VIRENDRA vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

Case Analysis

VIRENDRA vs. THE STATE OF PUNJAB AND ANOTHER

May 5, 2025

A) ABSTRACT / HEADNOTE

The case of Virendra v. The State of Punjab and Another, decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in 1957, stands as a landmark judgment on the interpretation of Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 19(1)(g), and 19(6) of the Constitution of India in the context of press freedom vis-à-vis public order. The constitutional validity of Sections 2 and 3 of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 was challenged by the editors, printers, and publishers of two Hindi-Urdu daily newspapers—Pratap and Vir Arjun—who claimed their freedom of expression and right to carry on business had been infringed through prohibitive government notifications. Section 2 empowered the state to restrict publication of content relating to the Save Hindi agitation, while Section 3 barred the entry of publications printed in Delhi into Punjab. The Court upheld Section 2 as a reasonable restriction permissible under Article 19(2) but struck down Section 3 as unreasonable for lacking procedural safeguards. This case balanced individual freedoms with state interest in public order, establishing nuanced jurisprudence on reasonable restrictions and press liberty during communal disturbances.

Keywords: Freedom of Press, Article 19(1)(a), Public Order, Reasonable Restrictions, Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act 1956

B) CASE DETAILS

i) Judgement Cause Title: Virendra v. The State of Punjab and Another

ii) Case Number: Petitions Nos. 95 and 96 of 1957

iii) Judgement Date: 6 September 1957

iv) Court: Supreme Court of India

v) Quorum: S.R. Das (C.J.), Venkatarama Ayyar, B.P. Sinha, J.L. Kapur, A.K. Sarkar, JJ.

vi) Author: Chief Justice S.R. Das

vii) Citation: [1958] SCR 308

viii) Legal Provisions Involved:

Article 19(1)(a), 19(1)(g), 19(2), and 19(6) of the Constitution of India
Sections 2 and 3 of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956

ix) Judgments Overruled by the Case: None explicitly overruled

x) Case is Related to which Law Subjects: Constitutional Law, Media Law, Civil Liberties, Administrative Law

C) INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND OF JUDGEMENT

The judgment arose from the conflict between individual liberties and state control during a period of intense linguistic and communal strife in Punjab. The Save Hindi agitation, led by Hindi Raksha Samiti, confronted the Akali movement, which demanded reorganization of Punjab on linguistic lines favoring Punjabi. This tension deeply polarized communities, prompting the Punjab legislature to enact the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956. This statute empowered state authorities to restrict press content potentially harmful to communal harmony. Newspapers Pratap and Vir Arjun, vocal supporters of the agitation, were targeted via executive orders under the Act, leading to the legal challenge on the grounds of violations of freedom of speech (Article 19(1)(a)) and freedom of trade (Article 19(1)(g)). The case tested the limits of permissible State interference in civil liberties during perceived threats to public order[1].

D) FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners, Virendra and K. Narendra, were editors and publishers of Pratap and Vir Arjun, which operated from both Jullundur (Punjab) and New Delhi. The newspapers actively opposed the regional formula and the Sachar formula, which were seen as accommodating the Akali demands for Punjabi as the official language. The State Government, under Section 2(1)(a) of the impugned Act, prohibited Virendra from publishing any material concerning the “Save Hindi agitation” for a period of two months. Simultaneously, under Section 3(1), the import of New Delhi editions into Punjab was banned.

The notifications targeted alleged “persistent propaganda” by the newspapers which, according to the government, stoked communal sentiments. The petitioners alleged the notifications imposed a total ban, lacked objective safeguards, and infringed Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the Act and the constitutionality of the restrictions imposed[2].

E) LEGAL ISSUES RAISED

i. Whether Sections 2 and 3 of the Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 violated Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g)?

ii. Whether the restrictions imposed were reasonable under Articles 19(2) and 19(6)?

iii. Did Section 3 of the Act impose an unreasonable restriction due to the lack of time limits and opportunity for representation?

iv. Whether the notifications under Section 2 imposed a total prohibition amounting to a constitutional violation?

v. Could the discretion granted under Sections 2 and 3 be deemed unfettered and arbitrary?

F) PETITIONER / APPELLANT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Petitioners submitted that:

The impugned sections violated fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(g). The petitioners argued that the restrictions imposed were not reasonable as per Articles 19(2) and 19(6) because they imposed absolute bans. Under Section 2(1)(a), the prohibition extended to all articles, letters, or reports concerning the Save Hindi agitation, irrespective of content or tone, which extinguished their constitutional freedom to report even neutral or critical perspectives on the agitation[3].

Further, Section 3(1) lacked any procedural safeguards like time limitation or right to representation, thus making the restriction open-ended and disproportionate. The petitioners relied on Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594 and Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1950) SCR 759 to argue that the language of the provisions was too wide, thereby making them unconstitutional[4].

They contended that the State Government wielded excessive discretionary power, which was neither subject to judicial scrutiny nor anchored in objective criteria, thus violating the doctrine laid down in Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1954) SCR 803[5].

G) RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENTS

i. The counsels for Respondents submitted that:

The Punjab Government defended the Act under the exception clause of Articles 19(2) and 19(6), arguing the restrictions were reasonable and necessitated by communal tensions prevalent in Punjab. They highlighted that the object of the Act was to prevent incitement of communal disharmony through incendiary press publications, and this fell squarely within the public order exception under Article 19(2)[6].

Relying on The State of Madras v. V.G. Row, (1952) SCR 597, they argued that the test of reasonableness varies with context, and urgent threats to communal harmony justified stricter controls. They denied any abuse of discretion, stating that the notifications were based on specific instances of communal provocation published by the petitioners. They also emphasized that Section 2 provided safeguards like two-month limitation and right to representation, which made the restriction constitutionally permissible.

H) RELATED LEGAL PROVISIONS

i. Article 19(1)(a) – Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression
ii. Article 19(1)(g) – Right to Practice any Profession or Trade
iii. Article 19(2) – Reasonable Restrictions in the Interest of Public Order
iv. Article 19(6) – Reasonable Restrictions in Public Interest on Trade
v. Punjab Special Powers (Press) Act, 1956 – Sections 2(1)(a), 2(1)(b), and 3(1)
[See full text: Indian Kanoon – Constitution Article 19]

I) JUDGEMENT

a. RATIO DECIDENDI

i. The Court held that Section 2(1)(a) imposed reasonable restrictions as per Article 19(2). It contained procedural checks such as time limits (two months) and the right to representation. Thus, it was held constitutionally valid[7].

ii. The Court ruled Section 3(1) as unconstitutional due to the absence of procedural safeguards, making it an unreasonable restriction under Article 19(6). The lack of time limitation and no provision for representation rendered the section arbitrary and excessive[8].

iii. The Court clarified that a restriction on one subject matter or in one geographical region does not equate to total prohibition. Thus, not all censorship amounts to invalidity, especially if aimed at maintaining public order[9].

b. OBITER DICTA

i. The Supreme Court acknowledged that press freedom is central to democracy, but public order concerns can supersede it in extraordinary circumstances. The expression “in the interest of” in Article 19(2) grants the legislature a wider berth to act against possible threats to communal harmony.

ii. The Court also observed that subjective satisfaction of the executive, especially during crises, cannot be subjected to judicial review unless there is clear mala fide or arbitrariness[10].

c. GUIDELINES

Section 2-type restrictions must:
- Be time-bound (e.g., 2 months).
- Allow representation by the affected party.
- Clearly identify the purpose as public order maintenance.
Section 3-type provisions lacking these checks are prima facie unreasonable.
Press regulations must balance liberty with communal harmony, and laws should be narrowly tailored.

J) CONCLUSION & COMMENTS

The Virendra case remains a critical constitutional precedent balancing individual liberties with the State’s preventive responsibilities. While upholding press freedom, the Court recognized the legitimacy of preventive censorship during periods of unrest. The judgment reflects a contextual judicial approach that adjusts the scope of fundamental rights based on the sociopolitical milieu.

By striking down Section 3 and upholding Section 2, the Court set a normative threshold for when prior restraint becomes unconstitutional. This case serves as a cautionary template for state legislation, ensuring it does not transgress into authoritarian control under the guise of public order. Its nuanced reasoning continues to inform media jurisprudence in India.

K) REFERENCES

a. Important Cases Referred

i. Ramesh Thappar v. State of Madras, (1950) SCR 594
ii. Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1950) SCR 759
iii. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1954) SCR 803
iv. Harishankar Bagla v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1955) I SCR 380
v. The State of Madras v. V.G. Row, (1952) SCR 597
vi. Dr. N.B. Khare v. State of Delhi, (1950) SCR 519
vii. Ramji Lal Modi v. State of U.P., Petition No. 252 of 1956