A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The Supreme Court of India in S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami & Others, [1959] SCR 868 examined whether the acceptance of gratification by candidates who withdrew from contesting elections amounted to corrupt practice under Section 123(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The case arose from the Madras Legislative Assembly elections where certain candidates withdrew after allegedly receiving monetary inducements from the appellant. The respondent challenged the election, alleging corrupt practices. The appellant contended that since these candidates were implicated in corrupt practices, their non-joinder in the election petition contravened Section 82(b) of the Act, necessitating dismissal of the petition under Section 90(3). The Court dissected the statutory language, the legislative history, and prior amendments, ultimately concluding that mere acceptance of gratification does not constitute corrupt practice under Section 123(1). Therefore, non-joinder of such candidates did not invalidate the petition. This judgment clarified the ambit of corrupt practices and procedural requirements under Indian election law.

Keywords: Corrupt practice, Representation of the People Act, bribery, election petition, acceptance of gratification, Supreme Court of India, Section 123(1), Section 82(b), Section 90(3)

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title
S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami and Others

ii) Case Number
Civil Appeal No. 130 of 1958

iii) Judgement Date
May 20, 1959

iv) Court
Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum
Gajendragadkar, A.K. Sarkar, and Subba Rao, JJ.

vi) Author
Justice A.K. Sarkar

vii) Citation
[1959] SCR 868

viii) Legal Provisions Involved

• Representation of the People Act, 1951: Sections 82, 90(3), 123(1), 124(3), 99

• Transfer of Property Act, 1882

ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any)
None

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects
Election Law, Constitutional Law, Civil Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The case germinated during the 1957 elections for the Madras Legislative Assembly, specifically for the Sathankulam constituency. Nine candidates filed nominations, including the appellant S.B. Adityan and respondent S. Kandaswami. Several candidates withdrew, among them M.R. Meganathan and G.E. Muthu. Allegations arose that these withdrawals resulted from monetary inducements provided by the appellant and his election agent. The respondent challenged the appellant’s election under the Representation of the People Act, 1951, alleging corrupt practices under Section 123(1).

The core issue was whether the withdrawal after accepting such gratification amounted to a corrupt practice under the statutory provisions, thereby necessitating their joinder under Section 82(b), failing which the petition stood dismissed under Section 90(3). The Election Tribunal and the Madras High Court both rejected the appellant’s contention, prompting this Supreme Court appeal.

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

During the Sathankulam Assembly election, nine valid nominations were filed. Several candidates withdrew before polling, resulting in only four candidates contesting, among whom the appellant won and was declared elected on March 6, 1957.

On April 15, 1957, S. Kandaswami filed an election petition seeking to void the appellant’s election, alleging corrupt practices. The key allegations were:

1. M.R. Meganathan received ₹10,000 from the appellant and his election agent to withdraw his candidacy.

2. G.E. Muthu accepted ₹5,000 for a similar withdrawal.

However, neither Meganathan nor Muthu were made parties to the election petition.

The appellant argued before the Election Tribunal that non-joinder of these candidates violated Section 82(b) and required dismissal under Section 90(3). The Tribunal rejected this plea, which was upheld by the Madras High Court. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court.

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i) Whether the acceptance of gratification by candidates withdrawing from election constitutes corrupt practice under Section 123(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951.

ii) Whether the failure to join such candidates as respondents to the election petition violates Section 82(b), warranting dismissal under Section 90(3).

F) PETITIONER/ APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Petitioner / Appellant submitted that

The appellant’s counsel, led by A.V. Viswanatha Sastri, argued that the petition violated procedural mandates of Section 82(b) by not including Meganathan and Muthu as respondents, since allegations of corrupt practice had been made against them.

They interpreted Section 123(1) to encompass not just the act of giving but also the acceptance of gratification. They referenced the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, emphasizing that a gift involves both giving and acceptance; thus, acceptance is integral to the act of bribery.

The appellant’s counsel further argued that under Section 99, corrupt practices include acts committed with the consent of any candidate. Therefore, acceptance of bribes to withdraw constituted consent to the corrupt practice.

They highlighted that earlier Section 124(3), before its repeal by Act XXVII of 1956, explicitly criminalized acceptance of bribes, suggesting that its removal should not affect the subsisting broader interpretation of Section 123(1).

The appellant maintained that even though Section 124(3) was repealed, acceptance still falls under the term “gratification” in Section 123(1), making it a continuing offense under the current statutory framework.

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i) The counsels for Respondent submitted that

The respondent’s counsel, led by Solicitor-General G.K. Daphtary, asserted that Section 123(1) criminalizes only the act of giving or offering gratification, not its acceptance.

They argued that the statutory language—”any gift, offer or promise by a candidate or his agent or any other person”—is directed solely towards the giver’s act. The recipient’s acceptance remains outside the purview of the section.

The respondent emphasized the significance of Section 124(3), which was repealed in 1956. Before repeal, this section specifically treated acceptance of bribes as a minor corrupt practice. Its deletion indicated legislative intent to decriminalize mere acceptance.

Further, Section 99 merely outlines the procedural duties of the Tribunal after finding proof of corrupt practice. It does not redefine or expand the scope of what constitutes a corrupt practice under Section 123.

The respondent thus contended that since no corrupt practice was alleged against Meganathan and Muthu, their non-joinder did not violate Section 82(b).

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i) Representation of the People Act, 1951

• Section 82(b) mandates joining all candidates against whom corrupt practices are alleged.

• Section 90(3) prescribes dismissal for non-compliance with Section 82.

• Section 123(1) defines bribery strictly in terms of the act of giving.

• Section 99 details tribunal procedures but does not redefine corrupt practice.

• Section 124(3) (now repealed) formerly criminalized acceptance of bribes.

ii) Transfer of Property Act, 1882

• Defines ‘gift’ as requiring both giving and acceptance.

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

The Supreme Court held that Section 123(1) focuses exclusively on the act of giving or offering gratification, not on its acceptance. Acceptance of gratification, therefore, does not amount to corrupt practice under this section.

The Court further reasoned that:

• The use of “by a candidate or his agent or any other person” clarifies that the emphasis is on the actor making the gift.

• The legislative repeal of Section 124(3) shows clear intent to exclude acceptance as corrupt practice.

• The argument relying on Section 99 misconstrues its role as procedural, not substantive.

• Acceptance cannot, by itself, be termed consent to commission of corrupt practice under Section 99.

Accordingly, non-joinder of Meganathan and Muthu did not violate Section 82(b). Thus, the petition was rightly allowed to proceed despite their absence as parties.

b. OBITER DICTA 

The Court remarked that even though a gift presupposes acceptance, the legislature has consciously criminalized only the act of giving under Section 123(1).

It declined to opine whether acceptance of a gift constitutes consent to a corrupt practice, as it was not necessary for resolving this case.

c. GUIDELINES 

• Section 123(1) does not include acceptance of gratification.

• Allegations against recipients of gratification do not require their joinder under Section 82(b).

• Repeal of Section 124(3) evidences legislative intent to exclude acceptance from corrupt practice definitions.

• Section 99 remains procedural and does not redefine substantive offenses.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Supreme Court’s ruling in S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami & Others has significantly clarified ambiguities surrounding the scope of corrupt practices under Indian election law. The Court’s interpretation adopted a literal approach, respecting legislative intent and statutory text over expansive readings.

The ruling preserves the sanctity of electoral petitions by preventing dismissal on hyper-technical grounds where no corrupt practice by non-party candidates exists. It demonstrates judicial restraint in not extending statutory definitions beyond their expressed terms, upholding the principle of nullum crimen sine lege (no crime without law).

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i) S. B. Adityan v. S. Kandaswami & Others, [1959] SCR 868
ii) Transfer of Property Act, 1882

b. Important Statutes Referred

i) Representation of the People Act, 1951
ii) Transfer of Property Act, 1882