal (1930) ILR 11 Lah 258) [5].

iii. It distinguished Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566 noting lis pendens applies only to new rights pendente lite, not recognition of pre-existing enforceable rights [5].

iv. The Court disapproved Kundan Lal v. Amar Singh, AIR 1927 All 664 and adopted Punjab’s established precedent emphasizing enforceable subsisting rights as the decisive factor (Mt. Sant Kaur v. Teja Singh ILR [1946] Lah 467) [5].

b. OBITER DICTA 

i. The Court clarified that Section 28 is procedural and does not affect substantive pre-emptive rights if one pre-emptor perfects substitution before another files suit [5].

ii. It emphasized judicial reluctance towards pre-emption rights due to their encroachment upon freedom of property alienation, reiterating pre-emption’s weak legal status [5].

c. GUIDELINES 

• Pre-emption is a right of substitution, not ownership ab initio.

• Substitution requires fulfillment of decree terms, including payment and possession.

• Lis pendens doctrine excludes transactions effectuating pre-existing enforceable rights.

• Section 28 regulates procedure but cannot alter vested substantive rights.

• Subsequent equal degree pre-emptors must demonstrate superior rights after substitution.

J) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Gobind Dayal v. Inayatullah (1885) ILR 7 All 775
ii. Dhani Nath v. Budhu, 136 P.R. 1894 at p.511
iii. Mool Chand v. Ganga Jal (1930) ILR 11 Lah 258
iv. Mt. Sant Kaur v. Teja Singh ILR [1946] Lah 467
v. Mohammad Sadiq v. Ghasi Ram, AIR 1946 Lah 322
vi. Wazir Ali Khan v. Zahir Ahmad Khan, AIR 1949 East Punj 193
vii. Deonandan Prashad Singh v. Ramdhari Chowdhri (1916) LR 44 IA 80
viii. Bellamy v. Sabine (1857) 1 De G & J 566
ix. Kundan Lal v. Amar Singh, AIR 1927 All 664 (disapproved)

b. Important Statutes Referred

i. Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913, Sections 4, 13, 17, 19, 20, 28
ii. Doctrine of Lis Pendens (General Principles of Civil Law)