A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The judgment in Dajisaheb Mane and Others v. Shankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane and Another ([1955] 2 SCR 872) addresses a pivotal constitutional interpretation concerning the maintainability of appeals post the enactment of the Indian Constitution. It explores the contours of Articles 133 and 135 of the Constitution of India, focusing on appeals pending under pre-Constitutional laws and the transitory jurisdictional authority of the Supreme Court vis-à-vis the erstwhile Federal Court. The matter arose from a suit over immovable properties valued over ₹10,000, initially dismissed by the trial court but later allowed by the Bombay High Court in a reversing decree. The legal question centred on whether an appeal, filed before the Supreme Court but certified under pre-Constitution law, remained maintainable after the Constitution commenced. The Supreme Court upheld the appeal’s competence, emphasizing the principle of vested rights of appeal, thereby preventing the extinguishment of such rights solely due to constitutional transitions. The Court interpreted the term “exercisable” under Article 135 expansively to preserve appeals falling under the Federal Court’s jurisdiction. The case also entailed a substantive dispute over property succession, where the Supreme Court overruled the High Court’s misinterpretation of a historical deed and reinstated the trial court’s decree.

Keywords: Article 135 Constitution of India, vested right of appeal, Federal Court, reversing decree, immovable property, Civil Procedure Code, jurisdiction transition.

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
Dajisaheb Mane and Others v. Shankar Rao Vithal Rao Mane and Another

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 92 of 1953

iii) Judgement Date
11 October 1955

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
S.R. Das (Acting C.J.), Vivian Bose, Imam, and Chandrasekhara Aiyar JJ.

vi) Author
Justice Chandrasekhara Aiyar

vii) Citation
[1955] 2 SCR 872

viii) Legal Provisions Involved
Article 133 and Article 135 of the Constitution of India, Section 110 CPC, Order XLV CPC

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None explicitly overruled, but the High Court decision was reversed.

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Constitutional Law, Civil Procedure, Property Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The appeal arose during India’s constitutional transition, amidst the substitution of the Federal Court of India with the Supreme Court post 26 January 1950. The underlying suit related to possession of immovable property valued above ₹10,000, dismissed by the Civil Judge, Sholapur, and reversed by the Bombay High Court on 8 November 1949. The appeal was sought under Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code, invoking jurisdiction available under pre-Constitution law. The High Court issued a certificate of appeal on 1 October 1951. The central question was whether the appeal remained valid under the new constitutional regime and if the jurisdiction formerly held by the Federal Court remained “exercisable” by the Supreme Court under Article 135. The decision required deep scrutiny of constitutional provisions, transitional jurisprudence, and prior legal entitlements under repealed frameworks.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The plaintiffs, Dajisaheb Mane and others, appealed against a High Court decree granting possession of certain immovable properties to Shankar Rao. Originally, the trial court dismissed the claim on 20 December 1946. The High Court overturned this on 8 November 1949. The properties, assessed to be valued over ₹10,000, were once under the Deshmukh Watan system, indicating hereditary office and associated land grants. The dispute centered on succession rights and interpretation of a deed dated 1867 which allegedly transferred the lands in question either as maintenance or absolute ownership. The appellants challenged the High Court’s interpretation and invoked a vested right of appeal to the then Federal Court under Section 110 CPC, seeking refuge under Article 135 post Constitution. The appeal was filed before the Supreme Court, raising constitutional questions alongside the merits of the property claim.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the appeal to the Supreme Court was maintainable under Article 135 of the Constitution of India, despite not fulfilling the threshold of Article 133.

ii) Whether the right of appeal under Section 110 CPC continued post-Constitution due to its vested nature.

iii) Whether the High Court erred in construing the deed of 1867 as conferring conditional and provisional rights rather than absolute ownership.

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Petitioners/Appellants submitted that a vested right of appeal existed under Section 110 CPC prior to the commencement of the Constitution. They argued that the decree of the High Court dated 8 November 1949 was passed when the Federal Court had jurisdiction over such matters. Consequently, Article 135 enabled the Supreme Court to inherit that jurisdiction. They further cited that Order XLV CPC conditions were procedural, and did not negate the substantive right already acquired. The appeal remained competent, given the property value and the reversal by the High Court. C.K. Daphtary, Solicitor-General of India, contended that the interpretation of the word “exercisable” should not be constrained narrowly to pending matters but should include jurisdiction capable of being exercised. The appellants also attacked the High Court’s reading of the 1867 deed, insisting that it granted the Sangam lands absolutely to their ancestor, Krishna Rao, in lieu of his one-third share in the Velapur Mahal properties.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for the Respondents submitted that Article 133 governed the case and the value being under ₹20,000 rendered the appeal incompetent. They claimed that the jurisdiction under Article 135 could be invoked only if the matter was actually pending before the Federal Court when the Constitution came into force. They stressed that Order XLV CPC mandates formal admission of appeal, which had not occurred. Further, the respondents maintained that the 1867 deed merely transferred the property for maintenance purposes, subject to recovery upon acquisition of the Velapur Mahal lands. They supported the High Court’s interpretation that the grant was provisional and did not confer absolute ownership.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Article 133(1) of the Constitution of India – Governs civil appeals to the Supreme Court based on monetary threshold and substantial question of law.

ii) Article 135 of the Constitution of India – Continuance of pre-Constitution jurisdiction exercisable by the Federal Court, unless otherwise provided.

iii) Section 110 of the Civil Procedure Code – Deals with appeals to the Federal Court based on property valuation.

iv) Order XLV CPC – Procedure for appeals to the Federal Court/Supreme Court.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i) The Supreme Court held that Article 133 did not apply, as the appeal pertained to a decree passed prior to the Constitution by a High Court not established under it. Instead, Article 135 governed the appeal, as it preserved the jurisdiction formerly exercisable by the Federal Court. The Court rejected the narrow interpretation that jurisdiction must be pending to be exercisable. It emphasized that the right to appeal vested on the date of the High Court decree, and the constitutional transition could not destroy that right. The Court also clarified that the Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 ensured preservation of such rights. On merits, the Court held that the deed of 1867 clearly transferred absolute ownership of the Sangam lands to Krishna Rao’s branch and that the High Court’s construction of a conditional grant was erroneous.

b. OBITER DICTA 

i) The Court observed that constitutional interpretation must avoid extinguishing existing rights unless absolutely necessary. It highlighted that transitional jurisprudence must aim for legal continuity rather than disruption. It also noted that pending matters and exercisable jurisdiction must be differentiated to avoid undue hardship.

c. GUIDELINES 

• “Exercisable” jurisdiction under Article 135 includes rights capable of being exercised, not merely pending cases.

• Vested rights of appeal cannot be taken away by constitutional transition unless expressly done.

• Interpretation of legal instruments such as deeds must rest on plain terms rather than inferred intentions.

• The Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 preserved accrued rights under Section 110 CPC despite value threshold amendments.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The judgment masterfully reconciles constitutional transience with the doctrine of vested rights. It stands as a beacon for preserving procedural entitlements during structural legal overhauls. The Supreme Court rightly adopted a purposive interpretation of Article 135 to shield accrued legal rights from being arbitrarily annulled. The decision also underscores strict adherence to document language in property disputes. It rebukes judicial conjecture when interpreting unambiguous instruments. This judgment fortifies the jurisprudence on jurisdictional continuity and vested rights. It is a touchstone in cases where procedural rights precede constitutional change, and has influenced numerous later cases on similar jurisdictional questions.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) Gundapuneedi Veeranna v. Gundapuneedi China Venkanna, [1953] ILR Mad 1071.
ii) Privy Council and Federal Court precedents under Government of India Act, 1935 (Not individually cited but used in reasoning).

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Constitution of India, Article 133 and Article 135
ii) Civil Procedure Code, Section 110, Order XLV
iii) Adaptation of Laws Order, 1950 (as amended in 1951)