NISAR ALI vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

Case Analysis

NISAR ALI vs. THE STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH

April 30, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1957 SC 366, delivered by the Supreme Court of India, forms a critical exposition on several cardinal principles of criminal jurisprudence, particularly concerning the presumption of innocence, the evidentiary value of First Information Reports (FIR), and the application (or rejection) of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. This judgment arose from an appeal against a decision of the Allahabad High Court which had reversed an acquittal granted by the Sessions Court. The case revolved around a charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, for the murder of one Sabir by the appellant Nisar Ali. Initially acquitted by the Sessions Judge, the High Court convicted him, relying heavily on eyewitness testimony while disregarding the alleged involvement of a co-accused. The Supreme Court in its ruling elucidated that FIRs are not substantive evidence and cannot be used against the maker if he becomes an accused. Moreover, the Court critically rejected the High Court’s interpretive errors that bordered on reversing the burden of proof onto the accused. It reaffirmed that the prosecution bears the complete onus of establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This judgment is foundational in defining the contours of fair criminal trial procedures and the importance of evidence credibility.

Keywords: Presumption of Innocence, Section 302 IPC, FIR Evidence, Eyewitness Credibility, Falsus in Uno, Criminal Appeal

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Nisar Ali v. The State of Uttar Pradesh

ii) Case Number: Criminal Appeal No. 150 of 1956

iii) Judgement Date: 14 February 1957

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: Justices B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, and N.H. Bhagwati

vi) Author: Justice J.L. Kapur

vii) Citation: AIR 1957 SC 366, [1957] SCR 657

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

Section 302 IPC (Punishment for murder)
Section 114 IPC (Abetment)
Section 145 & 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872
Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), 1898

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None explicitly overruled.

x) Law Subjects: Criminal Law, Law of Evidence

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

This appeal arose from a criminal case concerning the fatal stabbing of a man named Sabir. The incident occurred on 11 May 1951, and the case subsequently underwent trials and appeals before the Sessions Court of Bareilly, the Allahabad High Court, and finally the Supreme Court of India. The Sessions Court acquitted the accused Nisar Ali and co-accused Qudrat Ullah. However, the State appealed against the acquittal of Nisar Ali alone. The High Court overturned his acquittal, convicted him under Section 302 IPC, and sentenced him to life imprisonment. Nisar Ali challenged this conviction before the Supreme Court by Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

On the evening of 11 May 1951, a quarrel broke out between Nisar Ali and the deceased Sabir near a shop owned by Qudrat Ullah, the co-accused. The dispute escalated when the deceased remarked on Nisar’s disheveled appearance, leading to verbal abuse and a physical altercation. Witnesses stated that during the scuffle, Nisar asked Qudrat Ullah for a knife, which he allegedly provided, and with which Nisar then stabbed Sabir.

Sabir succumbed to his injuries shortly thereafter. Qudrat Ullah reportedly took the deceased to a hospital and then went to the police station to file the FIR. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimonies of three eyewitnesses—Yad Ali, Banne, and Mohammad Ahmed. Qudrat Ullah was not convicted, and the High Court concluded he was wrongly implicated. However, based on the same witnesses’ statements, Nisar Ali was held guilty.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether the High Court erred in reversing the acquittal of Nisar Ali despite contradictions in eyewitness testimonies?

ii. Whether the First Information Report lodged by a co-accused could be treated as substantive evidence?

iii. Whether the principle of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus applied to discredit entire witness testimony?

iv. Whether the High Court incorrectly shifted the burden of proof onto the accused?

F) PETITIONER/APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the Petitioner submitted that the High Court failed to apply the presumption of innocence standard correctly. They contended that the acquittal by the Sessions Court had not been based on errors of law but on sound appreciation of evidence.

ii. They argued that the FIR filed by Qudrat Ullah, being himself a co-accused, could not be treated as substantive evidence under the Indian Evidence Act.

iii. They strongly relied on the doctrine of falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, asserting that since the prosecution witnesses were found to have falsely implicated Qudrat Ullah, their entire testimonies should be discarded.

iv. The defence highlighted inconsistencies in the prosecution’s narrative—particularly in the physical locations, the nature of injuries, and witness conduct—to establish that the case lacked credible evidence against Nisar Ali.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for the Respondent (State of Uttar Pradesh) asserted that the eye-witness testimony was consistent and credible as against Nisar Ali, even if the implication of the co-accused Qudrat Ullah was discarded.

ii. They submitted that the Sessions Judge had incorrectly evaluated the evidence and ignored the overwhelming corroboration from three independent witnesses.

iii. The prosecution maintained that medical evidence supported the version of events—particularly the wound caused by a sharp weapon, consistent with the prosecution story.

iv. It was argued that the conduct of the accused, especially fleeing from the scene, indicated consciousness of guilt.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Section 302 IPC – Punishment for Murder: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/311575/

ii. Section 114 IPC – Abetment: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/287965/

iii. Section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Cross-examination as to previous statements: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1418429/

iv. Section 157 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Corroboration of witness: https://indiankanoon.org/doc/342062/

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Supreme Court held that the First Information Report, having been lodged by Qudrat Ullah, a co-accused, could not be treated as substantive evidence. It could only serve a limited purpose under Sections 145 and 157 of the Evidence Act, i.e., to contradict or corroborate the maker’s statement, but not as proof against another accused [1].

ii. The Court rejected the application of the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, clarifying that Indian courts do not accept it as a rule of law. It is at most a rule of caution and not a basis to reject whole testimonies [2].

iii. The High Court had improperly approached the issue of burden of proof. The remark that an innocent man “must have come out of his house” was criticized as violating the presumption of innocence, a fundamental principle of criminal law [3].

iv. The Supreme Court, however, upheld the conviction on the basis that the High Court rightly assessed the credibility of eyewitnesses with regard to the appellant, even though they were disbelieved in part regarding the co-accused [4].

b. OBITER DICTA

i. The Court emphasized the presumption of innocence as the cornerstone of criminal trials. Any approach suggesting that the accused must explain their presence or absence during the incident inverts the burden of proof and erodes constitutional safeguards.

ii. The Court referred to the British case Woolmington v. DPP [1935] AC 462, reiterating that the burden of proof lies squarely on the prosecution [5].

c. GUIDELINES

FIR by a co-accused cannot be used as evidence against other accused persons.
The doctrine of falsus in uno is not a rule of law in India but only a rule of caution.
Presumption of innocence is fundamental and any commentary suggesting otherwise is legally impermissible.
Courts must examine whether the Sessions Court’s acquittal was perverse or unreasonable before reversing it.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case is a landmark reaffirmation of fundamental principles governing criminal trials in India. It clarified the limited evidentiary role of FIRs, especially when made by a co-accused, and cautioned against any interpretation that threatens the presumption of innocence. Furthermore, by rejecting a blanket application of falsus in uno, the Court urged judicial scrutiny over mechanical rejection of entire testimonies due to partial falsity. The case is a critical reference point in understanding how appellate courts must navigate between flawed acquittals and overzealous reversals.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred i. Woolmington v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1935] AC 462 [5]
ii. Chaubaria Singh v. Bhuneswari Prasad Pal (Unreported, Privy Council) [2]

b. Important Statutes Referred i. Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Sections 302 and 114
ii. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 145 and 157