Quashing of FIR and Complaint under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973

Section 482 and Quashing Power of the High Courts

Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (CrPC) confers inherent powers on the High Courts to make orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice[1]. This provision preserves the inherent powers of the High Courts to prevent the abuse of the process of law and to further the ends of justice[2]. The High Courts are empowered to quash criminal proceedings where the continuance of such proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of court. Section 482 of the Criminal Prcoedure Code, 1973, inter alia, confers this quashing power on the High Courts. Over the years, the Supreme Court has delineated the scope and ambit of the High Court’s powers under Section 482 CrPC through several landmark judgments. This paper examines the key principles laid down by the apex court regarding the exercise of power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC.

Exercise of Quashing Power to be Rare and in Exceptional Circumstances

The Supreme Court has consistently held that the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC should be exercised sparingly, with caution and only in rare or exceptional cases[3]. In Habib Abdullah Jeelani v. State of Telangana[4], the apex court observed that the power under Section 482 CrPC is not to be used in a routine manner as it does not confer arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to its whims or caprice. The court cautioned that this power should be used cautiously and strictly as per established parameters.

In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal[5], the Supreme Court held that criminal proceedings instituted against an accused person must ordinarily be tried for the offence as per CrPC provisions. The inherent power does not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to its whims or caprice[6]. The court set out the illustrative guidelines for exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC, which has come to be known as the ‘Bhajan Lal’ guidelines. As per these guidelines, the High Court can quash FIR/criminal proceedings if the allegations made do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused[7].

The apex court subsequently clarified in several cases that the categories enumerated under Bhajan Lal are illustrative and not exhaustive. The High Court can exercise inherent power if it is convinced that the criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process of law[8]. However, such power has to be exercised sparingly and in rarest of rare cases[9]. The court cannot examine the merits or demerits of the charge at the initial stage[10].

Parameters for Exercise of Quashing Power

Over the years, the Supreme Court has laid down several tests and parameters to be considered by the High Court while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC:

1. The High Court must record cogent reasons before exercising the power[11].
2. The power cannot be exercised on the basis of a mixed question of law and fact[12].
3. The complainant’s right to pursue legal remedies cannot be foreclosed at the threshold unless the complaint is bereft of any triable material[13].
4. The power can be exercised where the allegations made do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused[14].
5. The High Court cannot usurp the jurisdiction of the trial court by examining the sufficiency or inadequacy of evidence[15].
6. The power should be exercised to prevent abuse of the process of court and to secure the ends of justice[16].
7. The power can be exercised where it is evident that the criminal proceedings amount to an abuse of process or interfere with the course of justice[17].
8. The power can also be exercised where the allegations are absurd, fanciful and inherently improbable[18].
9. The power cannot be exercised on the basis of a factual dispute requiring examination of evidence on record[19].
10. Exercise of power would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case[20].

Tests Formulated by Supreme Court for Quashing

In addition to the above parameters, the Supreme Court has also framed tests to ascertain whether a case warrants the exercise of power under Section 482 CrPC. In the case of State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy[21], the court held that at the stage of quashing, the High Court can go through the FIR/complaint to hold whether the allegations made disclose the commission of a cognizable offence. If the allegations do not attract essential ingredients of the alleged offence, the FIR/complaint can be quashed.

Subsequently, in the Rajiv Thapar[22] decision, the court framed the following guideline:

1. Whether the material relied upon by the accused is sound, reasonable and indubitable?
2. Whether the material advanced is such as would lead a prudent man to condemn the material as false?
3. Whether the contradiction in the prosecutor’s version is such as would destroy its credibility?
4. Does the continuance of proceedings result in abuse of process or miscarriage of justice?

If the above questions are affirmatively answered, the High Court can quash the FIR/criminal case under Section 482 CrPC. The Supreme Court has affirmed these guidelines in several subsequent decisions[23].

Landmark Cases on Scope of Quashing Power under Section 482 CrPC

Over the decades, the Supreme Court has expansively interpreted the scope and ambit of the High Court’s power under Section 482 CrPC through several leading cases:

1. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh[24], the apex court held that Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. It does not confer new powers but only recognises and preserves powers already existing in the High Court.
2. In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre[25], the Supreme Court observed that the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quash proceedings to secure the ends of justice or to prevent the abuse of the process of any court.
3. In Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Saraful Haque[26], the court held that the High Court should be extremely cautious and circumspect in exercising its power under Section 482 CrPC for quashing a criminal proceeding. Such power should be exercised in very exceptional circumstances.
4. In Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor[27], the Supreme Court framed the aforementioned guidelines to be considered before quashing an FIR under Section 482 CrPC.
5. In P.V. Ramana Reddy v. Union of India[28], the apex court quashed criminal defamation proceedings under Section 482 as the trial would be abuse of process in the facts of the case.
6. In Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra[29], the Supreme Court reiterated the guidelines in Bhajan Lal case and quashed the FIR under Article 226 read with Section 482 CrPC.
7. In Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi)[30], the court reiterated that power under Section 482 CrPC has to be exercised in rare cases with circumspection considering the facts of the case.

The Supreme Court has thus expounded and evolved jurisprudential principles for exercise of power to quash criminal proceedings under Section 482 CrPC. The High Court can exercise this power with caution and circumspection to prevent abuse of process and further the cause of justice. However, such power has to be sparingly used based on the facts and circumstances of each case.

Conclusion

The CrPC confers wide powers on the High Court under Section 482 to quash FIRs and criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process and further the ends of justice. However, such power is not unbridled and has to be exercised sparingly and cautiously[31]. The Supreme Court has laid down several guidelines and tests to streamline the exercise of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC. The apex court has balanced the rights of the accused as well as the complainant in interpreting the scope and ambit of Section 482 powers. While laying emphasis on sparing exercise of power, the court has also expanded its scope by laying down progressive guidelines from time to time. In conclusion, the apex court’s jurisprudence on Section 482 CrPC reflects the delicate balance required to be maintained between protecting the rights of accused persons and preserving the complainant’s right to legal recourse in appropriate cases.

Endnotes:

[1]. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, No. 2, Acts of Parliament, 1974 (India), s. 482.

[2]. State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471.

[3]. Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 451.

[4]. State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779.

[5]. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335.

[6]. Supra note 4.

[7]. Supra note 5.

[8]. Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259.

[9]. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. v. State of Haryana, (1996) 5 SCC 665.

[10]. Supra note 4.

[11]. Supra note 5.

[12]. State of Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla, (1996) 8 SCC 164.

[13]. Supra note 4.

[14]. Supra note 5.

[15]. Supra note 4.

[16]. Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana, (1977) 4 SCC 451.

[17]. Supra note 5.

[18]. Shatrughna Babarao Meshram v. State of Maharashtra, (2022) 3 SCC 767.

[19]. Supra note 12.

[20]. Supra note 4.

[21]. State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522.

[22]. Rajiv Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330.

[23]. Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1.

[24]. State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, (1980) 2 SCC 471.

[25]. Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692.

[26]. Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Saraful Haque, (2005) 1 SCC 122.

[27]. Supra note 22.

[28]. P.V. Ramana Reddy v. Union of India, (2018) 17 SCC 695.

[29]. Arnab Manoranjan Goswami v. State of Maharashtra, (2020) 12 SCC 1.

[30]. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 5 SCC 1.

[31]. Supra note 4.