A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
This analysis examines Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v. Mathew K. Cherian & Anr., [2025] 1 S.C.R. 498 : 2025 INSC 51, decided by a two-judge Bench (Dipankar Datta and Prashant K. Mishra, JJ.) on 09 January 2025. The central question was whether the creation and use of fake or multiple IRCTC user-IDs to procure and supply railway e-tickets by persons who are not railway servants or authorised agents falls within the penal mischief of Section 143 of the Railways Act, 1989. The Court upheld a textual and purposive construction: Section 143(1)(a) proscribes the business of procuring and supplying railway tickets by anyone other than a railway servant or an authorised agent, and the statute does not limit the mode (physical or electronic) by which procurement/supply is effected.
Applying settled canons of statutory interpretation, the Court rejected the Kerala High Court’s view that the pre-internet enactment of the Act rendered Section 143 inapplicable to e-ticketing, and held that the provision is broad enough to cover online procurement and sale. On facts the Court restored criminal proceedings against Mathew (an unauthorised operator alleged to have created hundreds of fraudulent IDs) while quashing proceedings against Ramesh (an authorised agent) because the statute, by its terms, does not penalise authorised agents for alleged contract or regulatory breaches; such breaches are civil or disciplinary.
The decision balances literal reading with purposive application, stresses protection of the ticketing infrastructure from market hoarding and fraud, and circumscribes Section 143’s reach so that authorised agents are not criminalised for misconduct falling outside the statutory description.
Keywords: unauthorized business; procure and supply; railway e-tickets; multiple user-IDs; Statutory interpretation.
B) CASE DETAILS
i) Judgment Cause Title: Inspector, Railway Protection Force, Kottayam v. Mathew K. Cherian & Anr.
ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 4169 of 2024; connected Criminal Appeals Nos. 139–140 of 2025.
iii) Judgment Date: 09 January 2025.
iv) Court: Supreme Court of India.
v) Quorum: Two-Judge Bench (Dipankar Datta and Prashant K. Mishra, JJ.).
vi) Author: Dipankar Datta, J. (leading judgment).
vii) Citation: [2025] 1 S.C.R. 498 : 2025 INSC 51.
viii) Legal Provisions Involved: Section 143, Railways Act, 1989; procedural references to Section 482, CrPC and precedents on quashing.
ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any): None expressly overruled; Kerala High Court’s quashing order reversed as to lead appellant.
x) Related Law Subjects: Criminal law; Statutory interpretation; Administrative/regulatory law; Consumer protection and e-commerce regulation; Railway law.
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The judgment addresses a contemporary regulatory problem: how a statute enacted prior to internet ticketing should apply to e-reservation systems. The Railway Protection Force registered cases alleging organised procurement and distribution of e-tickets through fraudulent IRCTC IDs for commercial gain. Two factual streams were before the Court:
(a) Mathew alleged non-authorised actor, managing director of a finance company, accused of creating hundreds of fake IDs to book and peddle tickets;
(b) Ramesh an authorised railway agent accused of using multiple user-IDs and issuing Tatkal bookings improperly. The Kerala High Court quashed proceedings against Mathew mainly on the ground that Section 143 predated e-ticketing and that online booking by using a user ID in the name of genuine passengers did not amount to unauthorised procurement or sale.
The Madras High Court refused to quash the proceedings against Ramesh, emphasising alleged abuse of authorisation and commercial profiteering. The Supreme Court accepted that the legislative text is the primary guide. Applying principles from Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra and later authorities, the Court rejected the view that the statute is obsolete for online operations; instead, it held that where statutory language is wide enough, subsequent technological developments fall within its ambit.
At the same time, the Court remained attentive to statutory limits: Section 143 criminalises only the business of procuring and supplying by unauthorised persons, not regulatory or contractual transgressions by authorised agents. Consequently, proceedings against Mathew were restored while those against Ramesh were quashed.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
On 11 March 2016 the RPF registered Crime Case No. 524/2016 after receiving information that unauthorised procurement and supply of e-tickets was being carried out from Mathew’s office. A search produced 17 pieces of evidence and the arrest of an employee, who in a confessional statement implicated Mathew as supervising creation of multiple IRCTC user-IDs to procure tickets for resale. It was alleged that Mathew’s enterprise procured tickets in the names of genuine passengers but controlled the booking credentials and extracted service charges. Separately, searches in December 2019 and later led to registration of Crime Nos. 3116/2019 and 600/2020 against Ramesh and his son.
Ramesh ran Big Top Travels, an authorised IRCTC agent; allegations were that he created more than 200 user-IDs, booked Tatkal and other reserved tickets through those IDs, and supplied them at an additional service charge, flouting IRCTC rules that limit bookings per personal ID. The RPF alleged commercial hoarding and touting, and violations of IRCTC conditions. Mathew moved the Kerala High Court under Section 482, CrPC to quash; the High Court accepted the pre-internet enactment argument and quashed the complaint. Ramesh moved the Madras High Court; it refused to quash. Both matters reached the Supreme Court by special leave.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether creating fake/multiple IRCTC user-IDs to procure and supply e-tickets amounts to unauthorised carrying on of the business of procuring and supplying railway tickets under Section 143(1)(a), Railways Act, 1989?
ii. Whether Section 143 — enacted before e-ticketing — covers subsequent technological modes of procurement (i.e., online/e-reservation)?
iii. Whether an authorised agent who allegedly uses multiple IDs and supplies tickets in breach of IRCTC rules can be prosecuted under Section 143 or is restricted to civil/disciplinary remedies?
iv. Whether the High Courts were justified in quashing (Kerala) or refusing to quash (Madras) the criminal proceedings at the threshold stage under Section 482, CrPC?
F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The State (RPF) argued that Section 143 applies irrespective of booking modality and that the enactment’s object is to prevent unauthorised persons from disrupting ticketing integrity. The State relied on IRCTC limits (e.g., ticket caps per user ID) and asserted that the creation of multiple IDs and profiting by reselling tickets undermines public interest and amounts to a social crime. It urged the Court not to permit authorised-status to be used as a façade: where an authorised agent misuses the system to procure tickets through unauthorized channels or IDs, criminal liability should follow. The State maintained that the Kerala High Court’s literalist, pre-internet reading was erroneous and would render Section 143 ineffectual against modern e-ticketing frauds.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
Mathew contended Section 143 must be strictly construed as a penal provision and that the statute did not contemplate e-ticketing; tickets were purchased by genuine passengers via IRCTC and not “sold” by him. He urged that the act of using a computer to book or print tickets is not equivalent to unauthorised procurement or supply. Ramesh argued he was an authorised agent; any alleged misuse of IRCTC credentials or breach of contract/regulatory terms falls within civil/contractual or disciplinary remedies and not under Section 143’s penal mischief. Both respondents relied on the rule that penal statutes be narrowly construed.
H) JUDGEMENT
The Court read Section 143 literally and purposively. It held that the statutory phrase “carries on the business of procuring and supplying tickets” is sufficiently wide to cover modern modes, including e-reservations and online bookings. Precedents (including Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra and Dharani Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India) permit applying a statute to new situations if the language is broad enough. The Kerala High Court’s reasoning that the Act is inapplicable to e-tickets because it predates the internet was rejected as inconsistent with settled interpretive principles. On facts, allegations against Mathew creation of hundreds of IDs and commercial peddling of tickets prima facie satisfied Section 143(1)(a) and therefore the quashing petition failed; criminal proceedings were restored to allow investigation and trial.
Conversely, though serious, the allegations against Ramesh were directed at an authorised agent; Section 143 expressly excludes railway servants and authorised agents. The Court emphasized that penal law cannot be expanded to punish contractual breaches or regulatory non-compliance by authorised agents unless statute so provides; therefore proceedings against Ramesh were quashed and civil/disciplinary remedies left open. The Court reiterated quashing jurisprudence (e.g., R.P. Kapur, Bhajan Lal line) and held that quashing is permissible when no offence is prima facie made out, but not when allegations fall within the statutory phraseology.
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The operative ratio is twofold:
(1) Section 143 criminalises the business of procuring and supplying railway tickets by unauthorised persons; its language embraces procurement/supply by any mode, including electronic; technological developments do not dilute the statutory reach if the words are broad enough.
(2) The statute does not criminalise conduct of authorised agents for breaches of contractual/regulatory duties; such misconduct may attract civil, contractual, or administrative sanctions but not Section 143 prosecution unless the agent’s conduct falls within the statutory description as an unauthorised person.
b. OBITER DICTA
Obiter observations underscore the social magnitude of ticketing fraud and the need to protect the railway ticketing system from hoarding and market capture. The Court noted IRCTC’s technical limits (e.g., per-ID monthly caps) and accepted that rules prohibiting credential sharing/hoarding exist; however, enforcement of those rules against authorised agents requires appropriate forum and proof. The Court also observed that technology-driven services require robust regulatory oversight but courts must remain faithful to statutory text.
c. GUIDELINES
The Court did not lay down elaborate procedural guidelines but signalled:
(i) Investigating agencies must establish the unauthorised nature of the business and intention to trade in tickets for profit;
(ii) Prima facie satisfaction for prosecution under Section 143 requires showing active steps to procure and supply (including creating/controlling IDs), not mere facilitation;
(iii) Proceedings against authorised agents should be carefully filtered contractual/regulatory breaches ordinarily warrant civil/disciplinary remedies unless statutory elements of criminality are present.
I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The judgment achieves an apt statutory balance. It affirms that ancient or pre-internet statutes are not frozen in time when their wording can fairly be read to cover new technological contexts. At the same time, it respects statutory limits by refusing to convert every regulatory or contractual breach by authorised agents into a criminal offence. For prosecutors, the ruling clarifies that the decisive element is unauthorised business evidenced by creation of fraudulent credentials, systemic procurement for resale, and profiteering.
For authorised agents, it provides reassurance that mistakes or contractual breaches will not automatically trigger Section 143, preserving proportionality between regulatory enforcement and criminal law. Practically, the decision will strengthen prosecutions against organised e-ticketing touts and fake-ID operations while directing railways and IRCTC to pursue contractual, civil and disciplinary processes for agent misconduct where criminality under the statute is not made out. The judgment also serves as a timely reminder of interpretive discipline: literal reading combined with purposive insight, not judicial legislation, must resolve modern techno-legal controversies.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
• Senior Electric Inspector v. Laxminarayan Chopra, [1962] SCR 146 : AIR 1962 SC 159.
• Jugalkishore Saraf v. Raw Cotton Co. Ltd., [1955] 1 SCR 1369 : AIR 1955 SC 376.
• Ansal Properties & Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, [2009] 1 SCR 553 : (2009) 3 SCC 553.
• Dharani Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, [2019] 6 SCR 307 : (2019) 5 SCC 480.
• R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, [1960] 3 SCR 311.
• State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, [1982] 3 SCR 121 : (1982) 1 SCC 561.
• State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735.
• Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate, [1997] Supp. 5 SCR 12 : (1998) 5 SCC 749.
• Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, [2012] 7 SCR 988 : (2012) 9 SCC 460.
• Comdel Commodities Ltd. v. Siporex Trade S.A. (No. 2), (1990) 2 All ER 552 (HL).
b. Important Statutes Referred
• Railways Act, 1989, Section 143.
• Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, Section 482.
