A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE
Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra, Criminal Appeal No. 1718 of 2017, raised whether a Village Police Patil is a “police officer” within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 and whether the High Court rightly reversed a trial acquittal to convict the husband for the murder of his wife. The prosecution relied on four circumstantial strands: an alleged extra-judicial confession to the Village Police Patil, discovery of the alleged murder weapon, motive arising from suspicion of infidelity, and the accused’s exclusive knowledge as husband when the offence occurred within the family home.
The Supreme Court held that a Police Patil under the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967 cannot be equated with a police officer for the purposes of S.25, so an extra-judicial confession to him is admissible; nevertheless admissibility does not dispense with scrutiny of truth, voluntariness and precision of the confession. The Court found the purported confession vague and omnibus, panchas hostile and discovery inadequately proved by the Investigating Officer, and motive alone insufficient. The High Court’s reliance on the confession and invocation of S.106 without foundational facts was held to be erroneous; acquittal was restored.
Keywords: extra-judicial confession, Section 25 Evidence Act, Police Patil, circumstantial evidence, Section 106 Evidence Act.
B) CASE DETAILS
| i) Judgement Cause Title | Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra. |
|---|---|
| ii) Case Number | Criminal Appeal No. 1718 of 2017. |
| iii) Judgement Date | 09 January 2025. |
| iv) Court | Supreme Court of India (Bench of J. J.B. Pardiwala & J. R. Mahadevan). |
| v) Quorum | Division bench of two Judges. |
| vi) Author | Judgment delivered by the Bench (per report). |
| vii) Citation | [2025] 1 S.C.R. 592 : 2025 INSC 93. |
| viii) Legal Provisions Involved | Sections 25, 27, 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872; Sections 302, 201 IPC; CrPC, 1973; Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967. |
| ix) Judgments overruled by the Case (if any) | None; Court followed precedent but declined to apply pre-2009 view that equated Police Patil with police officer. |
| x) Related Law Subjects | Criminal Law; Evidence Law; Procedural Law; Statutory Interpretation. |
C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT
The appeal challenges the High Court’s reversal of a Sessions Court acquittal in a wife-murder case where the prosecution’s case is wholly circumstantial. The deceased, Lata, disappeared and was later found dead at the family home; post-mortem attributed death to asphyxia by strangulation. The Village Police Patil (PW-2) reported the missing person and is said to have discovered the body; he lodged the FIR. The prosecution relies on an alleged extra-judicial confession made by the accused to PW-2, the alleged pointing out and seizure of an iron-rod (weapon) by following the accused’s directions, and motive based on suspected infidelity.
At trial the Sessions Judge excluded the confession as hit by S.25 and disbelieved discovery under S.27 because panchas turned hostile, resulting in acquittal. The State appealed; the Bombay High Court reversed and convicted, relying on post-2009 Full Bench law that a Police Patil is not a police officer under S.25, thereby admitting the confession. The Supreme Court was called upon to test admissibility, voluntariness, precision of the confession, integrity of discovery, the role of motive, and the correctness of invoking S.106 to shift burden to accused.
D) FACTS OF THE CASE
Lata and the appellant were married and had a son. Marital discord allegedly existed due to the husband’s suspicion of his wife’s chastity. On 20-10-1990, her maternal uncle (PW-5) informed Village Police Patil Vasant Bhosale (PW-2) that she was missing. PW-2 visited the accused’s home at about 9:30 p.m. and found the dead body of Lata in a corner of the house; an inquest panchnama and post-mortem followed. Post-mortem concluded death by asphyxia due to strangulation. The prosecution alleged the appellant strangled his wife with an iron-rod which was later seized by the Investigating Officer after the accused allegedly pointed it out.
PW-2 lodged the FIR and the accused was arrested. Panchas who witnessed the discovery panchnama were later hostile at trial; the Investigating Officer merely identified signatures on the panchnama but did not prove the contents in detail. The appellant gave a S.313 statement asserting absence from home on nights and claimed implication due to suspicion. Trial court acquitted; High Court convicted; appeal to Supreme Court followed.
E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED
i. Whether a Village Police Patil is a police officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872?
ii. Whether the extra-judicial confession allegedly made before the Police Patil is admissible and sufficiently precise, voluntary and trustworthy to ground conviction?
iii. Whether the discovery of the alleged weapon proved under Section 27 is established where panchas turned hostile and Investigating Officer merely identified signatures?
iv. Whether motive and special knowledge (occurrence within house) combined with the above circumstances suffice to convict beyond reasonable doubt?
v. Whether Section 106 Evidence Act could be invoked to shift burden on accused absent foundational facts proved by prosecution?
F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS
The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial court correctly excluded the extra-judicial confession under the law prevailing then, contending that evidence of PW-2 was vague and did not reproduce the confession in exact or near-exact words as required. It was urged that discovery panchnama could not be relied upon because panch witnesses turned hostile and the Investigating Officer failed to prove contents in accordance with law. It was argued that motive alone cannot supply proof beyond reasonable doubt and that appellant furnished explanation under S.313 regarding his nocturnal absences, negating exclusive opportunity inference. The cumulative circumstantial chain was contended to be incomplete and insufficient for conviction.
G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS
The State submitted that a Police Patil is not a police officer for S.25 purposes per the 2009 Full Bench of Bombay High Court; thus the extra-judicial confession is admissible. The prosecution relied on the confession content as corroborative, the accused’s pointing out of the iron-rod constituting discovery under S.27, and motive coupled with the incident occurring within the house to invoke S.106 and expect explanation from husband. It contended that cumulative probability and inferences warranted conviction for S.302 and S.201 IPC.
H) JUDGEMENT
The Supreme Court accepted the legal premise that a Police Patil is not a police officer under S.25 in view of the statutory scheme and the Bombay Full Bench (e.g., Rajeshwer S/o Hiraman Mohurle), and therefore proceeded on the footing that the alleged extra-judicial confession was admissible. Yet admissibility was not conclusive; the Court applied established safeguards from precedents such as C.K. Ravindra v. State of Kerala and Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab which require reproduction of exact or nearly exact words and close scrutiny of voluntariness and surrounding circumstances. On examining oral testimony, the Court found the confession omnibus and vague—lacking precise words or narration of fact sufficient to constitute a self-incriminating admission.
The Court emphasized that extra-judicial confessions are inherently weak and need careful corroboration. The discovery evidence fared poorly: panchas were hostile and the Investigating Officer merely identified signatures on panchnama without demonstrating the chain of possession or independent proof; thus S.27 claim could not be safely relied upon. Motive was recognized but treated as a non-decisive adjunct; motive cannot substitute for proof beyond reasonable doubt. Regarding S.106, the Bench held prosecution must first establish foundational facts to fairly invoke the reverse onus; prosecution here did not lay adequate foundation, and the appellant’s failure to give a plausible account could not alone convict. Weighing all circumstances, the Court concluded the High Court erred in convicting; acquittal restored.
a. RATIO DECIDENDI
The decisive ratio is twofold:
(i) a Village Police Patil under the Maharashtra statute is not a police officer for the limited purpose of S.25, so confessions to him are not per se barred;
(ii) admissibility does not ipso facto convert an extra-judicial utterance into reliable proof courts must ensure the confession’s precision, voluntariness and corroboration, and discovery must be proved in strict accordance with law. The prosecution must first establish foundational facts before invoking S.106. These principles governed the acquittal restoration.
b. OBITER DICTA
The Court observed that historical divergence in Bombay High Court jurisprudence (Division Bench vs. Full Bench) illustrates that retrospective application of changed legal positions raises complex issues; the Bench refrained from deciding whether the 2009 Full Bench could be invoked retrospectively to upset a 1993 acquittal. The Court also cautioned against equating statutory powers of auxiliary village functionaries with those of police investigators unless legislative text compels it. Emphasis was placed on the fragility of extra-judicial confessions and on procedural rigour in proving panchnama contents.
c. GUIDELINES
i. Admissibility under S.25 turns on statutory characterisation; absence of station-in-charge powers and independent investigative authority weighs against treating auxiliary village functionaries as police officers.
ii. Extra-judicial confessions must be recorded in precise words or words as nearly as possible; vague omnibus statements are unreliable.
iii. Before relying on S.27 discovery, prosecution must prove panchnama contents through panchas or otherwise validate the chain of custody; mere identification of signatures by I.O. is insufficient.
iv. Motive may be considered but cannot be sole basis for conviction; it requires corroboration by credible incriminating circumstances.
v. S.106 can be invoked only after prosecution establishes foundational facts making the accused’s explanation material; prosecution cannot shortcut this by immediate burden shifting.
I) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS
The judgment restores the acquittal, reaffirming long-standing precepts: the admissibility of evidence is distinct from its probative weight; courts must apply heightened caution to extra-judicial confessions and to discovery proofs that lack independent corroboration. The Court’s analysis draws coherent lines between statutory role, evidentiary safeguards, and burden allocation under S.106. Practically, the case underscores investigative obligations: ensure panchas’ cooperation and robust panchnama procedure; when relying on statements to village functionaries, record exact words and circumstances to withstand scrutiny. For trial courts and prosecutors the ruling is a reminder that circumstantial chains must be complete, and that judicial inclination to rely on motive or familial proximity must be tempered by requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
J) REFERENCES
a. Important Cases Referred
i. Rajeshwer S/o Hiraman Mohurle v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) Crim. L.J. 3816 (Bombay Full Bench).
ii. C.K. Ravindra v. State of Kerala, AIR 2000 SC 369.
iii. Ram Singh v. State of Maharashtra & Anr., (1999) Cri. L.J. 3763 (Bombay Division Bench).
iv. Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) Supp. 4 SCC 259.
b. Important Statutes Referred
i. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (Sections 25, 27, 106).
ii. Indian Penal Code, 1860 (Sections 302, 201).
iii. Criminal Procedure Code, 1973.
iv. Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967.