A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The dispute concerns whether O.S. No. 49/2007 (second suit) for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 26.04.1991 was properly maintainable or whether the plaint ought to have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC as being barred by limitation. The respondent/plaintiff originally filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for the same relief; that plaint was rejected on 12.01.1998 for non-payment of court fees. The respondent thereafter filed O.S. No.49/2007 in 2007 relying on Order VII Rule 13, CPC which preserves the right to present a fresh plaint after rejection.

The defendant/appellant sought rejection of the second plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) on the ground that the suit was time-barred. The trial court and the High Court refused rejection, holding that limitation and extension issues raised mixed questions of fact requiring evidence. The Supreme Court examined whether the second suit fell within Article 113 (residuary three-year period) or Article 54 (specific performance) of the Limitation Act, 1963, and whether the admitted dates in the pleadings made the suit manifestly barred on the face of the plaint.

Concluding that the right to sue for the second suit accrued on 12.01.1998 (date of rejection) and that no timely fresh suit was filed within three years thereafter, the Court held the second suit barred under Article 113 and allowed the appeal by rejecting the plaint. Key doctrinal touchstones analysed include the interplay of Order VII Rules 11 & 13, accrual of “right to sue”, and the narrower application of Article 54 to first suits for specific performance.

Keywords: Specific Performance; Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC; Order VII Rule 13, CPC; Article 54 Limitation Act; Article 113 Limitation Act; accrual of right to sue; rejection of plaint.

B) CASE DETAILS

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case arises out of a sale agreement dated 26.04.1991 for 5.05 acres of a property known as Loch End, Kodaikanal; advance payment of Rs.10,00,000/ was made and balance was due within 27 months. The parties’ long and overlapping litigation history involving tenants, trust-related disputes and election disputes within the vendor trust led to multiple proceedings between 1991–2007. The buyer/plaintiff filed an unnumbered suit for specific performance in 1993; that plaint was rejected by the trial court on 12.01.1998 for failure to pay court fees.

The plaintiff then instituted O.S. No.49/2007 in 2007 relying upon Order VII Rule 13 (which allows a fresh plaint after rejection). The defendant moved to reject the fresh plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) asserting the suit was barred by limitation alternatively arguing res judicata in light of the earlier rejected suit. The trial court and Madras High Court refused to reject the second plaint, treating limitation as a mixed question of fact and law requiring evidence.

The Supreme Court, confronting the admitted chronology in the pleadings, had to decide whether the second suit was manifestly time-barred on the face of the plaint and therefore rejectable under Order VII Rule 11(d).

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The defendant, a charitable/trust body originally vested with the property by a 1975 judicial decree, agreed to sell 5.05 acres to the plaintiff on 26.04.1991 for Rs.3.02 crores, with staged payments culminating within 27 months; plaintiff paid Rs.10 lakhs as advance and received partial possession (nine buildings), while three buildings were occupied by a tenant. Litigation between tenant, impleading parties and trust officials followed: criminal-procedural proceedings, injunction suits, writs, revisions and proceedings in the trust petition (O.P. No.101/1975).

Owing to persistent litigation and alleged obstruction by the trust president, the plaintiff filed an unnumbered suit in 1993 for specific performance; that plaint was later rejected for non-payment of court fee on 12.01.1998. The plaintiff thereafter repeatedly litigated related matters; only in 2007 did it file O.S. No.49/2007 seeking specific performance anew, claiming the defendant had extended the time for performance by a letter dated 15.07.1991 and that pendency of proceedings prevented enforcement earlier.

The defendant moved to reject the plaint on limitation grounds. The trial court (16.09.2010) and High Court (15.03.2022) refused rejection; the Supreme Court granted leave and examined whether the admitted chronology rendered the second suit plainly time-barred.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether O.S. No.49/2007 is barred by limitation and therefore liable to be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC?
ii. Whether a second suit after rejection of an earlier plaint falls within Article 54 or must be governed by Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963?
iii. Whether averments about extension letters and pendency of other litigation, pleaded in the second plaint, can save the suit from summary rejection or require evidence-level enquiry?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

The appellant (vendor/trust) submitted that although Order VII Rule 13 permits a fresh plaint after rejection, the second suit must still be within the prescribed limitation period. The admitted chronology (first suit filed 1993; plaint rejected 12.01.1998) meant the plaintiff’s right to file a fresh suit accrued on 12.01.1998 and any fresh suit should have been filed within three years (i.e., by 12.01.2001). Filing in 2007 some nine years later was therefore inexcusable and indicative of acquiescence; reliance on the alleged extension letter of 15.07.1991 was absent in the earlier suit and inconsistent with the plaintiff’s conduct. The appellant urged that the plaint was manifestly barred on its face and should have been rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d).

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

The respondent (plaintiff) relied on Order VII Rule 13 and averred that Article 54 applied to the suit for specific performance; pendency of multiple litigations (tenant proceedings, trust petitions, elections) and the 15.07.1991 extension letter prevented performance and tolled limitation; thus the limitation question raised mixed issues of fact and law necessitating evidence. The respondent argued the trial court therefore rightly refused summary rejection.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS 

i. Order VII Rule 11(d), CPC — plaint shall be rejected where suit appears from the plaint to be barred by law.
ii. Order VII Rule 13, CPC — rejection of plaint does not of its own force preclude fresh plaint on same cause of action.
iii. Article 54, Limitation Act — period for suits for specific performance (applies to first suits).
iv. Article 113, Limitation Act — residuary three-year period; accrual when “right to sue” accrues.
v. Section 149, CPC (acceptance of court fee deficit — noted).

I) JUDGEMENT

The Supreme Court analysed pleadings holistically. It emphasized that Order VII Rule 11(d) permits rejection where the plaint on its face shows the suit is barred; precedents (e.g., T. Arivandandam, Biswanath Banik) require reading the plaint meaningfully and rejecting only when barring is manifest. The Court then turned to limitation law: the Limitation Act is adjective and prescribes when remedies are available; Article 113 is the residuary omnibus article for suits not covered by specific articles.

The Court held that the second suit could not be governed by Article 54 because it was a fresh suit filed after rejection of a prior plaint; the right to file the fresh suit accrued on the date of rejection (12.01.1998) and therefore Article 113’s three-year period applied. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s attempt to rely on the alleged 15.07.1991 extension: that letter was not pleaded in the earlier 1993 suit and the plaintiff’s conduct (bringing the earlier suit in 1993) was inconsistent with a claim that no cause of action arose then.

Given the admitted dates, the Court concluded that no relevant evidence was required to decide limitation the plaint on its face showed the suit was filed beyond the residuary three-year period (filed 2007) and therefore was plainly barred. Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court and trial court orders, and rejected the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) read with Article 113. Costs were apportioned to parties.

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

When a fresh suit is presented after the rejection of an earlier plaint, Order VII Rule 13 allows presentation but does not alter limitation: the fresh suit’s right to sue accrues upon the event enabling that fresh suit (here the rejection on 12.01.1998), and if not instituted within the residuary period under Article 113 it may be rejected under Order VII Rule 11(d). If dates are admitted in pleadings and show the limitation bar on their face, no factual inquiry is necessary.

b. OBITER DICTA

The Court observed (obiter) that limitation policy balances defendant repose and plaintiff’s remedy; the Limitation Act does not create substantive rights. It reiterated that ordinarily limitation is a mixed question but emphasized exceptions where the plaint itself discloses the bar. The Court noted Section 149 CPC and precedent on court-fee irregularities but held those could not retroactively validate the belated fresh suit.

c. GUIDELINES

1. Read the plaint holistically; reject under Order VII Rule 11(d) only where limitation bar is manifest from pleadings.

2. Rejection under Order VII Rule 11 does not preclude a fresh suit, but the fresh suit must itself satisfy limitation provisions.

3. For second suits after rejection, fall back on Article 113 unless a specific Article (e.g., Article 54) clearly governs.

4. Pleadings should consistently plead any extension or tolled period at the earliest stage; inconsistent conduct may be fatal.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The decision draws a clear line: Order VII Rule 13 confers procedural opportunity but does not enlarge substantive deadlines. Where the chronology is admitted in the plaint and demonstrates that the fresh suit is filed after the residuary period, summary rejection is warranted. Practically, litigants must either pursue a timely fresh suit after a rejected plaint or ensure the factual basis (extension letters, tolling events) is pleaded and relied upon consistently from the first suit; otherwise the Court will treat delay as acquiescence. The judgment sensibly reconciles public-policy aims of limitation with procedural safeguards against premature dismissal: it preserves the rule that limitation is generally a mixed question but confirms that where pleadings themselves disclose the bar, the court must act on Order VII Rule 11(d). The ruling is therefore an important caution for practitioners handling successive suits after procedural rejection.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

1. T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal, (1977) 4 SCC 467.

2. Sopan Sukhdeo Sable v. Assistant Charity Commissioner, (2004) 3 SCC 137.

3. Delhi Wakf Board v. Jagdish Kumar Narang, (1997) 10 SCC 192.

4. Biswanath Banik v. Sulanga Bose, (2022) 7 SCC 731.

5. Mannan Lal v. Mst. Chhotaka Bibi, (1970) 1 SCC 769.

6. Patil Automation Pvt. Ltd. v. Rakheja Engineers Pvt. Ltd., (2022) 10 SCC 1.

b. Important Statutes Referred

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: Order VII Rules 11 & 13; Order IV, V; Section 149.

2. Limitation Act, 1963: Article 54; Article 113.