JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

JASWANT SINGH v. STATE OF PUNJAB

By:- Haseeb Khan

In the Supreme Court of India

NAME OF THE CASEJaswant Singh v. State of Punjab
CITATIONCriminal Appeal No. 1233 of 2021
DATE OF JUDGEMENTOctober 20, 2021
APPELLANTJaswant Singh
RESPONDENTState of Punjab
BENCH/JUDGEJustices Dinesh Maheshwari and Vikram Nath
STATUTES/CONSTITUTION INVOLVEDCriminal Procedure Code, 1973Indian Penal Code, 1860
IMPORTANT SECTIONS/ARTICLESCriminal Procedure Code, 1973, Ss. 482, 173(2), 319.Indian Penal Code, 1860, Section 406/420, 320.

ABSTRACT

In the present case, the complainant, Jaswant Singh, by means of this petition has pleaded for the rescinding of the order dated 6.02.20 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High Courts in CRM-M-32011 of 2018 (O&M)[1] whereby the High Court declined to exercise its powers under Section 482[2] of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, to quash the wrongful proceedings arising out of FIR No. 179 dated 29.10.2009 under Section 406/420[3] of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, Police Station Fatehgarh Sahib, District Fatehgarh Sahib. Still the High Court granted bail to the complainant subject to certain conditions contained in the said order.  

The matter was further investigated and a police report under Section 173(2)[4] of the CrPC was submitted with the finding that a triable case was made out only against Gurmeet Singh, and as against the other two named accused Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh, as there was no evidence of any offence, they were exonerated. The High Court mistakenly did not consider the entire material on record and further did not appreciate the fact that the dispute, if any, was civil in nature and that the complainant had already settled his score with the main accused Gurmeet Singh against whom the proceedings have been closed as far back as 26.09.2014, in the view of the Supreme Court. Thus, no justification remained to continue with the proceedings against the complainant and the FIR No. 179 dated 29.10.2009 and all consequent proceedings were quashed in the capacity of the complainant.

INTRODUCTION

An appeal can be filed before High Court for quashing the FIR and all related proceedings against the indicted. An FIR an be quashed by the High Court if the Court is satisfied that the indicted is falsely incriminated and the FIR is bogus and frivolous.

  1. Section 482[5] of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, enumerates that a High Court has got the power to act in any manner in order to make the two ends of justice match.
  2. Under this section, a High Court has the power to quash an FIR if it thinks that the FIR which has been lodged is a false one and was done with vicious intention to trouble the displeased person.
  3. If any person has been incriminated and indicted of a non-compoundable offence, he can approach a High Court and file a Writ under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution read with Section 482 of CrPC.
  4. The burden of evidence is on the applicant to prove that he FIR has been lodged only for vicious reasons and to trouble the applicant.

Although the Apex Court in its judgment in Madhu Limaye v. the State of Maharashtra[6], has laid down some important principles which modulate the exercise of the powers of Section 482 CrPC by the court:

  1. The exercise of powers under Section 482 CrPC for FIR quashing is not to be resorted to if there’s a specific provision in law to compensate the grievances of the displeased party.
  2. Powers under Section 482 CrPC for quashing should be exercised sparingly and to insure the abuse of process of any court or else to secure ends of justice.
  3. The powers under Section 482 CrPC should not be exercised for quashing against the express bar of the law engrafted in any other provision of the law.

The Supreme Court of India in the cases of Sundar Babu & Ors. vs. State of Tamil Nadu[7] and State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal[8] has issued some important guidelines as to the grounds and conditions for quashing of an FIR under Section 482 CrPC. The said grounds are listed below:

  1. Where the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.
  2. Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
  3. Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
  4. Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.
  5. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.
  6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the law or the concerned Act (under which an unlawful proceeding is introduced) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the law or the concerned Act, furnishing efficient requital for the grievance of the displeased party.
  7. Where a felonious proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is virulently instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking revenge on the indicted and with a view to spite him due to private and particular grudge.

In case of remunerative offences, quashing the FIR is the striking expedient when the fiscal disagreement is settled after the parties come to terms. Parties oftentimes resort to a Concession Deed and go for nullification of FIR if certain serious offences other than remunerative offences are involved. The High Court can, by the virtue of powers conferred under Section 482 CrPC pass an order for quashing on the grounds of agreement keeping in mind the data and circumstances of the case.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Respondent no. 2 Nasib Singh moved an appeal dated 18.08.2009 addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, District Fatehgarh Sahib, stating therein that he was known to one Gurmeet Singh, who was in the business of transferring people abroad. Gurmeet Singh had assured the Complainant that his two familiarity Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh who were settled in Italy, would help his son to get a job and settle in Italy. For the forenamed arrangement, Gurmeet Singh demanded a total sum of Rs. 7 lacs. Further, according to the Plaintiff, Rs. 4 lacs was paid in cash on 10.12.2008 and thereafter Rs. 2 lacs were paid by way of a cheque dated 18.02.2009 of the Punjab National Bank, Branch AS College, Khanna in favor of Gurmeet Singh which sum has formerly been credited in the account of Gurmeet Singh.

Latterly, Sarpreet Singh, son of the Complainant, was put on a flight to Italy on 19.02.2009. Another allegation is that Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh did not honor their pledge and hassled his son. They did not arrange for a job as per their pledge. The documents were lost by them and ultimately his son had to return after three/four months. The complaint further alleges that the named accused farther demanded Rs. 3 lacs and also gestured of dire consequences in case the amount was not paid. It is ergo pleaded that appropriate action be taken and justice be done to the Complainant. The said complaint was inquired into by the ASI Manjit Singh of the Economic offences Wing, Fatehgarh Sahib. In the inquiry, the statements of the Complainant, his son and Gurmeet Singh were recorded.

Additionally, Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh, who were settled abroad and named in the complaint, were also called upon to submit their statements which they have submitted through e-mail. The Inquiry Officer did not find the case so as to make out any offence of cheating or breach of trust and, consequently, recommended that the appeal be consigned by order dated 04.09.2009. The in-charge, Economic Offences Wing, Shri Gurdeep Singh, also examined the material and the attestation on record and concurred with the recommendation made by the ASI on 04.09.2009. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bassi Pathana, Shri Rajwinder Singh also recommended that there is no need of any action on the appeal and the same may be consigned.

Still, the Senior Superintendent of Police Shri Kostav Sharma, directed the Station House Officer to register a FIR and consequently it was registered on 29.10.2009. In the meantime, a statement of the plaintiff Nasib Singh was recorded on 20.05.2010 in which also he undeniably stated that he had paid the sum to Gurmeet Singh, Rs. 4 lacs in cash and Rs. 2 lacs by cheque. Upon examining the police report and the material enclosed with it, the Magistrate First Class at Fatehgarh Sahib took cognizance and registered the Case No CHI/0600029/2010. During the trial the prosecution moved an application on 11.06.2013 purported to be under Section 319 CrPC appealing for summoning the petitioner and the other co-accused Gurpreet Singh to face trial under Section 420 I.P.C. On the same day the Trial Court summoned both the indicted under Section 420 I.P.C.

As the complainant was in Italy, he did not appear and consequently was declared as an established lawbreaker on 28.04.2014. The complainant filed an appeal under Section 482 CrPC before the High Court in September, 2018 for annulment of the order dated 28.04.2014 declaring him as an established lawbreaker. In the meantime, the appellant Nasib Singh negotiated with the main indicted Gurmeet Singh and they conjointly applied before the Trial Court. The Trial Court, vide order dated 26.09.2014 allowed the parties to amicably resolve their issue being of economic import and consequently compounded the offence. Proceedings were debarred against the indicted Gurmeet Singh.

The High Court, vide interim order dated 10.09.2018, stayed the order of the Trial Court dated 28.04.2014 and further directed the complainant to surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks and on his doing so the Trial Court was directed to release him on interim bail subject to its satisfaction. The complainant later appeared before the Trial Court on 27.10.2018 where after the Trial Court admitted him to interim bail on his furnishing bail bonds and surety bonds and in the sum of Rs. 1 lac. In the pending 482 Cr.P.C. plea before the High Court, the complainant filed another appeal registered as CRM No 4655/2020 wherein he appealed for annulment of the proceedings on multiple grounds and in particular that the plaintiff had already earlier his score with the main indicted Gurmeet Singh and on their common request the Trial Court had beforehand acquitted Gurmeet Singh of the offence.

The High Court vide order dated 10.01.2020 permitted to place on record the order granting interim bail and also the order of compounding of the co-accused and any other material which the complainant may wish to file. All the applicable material was filed by the complainant before the High Court by way of an appeal dated 04.02.2020. the High Court, vide the impugned judgment, declined to quash the proceedings on the ground that a perusal of the FIR goes to show that the name of the complainant is specifically mentioned in the FIR and unlawful acts have been attributed to him. Nonetheless, the High Court with respect to the order dated 28.04.2014 declared the complainant to be an established lawbreaker and directed him to surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks and to move an appeal for a regular bail, which was to be decided within two weeks subject to three conditions.

ISSUES RAISED BEFORE THE COURT

  1. Should FIR No. 179 dated 29.10.2009 under Sections 406/420 IPC registered at Police Station Fatehgarh Sahib, District Fatehgarh Sahib be quashed or not?
  2. Whether Section 482 of CrPC is applicable to this case or not?

ARGUMENTS FROM THE APPELLANT SIDE

  1. Shri Lakhwinder Singh Mann, learned counsel for the appellant, argued that there was no evidence of offence against his client, Jaswant Singh, and as per the investigation by the police department, the only triable case could be made out against Gurmeet Singh, under Section 173(2)  of the CrPC. Therefore, Jaswant Singh should be exonerated.
  2. Furthermore, the learned counsel for the appellant stated that since the agreement was done between Nasib Singh and Gurmeet Singh, the fault lies with him entirely that he had failed to bring their deal to a completion. Jaswant Singh was only an acquaintance whom Gurmeet Singh had helped settle abroad in the past, not a party to the agreement. Thus, he prayed for the quashing of the FIR against his client.

ARGUMENTS FROM THE RESPONDENT SIDE

  1. Shri Jaspreet Singh Gogia, learned counsel for the respondent, stated before the Honorable Court that the appellant must be punished under Section 406/420[9] of the IPC, 1860, as he and Gurpreet Singh had failed to see their pledge through and had also misplaced the documents of Sarpreet Singh, son of Nasib Singh, due to which he had to return from Italy after 3 or 4 months.
  2. Futhermore, they hassled Sarpreet Singh and threatened him to pay the amount in full even after they had failed to help him settle abroad, and warned him of dire consequences if he failed to do so.

RELATED PROVISIONS

  1. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    1. Section 173(2). Report of police officer on completion of investigation.
      1. As soon as it is completed, the officer in charge of the police station shall forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government, stating-:[10]

(a) the names of the parties;

(b) the nature of the information;

(c) names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case;

(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if so, by whom;

(e) whether the accused has been arrested;

(f) whether he has been released on his bond and, if so, weather with or without sureties;

(g) whether he has been forwarded in custody under section 170.

  1. The officer shall also communicate, In such manner as may be prescribed by the State Government, the action taken by him, to the person, if any, by whom the information relating to the commission of the offence was first given.
    1. Section 319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence.[11]

(1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed.

(2) Where such person is not attending the Court, he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid.

(3) Any person attending the Court, although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed.

(4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub- section (1), then-:

(a) the proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced a fresh, and the witnesses re- heard;

(b) subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced.

      c.    Section 482. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.[12]

Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.

  • Indian Penal Code, 1860.
    • Section 320. Grievous hurt.—The following kinds of hurt only are desig­nated as “grievous”:[13]
      • Emasculation.
      • Permanent privation of the sight of either eye.
      • Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear,
      • Privation of any member or joint.
      • Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint.
      • Permanent disfiguration of the head or face.
      • Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth.
      • Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.
    • Section 406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.[14]

Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.

  • Section 420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of property.[15]

Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly induces the person de­ceived to deliver any property to any person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years, and shall also be liable to fine.

JUDGEMENT

In the Honorable Court’s view, the present case was amongst those fittest cases where the High Court ought to have exercised its powers under Section 482 CrPC and ought to have secured the ends of justice by closing the proceedings against the plaintiffs. The learned judges noted that it was also surprising as to how and in what circumstances after moving an appeal under Section 319 CrPC, the prosecution continued to challenge the case even after 26.09.2014 when the matter had previously been compromised and compounded as against the main indicted Gurmeet Singh. Evidently, the parties were unable to properly place the facts and material before the Trial Court or the High Court, which could have closed this matter without advancing any farther. The power under Section 482 CrPC is to be exercised to avert the abuse of process of any Court and also to secure the ends of justice. The Supreme Court, time and again, has laid emphasis that essential powers should be exercised in a given and meritorious case where the Court is satisfied that exercise of similar power would either avert abuse of similar power or such like exercise would result in securing the ends of justice. A paragraph from the case of S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar[16], was quoted which reads as:

“…whereas while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC the High Court has to look at the object and purpose for which such power is conferred on it under the said provision. Exercise of inherent power is available to the High Court to give effect to any order under CrPC, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the judicial forum of court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique motive. When a person approaches the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for which they are conferred.”

Another case, P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka[17] was also cited by the Honorable Supreme Court, which also laid down the same principles for use of the power under Section 482 CrPC in a case where the Court was convinced that such exercise was necessary for whatever reason in order to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. The relevant provisions read as follows:

“… In appropriate cases, inherent power of the High Court, under Section 482 can be invoked to make such orders, as may be necessary, to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal Procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise, to secure the ends of justice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and consciously exercised, can take care of almost all the situations where interference by the High Court becomes necessary on account of delay in proceedings or for any other reason amounting to oppression or harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings. In appropriate cases, the High courts have exercised their jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the FIR and investigation, and terminating criminal proceedings if the case of abuse of process of law was clearly made out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a case being made out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the Constitution.”

From the above discussion on the settled legal principles, it was made clear by the Honorable Court that from the facts of the present case there was a clear abuse of the process of the Court and further that the Court had a duty to secure the ends of justice. The allegations made in the FIR had an overwhelmingly a Civil flavor in as much as the complainant alleged that he had paid money to Gurmeet Singh, the main indicted to get employment for his son abroad. If Gurmeet Singh failed the plaintiff could have filed a suit for recovery of the sum paid for not fulfilling the pledge. At first, the investigating officer and two superior officers of the Economic Wing had set up that there is no substance in the complaint making out a prima facie triable case and had thus, recommended for cessation. Yet, on the orders of the Senior Superintendent of Police, the FIR was registered and the matter was probed. No criminal breach of trust was instituted and the charge sheet was submitted only against Gurmeet Singh under section 420 I.P.C.

The plaintiff Nasib Singh had undeniably deposed that he had paid Rs. 4 lacs cash to Gurmeet Singh and had also given a cheque of Rs. 2 lacs favouring Gurmeet Singh which he had encashed. During trial the present complainant as well as the other co-accused Gurpreet Singh were summoned in April 2014 invoking powers of Section 319 CrPC, for being tried under Section 420 I.P.C. It may be noted that no specific allegations of cheating are made against these two indicted as they were both settled abroad in Italy. The complainant Nasib Singh entered into a compromise with the main accused Gurmeet Singh which was filed before the learned Magistrate and the same was accepted vide order dated 26.09.2014 and the alleged offence being of financial transaction stood compounded. Proceedings against Gurmeet Singh were closed. Right from 2014, the present complainant and other co-accused Gurpreet Singh who were in Italy were being summoned by the Court.

The complainant applied before the High Court challenging the order declaring him an established lawbreaker and also filed a 482 CrPC appeal for voiding of the proceedings wherein he also filed the compounding order of 26.09.2014. The High Court simply read the FIR and noting the fact that the name of the complainant was mentioned in the FIR, declined to exercise the essential power under Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court noted that the High Court had made an error and had failed to honor the entire material on record and further did not appreciate that the disagreement was civil in nature and the plaintiff had formerly settled his score with the main indicted, therefore, there was no need to continue with the proceedings against the plaintiff.

CONCLUSION

While there are cases where Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code is befitting and applicable, there are also cases where it is not applicable. In recent days, it is seen that numerous similar cases which have been quashed from the High Court are set for a Special Leave Appeal at the Supreme Court and the same is allowed by setting aside the impugned order. In forming an opinion whether a proceeding or complaint should be quashed in exercise of its governance under Section 482, the High Court must estimate whether the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the essential power. The decision as to whether a complaint or First Information Report should be quashed on the ground that the lawbreaker and victim have settled the disagreement, revolves on the facts and circumstances of each case and no total elaboration of principles can be formulated. As distinguished from serious offences, there may be cases which have a predominant element of a civil disagreement. They stand on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the essential power to quash is concerned. It is constantly observed that while deciding matters under section 482 of the CrPC, the High Court chooses to conduct mini-trials. In the judgment by Honorable Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Chandrachud and Honorable Justice M.R. Shah in the case of Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors.[18] On the 13th of August, 2021, it was observed that there should no way be authorization of any appreciation of substantiation at the very stage of proceedings in exercise of powers under section 482 of CrPC. Hence, it is necessary to sparingly use such an essential power given to the High Court by the Indian Constitution and the said power should only be exercised in the interests of meeting the fair ends of justice, as well as to put a halt to the abuse of the process of the Court.

[1] Atama Singh v. State of Punjab, CRM-M-32011-2020(O&M).

[2] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 482, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).

[3] Indian Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 406 and 420, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[4] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 173(2), No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).

[5] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 482, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).

[6] Madhu Limaye vs The State Of Maharashtra, 1978 AIR 47, 1978 SCR (1) 749.

[7] Sundar Babu & Ors. Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, Criminal Appeal No. 773 of 2003.

[8] State of Haryana vs Bhajan Lal, 1992 AIR 604, 1990 SCR Supl. (3) 259.

[9] Indian Penal Code, 1860, Ss. 406 and 420, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[10] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 173(2), No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).

[11] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 319, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).

[12] Criminal Procedure Code, 1973, S. 482, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India).

[13] Indian Penal Code, 1860, S. 320, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[14] Indian Penal Code, 1860, S. 406, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[15] Indian Penal Code, 1860, S. 420, No. 45, Acts of Parliament, 1860 (India).

[16]  S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, 2001 ( 4 ) Suppl. SCR 397.

[17]  P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, Criminal Appeal 535 of 2000.

[18] Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors., Criminal Appeal No. 787 of 2021.

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